Lovejoy v. Transdev Services, Inc.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CHERISHA LOVEJOY, an individual, on Case No.: 23-cv-00380-AJB-MMP behalf of herself and all others similarly 12 situated, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 13 RENEWED MOTION FOR CLASS Plaintiff, CERTIFICATION 14 v. 15 (Doc. No. 75) TRANSDEV SERVICES, INC., et al., 16 Defendants. 17 18 19 Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Cherisha Lovejoy’s (“Plaintiff”) renewed 20 motion for class certification. (Doc. No. 75.) Defendant Transdev Services, Inc. 21 (“Defendant”) filed an opposition (Doc. No. 79), to which Plaintiff replied (Doc. No. 82). 22 Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1, the Court deems this motion suitable for 23 determination on the papers and without need for oral argument. For the reasons set forth 24 below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion. 25 I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 26 On August 11, 2025, the Court granted in part Plaintiff’s first motion for class 27 certification, certifying Plaintiff’s first, second, third, fourth, seventh and eighth causes of 28 action. (Doc. No. 72.) The Court denied without prejudice the motion with regard to the 1 fifth and sixth causes of action. (Id.) 2 Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action asserts Defendant violated California Labor Code 3 § 226 by failing to provide accurate itemized wage statements. (Doc. No. 1, Complaint 4 (“Compl.”), ¶¶ 96–106.) As one component of that claim, Plaintiff proffered a sample wage 5 statement to support the allegation that “[e]ach wage statement failed to identify 6 Defendants’ legal name, ‘U.S. HealthWorks, Inc.’ This violation applies to all California 7 Employees.” (Id. ¶ 99.) Because Plaintiff neither asserted nor proffered evidence 8 demonstrating that Defendant issues uniform wage statement for all operators across all 9 locations, the Court found that Plaintiff had not carried her burden to establish 10 predominance. (Doc. No. 72 at 24–25.) 11 Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action asserts Defendant failed to pay all wages due upon 12 termination, in violation of the California Labor Code § 203. (Compl. ¶¶ 107–12.) Because 13 this cause of action is brought only on behalf of former employees and Plaintiff did not 14 seek to certify a subclass of former workers, the Court found that the over-inclusivity of 15 the class definition undermined commonality and predominance. (Doc. No. 72 at 25–26.) 16 On August 25, 2025, Plaintiff timely filed the instant motion seeking certification of 17 the fifth and sixth causes of action. (Doc. No. 75.) 18 II. LEGAL STANDARD 19 Class actions are the “exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and 20 on behalf of the individual named parties only.” Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33 21 (2013) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700–01 (1979)). “To certify a class, 22 plaintiffs bear the burden of satisfying each of the four requirements of Federal Rule of 23 Civil Procedure 23(a)—numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy—and at least 24 one requirement of Rule 23(b).”1 Small v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 122 F.4th 1182, 25 1197 (9th Cir. 2024). “To make their required showing, plaintiffs ‘must actually prove— 26 27 1 All further references to Rule or Rules are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise 28 1 not simply plead—that their proposed class satisfies each requirement of Rule 23 . . . .’” 2 White v. Symetra Assigned Benefits Serv. Co., 104 F.4th 1182, 1192 (9th Cir. 2024) 3 (quoting Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 275 (2014)). 4 Under Rule 23(a), a case is appropriate for certification as a class action if: “(1) the 5 class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions 6 of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties 7 are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will 8 fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). The Rule 9 23(a) requirements “effectively limit the class claims to those fairly encompassed by the 10 named plaintiff’s claims.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349 (2011) 11 (General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982)). 12 “In addition to satisfying Rule 23(a)’s prerequisites, parties seeking class 13 certification must show that the action is maintainable under Rule 23(b)(1), (2), or (3). 14 Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997). Relevant here, pursuant to Rule 15 23(b)(3), “[a] class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if . . . the court 16 finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any 17 questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other 18 available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 23(b)(3). 20 Because “[c]lass certification is . . . not to be granted lightly[,] . . . Rule 23 mandates 21 that district courts ‘rigorous[ly] analy[ze]’ whether a proposed class meets various 22 requirements.” Black Lives Matter L.A. v. City of L.A., 113 F.4th 1249, 1258 (9th Cir. 2024) 23 (quoting Comcast, 569 U.S. at 33) (alterations in original). 