Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Julia TERYAEVA-REED, Case No.: 25-cv-2219-AGS-JLB 4 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 5 v. ORDER (ECF 12), DENYING 6 Christopher LAROSE, MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL (ECF 11), RESETTING HEARING, 7 Respondent. AND DENYING RESPONDENTS’ 8 REQUEST TO VACATE HEARING (ECF 19) AS MOOT 9 10 The habeas petitioner here, who is in immigration detention, seeks a temporary 11 restraining order and an order appointing counsel. Both requests are denied. 12 BACKGROUND 13 Petitioner Julia Teryaeva-Reed was a lawful permanent resident who was “convicted 14 of wire fraud and arson charges” and “sentenced to” “162 months of imprisonment.” 15 (ECF 1, at 11.) She was released directly to ICE custody on “March 18th, 2025.” (Id.) “On 16 April 21st, 2025,” Teryaeva-Reed received a final “order of removal” to her “country of 17 origin, Ukraine,” and “waived her right to appeal.” (Id. at 12.) To date, ICE has not 18 successfully removed her. So Teryaeva-Reed sought her court-ordered release by applying 19 for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (See generally id.) Since the filing of 20 her habeas petition, ICE has “obtained a travel document” for her and “intends to remove” 21 her “to Ukraine no later than November 24, 2025.” (ECF 16, at 2.) 22 DISCUSSION 23 Teryaeva-Reed moves for emergency injunctive relief and for appointed counsel. 24 A. Motion for Temporary Restraining Order 25 A temporary restraining order, like all injunctive relief, is “an extraordinary remedy 26 that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” 27 Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). Teryaeva-Reed must 28 1 clearly demonstrate that: (1) she “is likely to succeed on the merits”; (2) she “is likely to 2 suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief”; (3) “the balance of equities 3 tips in [her] favor”; and (4) “an injunction is in the public interest.” See id. at 20; see also 4 Synopsys, Inc. v. AzurEngine Techs., 401 F. Supp. 3d 1068, 1072 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (“The 5 standard for obtaining a temporary restraining order is identical to the standard for 6 obtaining a preliminary injunction, with the primary difference being [timing].”). But 7 Teryaeva-Reed cannot show the “most important” factor—likelihood of success—which 8 dooms her request. See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015). “Because 9 it is a threshold inquiry, when a plaintiff has failed to show the likelihood of success on the 10 merits, we need not consider the remaining three Winter elements.” Id. (cleaned up). 11 Teryaeva-Reed argues that her release is required under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 and the 12 Supreme Court’s opinion in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). (See ECF 1, 13 at 14–15.) She reasons that she must be released because: the 90-day mandatory-detention 14 “removal period” of § 1231(a) expired in July; “there is no likelihood of her removal in the 15 reasonably foreseeable future due to war in Ukraine”; and “there is no statutory authority 16 or Executive Order authorizing her further detention.” (Id. at 16.) 17 But she misunderstands both the statutory context of her confinement and 18 Zadvydas’s import. Once a final order of removal has been issued, the “Attorney General 19 shall remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days (in this section 20 referred to as the ‘removal period’).” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A), (B)(i). “During the removal 21 period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.” Id. § 1231(a)(2)(A). But there is 22 another provision, the so-called “post-removal-period detention statute,” that permits 23 certain individuals to “‘be detained beyond the removal period.’” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 24 at 688–89 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)). Notably, that other statute covers people, like 25 Teryaeva-Reed, who have been found removable on account of criminal convictions, as 26 set out in section “1227(a)(2).” See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6); (ECF 5-1, at 2 (petitioner was 27 charged as being removable “under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)”)). So, contrary to 28 1 Teryaeva-Reed’s arguments, her continued detention past the initial 90-day removal period 2 is statutorily authorized. 3 But the Zadvydas Court recognized that the post-removal-period detention statute 4 didn’t include a limit on that authority and that interpreting it “to authorize indefinite, 5 perhaps permanent, detention” would create a “serious constitutional threat.” 