Roland Tumasov v. Doe 1, et al.
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Andrew G. Schopler (author)
Analysis
Petitioner Roland Tumasov filed a habeas petition seeking release from immigration detention and a motion for a preliminary injunction. The court denied the habeas petition because the petitioner is within the 90-day mandatory detention period following the administrative finality of his removal order, and denied the preliminary injunction motion as moot.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Habeas petition denied“Thus, Tumasov’s habeas petition is DENIED.” | agree with court The court correctly applied 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) and Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523 (2021). The statute mandates detention for 90 days after a removal order becomes administratively final. The order recites that the order became final in October 2025 and the decision was issued in November 2025, placing the petitioner within the mandatory detention window. The court correctly distinguished pre-removal custody from the statutory 90-day period. |
Preliminary injunction motion denied as moot“The preliminary-injunction motion is DENIED as moot.” | agree with court Because the underlying habeas petition was denied on the merits (the detention is currently lawful and mandatory), the request for preliminary injunctive relief to stop the detention is moot. This is a standard procedural consequence of the merits ruling. |
The order itself: sound — The order is concise but legally sound. It correctly identifies the controlling statute (8 U.S.C. § 1231) and the controlling Supreme Court precedent (Johnson v. Guzman Chavez) regarding the start of the mandatory detention period. It addresses the petitioner's equities (withholding of removal and length of prior custody) and explains why they do not override the statutory mandate for the current 90-day window. The reasoning directly answers the motion with the appropriate authorities.
Opinion
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Roland TUMASOV, Case No.: 25-cv-2704-AGS-JLB 4 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING HABEAS PETITION (ECF 1) AND 5 v. PRELIMINARY-INJUNCTION 6 DOE 1, et al., MOTION (ECF 2) Respondents. 7 8 9 Petitioner Roland Tumasov seeks a writ of habeas corpus releasing him from 10 immigration detention. But he doesn’t qualify for release, so his petition must be denied. 11 On September 26, 2025, Tumasov was ordered removed from the United States. 12 (ECF 1-7, at 1.) In October, that removal order became administratively final, which 13 triggered what is known as the “removal period”—“a period of 90 days” during which the 14 government “shall detain the alien” while seeking his removal. See 8 U.S.C. 15 § 1231(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added); see also Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 16 533–34 (2021) (“As relevant here, the removal period begins when an alien is ‘ordered 17 removed,’ and the removal order becomes ‘administratively final.’” (discussing 8 U.S.C. 18 § 1231(a)(1)(B))). 19 Tumasov’s removal period only began last month, so he is still in the 90-day window 20 of statutorily mandated detention. In other words, his detention is not merely legal, but 21 required. This is so despite two significant equities in his favor. First, an immigration judge 22 granted Tumasov withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3) of the Immigration and 23 Nationality Act, meaning he cannot be deported to his home country due to threats to his 24 safety. (See ECF 1-7, at 1; 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A).) Yet the government may still pursue 25 removal to a different country during the removal period. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(E). 26 Second, Tumasov has been in immigration custody for over a year. But the detention statute 27 at issue here—8 U.S.C. § 1231—only concerns the custodial time after his removal order 28 was finalized last month. See Johnson, 594 U.S. at 533–34 (discussing the interplay 1 ||{between § 1231 and a pre-removal-order detention statute). Any pre-removal-order 2 ||custody does not count toward the 90-day removal period, which “beg[an]” once 3 ||Tumasov’s removal order was “administratively final,” Johnson, 594 U.S. at 533, and 4 during which the government “shall detain” him, see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). 5 Thus, Tumasov’s habeas petition is DENIED. The preliminary-injunction motion is 6 || DENIED as moot. 7 8 Dated: November 13, 2025 10 Hon. Andrew G. Schopler United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28