24 III. DISCUSSION 25 With regard to the fifth cause of action, Plaintiff seeks to certify the following class: 26 All current and former California Bus Driver/Operator employees of Transdev 27 Services, Inc. who drove routes with stops in California during the period from February 27, 2022 through the present (“Class Period”). 28 1 (Doc. No. 75 at 7–8; see also Compl. ¶¶ 59, 60(v).) With regard to the sixth cause of action, 2 Plaintiff seeks certification of the following class: 3 All former California Bus Driver/Operator employees of Transdev Services, 4 Inc. who drove routes with stops in California during the period from February 27, 2019 through the present (“Class Period”). 5 6 (Doc. No. 75 at 8; see also Compl. ¶¶ 59, 60(v).) Excluded from the putative class in both 7 instances are “any of Defendant’s officers, directors, legal representatives, heirs, 8 successors, or assigns, and any entity in which Transdev has a controlling interest.” (Doc. 9 No. 75-1 at 1.) Plaintiff also moves the Court for an order appointing her as class 10 representative for these causes of action and appointing Hewgill Cobb & Lockard, APC 11 and Schonbrun Seplow Harris Hoffman & Zeldes, LLP as class counsel. (Id.) 12 Defendant opposes Plaintiff’s motion on two narrow grounds: (1) Plaintiff fails to 13 provide sufficient evidence that Defendant’s wage statement did not display an improper 14 name, and (2) the amended class definition for the sixth cause of action is overbroad 15 because it exceeds the applicable statute of limitations. (Doc. No. 79.) 16 As the Court has previously found the Rule 23(a) prerequisites of numerosity, 17 typicality, and adequacy and Rule 23(b) superiority requirements met for the causes of 18 action at issue, the Court addresses only the outstanding issues of commonality and 19 predominance. 20 A. Class Definitions 21 In opposing Plaintiff’s renewed motion for class certification of the sixth cause of 22 action, Defendant asserts that the proposed subclass is overbroad. (Doc. No. 79 at 4.) 23 Specifically, the proposed class period spans four years prior to filing of the Complaint, 24 but the applicable statute of limitations is three years. (Id.) In response, Plaintiff requests 25 the Court amend the proposed definition to comply with the time period Defendant 26 identifies. (Doc. No. 82 at 7–8.) 27 District courts have the inherent power to modify class definitions. See Mazur v. 28 eBay Inc., 257 F.R.D. 563, 568 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Hagen v. City of Winnemucca, 108 1 F.R.D. 61, 64 (D. Nev. 1985)); see also Powers v. Hamilton Cnty. Pub. Def. Comm’n, 501 2 F.3d 592, 619 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[D]istrict courts have broad discretion to modify class 3 definitions . . . .”); Schorsch v. Hewlett–Packard Co., 417 F.3d 748, 750 (7th Cir. 2005) 4 (noting that “[l]itigants and judges regularly modify class definitions”). 5 First, in accord with the Court’s prior Order and the renewed motion for class 6 certification, and absent opposition from Defendant on the matter, the Court MODIFIES 7 the class definitions for the fifth and sixth causes of action to restrict the Class to Bus 8 Driver/Operator employees exclusively in California for both causes of action and to 9 former employees only for the sixth cause of action. (See Doc. No. 75 at 7–8.) 10 Second, the Court MODIFIES the “Sub-Class Period” applicable to the sixth cause 11 of action as commencing on February 27, 2020. 12 B. Sixth Cause of Action 13 Plaintiff sixth cause of action is derivative of the other wage claims that the Court 14 already certified. (See Compl. ¶¶ 107–12 (failure to pay wages due upon termination); Doc. 15 No. 72 at 25–26.) However, the Court previously held that the proposed class definition, 16 which included current and former employees, was overinclusive. (Doc. No. 72 at 26.) By 17 restricting the definition to former employees, the overinclusivity that undermined 18 commonality and predominance for the sixth cause of action has been resolved. See, e.g., 19 Perez v. Leprino Foods Co., No. 117CV00686AWIBAM, 2021 WL 53068, at *13 (E.D. 20 Cal. Jan. 6, 2021). 21 Because the sixth cause of action is derivative of Plaintiff’s labor code violation 22 claims, which the Court has previously deemed suitable for class treatment, and 23 considering the amended subclass definition, the Court finds the sixth cause of action 24 similarly suitable for certification. See Norris-Wilson v. Delta-T Grp., Inc., 270 F.R.D. 596, 25 611 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (“Because the Court has found that some of those claims can be 26 resolved on a class-wide basis—the overtime compensation claim, for example—the unfair 27 business practices claim can also be so resolved.”). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS 28 Plaintiff’s renewed motion as to the sixth cause of action. 1 C. Fifth Cause of Action 2 Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action asserts Defendant violated the California Labor Code 3 by failing to provide accurate itemized wage statements. (Compl. ¶¶ 96–106.) Although 4 Defendant notes the distinction between the derivative and non-derivative portions of this 5 cause of action, Defendant’s argument does not expressly oppose certification of the 6 derivative claims. (See generally Doc. No. 79.) To the extent this cause of action is 7 derivative of Plaintiff’s off-the-clock work, meal break, rest break, and split shift premium 8 claims, certification is proper as the Court has certified the underlying claims, Plaintiff has 9 demonstrated standardized wage statements, and Defendant offers no counterargument. 