Raymonda Singleton v. Justice System; Employment Development Department, et al.
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- James E. Simmons (author)
Analysis
The court reviewed a pro se plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis and her complaint against the Justice System and the Employment Development Department. The court granted the IFP motion and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Granting the Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis“Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis.” | agree with court The plaintiff submitted an affidavit showing monthly income of $1,189.00 and expenses of $1,307.00, demonstrating an inability to pay the filing fee while maintaining necessities of life. This satisfies the statutory requirement for indigency under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). |
Dismissing the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)“DISMISSES her Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).” | agree with court The court applied the plausibility standard from Ashcroft v. Iqbal, noting that the complaint failed to allege enough facts to state a claim. The plaintiff's allegations were incoherent, failed to identify a specific legal theory, and did not tie the alleged improper termination to any specific named defendant. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), a complaint that fails to state a claim must be dismissed. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the applicable legal standards for both the IFP motion and the screening of the complaint. It applies the Iqbal plausibility standard to the specific facts of the plaintiff's incoherent pleading, finding that no cognizable legal theory was alleged against the specific defendants. The reasoning is direct and supported by the cited authorities.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RAYMONDA SINGLETON, Case No.: 3:25-cv-2750-JES-MSB 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION 13 v. TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND DISMISSING 14 JUSTICE SYSTEM; EMPLOYMENT COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 28 DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT, et al., 15 U.S.C. § 1915(e) Defendants. 16 [ECF No. 2] 17 18 On October 16, 2025, Plaintiff Raymonda Singleton, proceeding pro se, filed a 19 Complaint and an accompanying Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”). ECF 20 Nos. 1, 2. Upon review, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP request and DISMISSES 21 Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). 22 I. Motion to Proceed IFP 23 All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the 24 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 25 // 26 // 27 // 28 // 1 $405. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). Upon a showing of an inability to pay, a party may proceed, 2 IFP, without prepaying the filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). The determination of 3 indigency and thus whether to grant an IFP application is left to the discretion of the district 4 court. See Cal. Men’s Colony, Unit II Men’s Adv. Council v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 5 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting “Section 1915 typically requires the reviewing court to exercise its 6 sound discretion in determining whether the affiant has satisfied the statute’s requirement 7 of indigency.”), rev’d on other grounds, 506 U.S. 194 (1993). To satisfy the requirements 8 of § 1915(a), “an affidavit [of poverty] is sufficient which states that one cannot because 9 of [her] poverty pay or give security for the costs … and still be able to provide [for herself] 10 and dependents with the necessities of life.” Adkins v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 11 U.S. 331, 339 (1948) (internal quotation marks omitted). 12 Here, in support of Plaintiff’s IFP request, she reports in her affidavit a monthly 13 disability income of $1189.00, $12.00 in her checking account, a vehicle worth $1500.00, 14 and monthly expenses totaling $1307.00. ECF No. 2. Upon review of Plaintiff’s IFP 15 application, the Court finds that she has sufficiently shown that she is unable to pay the 16 fees associated with commencing this lawsuit. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s 17 motion to proceed in forma pauperis. 18 II. Screening Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) 19 When reviewing an IFP application, district courts must screen the complaint to 20 ensure it states a claim, is not frivolous, and does not seek monetary relief against a 21 defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see Lopez v. Smith, 22 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). A “frivolous” complaint “lacks an 23 arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). To 24 survive screening, all complaints must include a “short and plain statement of the claim 25 26 1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $55. 27 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, section 14 (eff. Dec. 2020)). The additional $50 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted 28 1 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “The standard for 2 determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 3 under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 4 standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 5 2012); see also Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988) 6 (recognizing that a complaint fails to state a claim if it lacks a cognizable legal theory or 7 does not allege enough facts under a cognizable legal theory); see also Barren v. 8 Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that “[t]he language of § 9 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”). 10 Rule 12(b)(6) requires that a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 11 as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 12 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Determining whether a complaint 13 states a plausible claim for relief [is] … a context-specific task that requires the reviewing 14 court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. “[T]he pleading 15 standard … demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 16 accusation.” Id. at 678. Thus, the “mere possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting 17 the Iqbal plausibility standard. Id. at 679; see Moss v. U. S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 18 (9th Cir. 2009). 19 The Court is unable to discern from Plaintiff’s Complaint the basis for her claims or 20 what the legal basis is for any claim against any defendant. She lists in the heading of the 21 Complaint “Defamation of Character, Direct Attacts [sic] on Mental Stability, Allowing 22 Biasness [sic] Implementing Exact Reasons for and behind Claim.” ECF No. 1 at 1. She 23 appears to vaguely allege that she may have been terminated improperly but does not tie 24 that to any specific named defendant. Id.at 2-3. Overall, her allegations are not coherent 25 such that the Court can find that she plausibly states a claim and the Court must screen her 26 Complaint under § 1915(e). 27 // 28 // 1 CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP request and 3 || DISMISSES her Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The Clerk is directed to close 4 || the case. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 || Dated: October 22, 2025 8 Honorable James E. Simmons Jr. 9 United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28