533 U.S. 6 at 699. To avoid such constitutional perils, the Court held that, after a “6-month period” of 7 presumptively reasonable detention, “once an alien provides good reason to believe that 8 there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the 9 Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id. at 701. “And 10 for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior postremoval confinement grows, 11 what counts as the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’ conversely would have to shrink.” Id. 12 Yet “[t]his 6-month presumption, of course, does not mean that every alien not removed 13 must be released after six months. To the contrary, an alien may be held in confinement 14 until it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the 15 reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. 16 In the light most favorable to Teryaeva-Reed, she has now been in immigration 17 custody slightly longer than Zadvydas’s presumptively reasonable limit of six months. (See 18 ECF 1, at 12 (alleging her “order of removal became final” on “April 21st, 2025”).) But 19 the record makes clear that there is, in fact, a significant likelihood of removal in the 20 reasonably foreseeable future. After all, ICE now has a travel document and an intended 21 removal date for her later this month. (See ECF 14.) It’s possible something might go awry 22 with those plans that derail her removal. Or ICE may have been inaccurate or incomplete 23 in its reporting to the Court. But the facts, as they currently stand, establish a significant 24 likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. See Kazakov v. ICE Field Off. 25 Dir., No. 2:24-cv-00774-RSL-TLF, 2024 WL 4268074, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 5, 2024) 26 (denying a habeas corpus petition entirely, despite petitioner’s argument “that procurement 27 of his travel document” was “problematic,” because it remained “reasonably foreseeable” 28 that he would be removed), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:24-cv-00774-RSL- 1 TLF, 2024 WL 4266668 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 23, 2024). Without more, the Court cannot 2 grant the extraordinary remedy of injunctive relief. 3 B. Motion for Appointed Counsel 4 Next, Teryaeva-Reed requests “an order appointing counsel as required under 5 Rule 23(g) for class certification and authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1).” (ECF 11, 6 at 1.) But Rule 23(g) is only applicable to class-action complaints. The habeas petition in 7 this case does not include any class allegations. (See generally ECF 1.) Nor could it. As a 8 pro se litigant, Teryaeva-Reed “may not serve as the representative of a class in a class 9 action lawsuit under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.” Khalid v. Microsoft Corp., 409 F. Supp. 3d 1023, 10 1031 (W.D. Wash. 2019); accord Ignacio v. Dudek, No. 23-2872, 2025 WL 878981, at *1 11 (9th Cir. Mar. 21, 2025) (“The district court properly denied Ignacio’s request to bring a 12 class action because, as a pro se litigant, Ignacio has no authority to represent anyone other 13 than himself.”). 14 That leaves her request under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), which grants the court the 15 authority to “request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.” But that 16 provision, which is in the code section authorizing in forma pauperis proceedings, is not 17 applicable either. First, Teryaeva-Reed is not proceeding IFP. Second, and more 18 importantly, she has not even attempted to satisfy that statute’s requirement that she 19 demonstrate she is “unable to afford counsel.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). 20 Still, the Court has authority under a different provision to appoint an attorney for 21 an “impoverished habeas petitioner” when “the interests of justice so require.” See Bashor 22 v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 1984) (cleaned up); see also 18 U.S.C. 23 § 3006A(a)(2)(B). Once a threshold showing of “financial eligibility” is made, courts 24 exercise this authority based on a petitioner’s (a) “likelihood of success on the merits” and 25 (b) “ability . . . to articulate [her] claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues 26 involved.” Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986). 27 Again, with no showing of indigency, Teryaeva-Reed hasn’t gotten off the starting 28 blocks. But the rest of the analysis is grim, too. As already set out above, she has not shown 1 || a likelihood of success. So even if she financially qualified, this case does not yet warrant 2 appointment of counsel. 3 CONCLUSION 4 The motions for a temporary restraining order and for appointed counsel are 5 || DENIED. Based on the Court’s schedule, the upcoming hearing is reset to December 2, 6 || 2025, at 1:00 p.m. Respondents’ counsel must coordinate with petitioner, her custodians, 7 this Court’s courtroom deputy to permit petitioner to participate at that hearing by 8 || videoconference, or if videoconferencing is unavailable, by telephone. Respondents’ 9 || motion to vacate the previously scheduled November hearing date is DENIED as moot. 10 ||Dated: November 13, 2025 _Af— 12 Hon. rew G. Schopler United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28