10 See Norris-Wilson, 270 F.R.D. at 611. 11 With regard to the non-derivative claim, Defendant opposes certification of this 12 cause of action on the basis that “the wage statements Plaintiff offers . . . do not show 13 uniform proof of violations, but rather nearly uniform compliance.” (Doc. No. 79 at 3.) 14 However, Defendant’s argument goes to the merits of Plaintiff’s claim, not whether it is 15 susceptible to common proof. See Jimenez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 765 F.3d 1161, 1166 n.5 16 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Whether any of these common questions are ultimately resolved in favor 17 of either side is immaterial at this class certification stage, where we determine whether 18 any answer that the questions could produce will drive resolution of the class’ claims.”); 19 see also Olean Wholesale Grocery Coop., Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC, 31 F.4th 651, 20 666–67 (9th Cir. 2022) (“In determining whether the ‘common question’ prerequisite is 21 met, a district court is limited to resolving whether the evidence establishes that a common 22 question is capable of class-wide resolution, not whether the evidence in fact establishes 23 that plaintiffs would win at trial.”). Accordingly, Defendant’s argument regarding uniform 24 compliance “is appropriately made at trial or at the summary judgment stage, as it goes to 25 the merits of [P]laintiff[’s] claim.” Jimenez, 765 F.3d at 1166 n.5. 26 Defendant argues in a footnote that there is a “lack of uniformity” and “variation in 27 wage statements across locations and time periods[,] mak[ing] it impossible to provide 28 common proof of violation[.]” (Doc. No. 79 at 3 n.2.) However, from the Court’s review, 1 the wage statements appear uniform in structure across time and locations, with the 2 exception of two wage statements from the South San Francisco location. (See Doc. Nos. 3 75-3 (public); 81-1 (sealed).) Defendant correctly identifies that the South San Francisco 4 wage statements are from before Plaintiff’s proposed class period, asserting that “this 5 choice to use time-barred wage statements is likely deliberate because later sampled wage 6 statements for the same employees at that same location list ‘Transdev Services, Inc.’ as 7 the employer.” (Doc. No. 79 at 3; see also Doc. No. 79-2 (wage statements from South San 8 Francisco within the proposed class period).) Considering the wage statements within the 9 proposed class period proffered by both Plaintiff and Defendant, the Court is satisfied that 10 the common question of whether Defendant’s wage statements comply with California 11 Labor Code § 226 is capable of class-wide proof and will predominate for the fifth cause 12 of action. See, e.g., Cabrales v. BAE Sys. San Diego Ship Repair, Inc., No. 21-CV-02122- 13 AJB-DDL, 2023 WL 8458247, at *19 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2023) (finding common issues 14 predominate where “the employer provides its employees with wage statements in 15 substantially the same format”) (citation omitted); Aguirre v. Genesis Logistics, 16 No. SACV1200687JVSANX, 2013 WL 12129648, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013) 17 (finding commonality and predominance met where the employer provided “standardized” 18 wage statements “produced subject to a common policy”); Wren v. RGIS Inventory 19 Specialists, 256 F.R.D. 180, 209 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (“[T]here is a common question that 20 predominates, namely, does the standardized wage form that is used by [the defendant] for 21 all of its employees comply with the requirements of California Labor Code § 226 that 22 employers must provide properly itemized wage statements.”). 23 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s renewed motion as to the fifth cause of 24 action. 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 |}IV. CONCLUSION 2 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's renewed motion. With 3 ||regard to the fifth cause of action, the Court certifies the following class pursuant to Rule 4 || 23(b)(3): 5 All current and former California Bus Driver/Operator employees of Transdev 6 Services, Inc. who drove routes with stops in California during the period from 7 February 27, 2022 through the present (“Class Period”’). 8 || With regard to the sixth cause of action, the Court certifies the following class pursuant to 9 || Rule 23(b)(3): 10 All former California Bus Driver/Operator employees of Transdev Services, 11 Inc. who drove routes with stops in California during the period from 0 February 27, 2020 through the present (“Sub-Class Period”). 13 || The Court appoints named Plaintiff Cherisha Lovejoy as class representative and appoints 14 || Hewgill Cobb & Lockard, APC and Schonbrun Seplow Harris Hoffman & Zeldes, LLP to 15 ||serve as class counsel. 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 17 || Dated: October 7, 2025 © ¢ 18 Hon, Anthony J.Battaglia 19 United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28