Wadeea v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

Opinion

1 2 3 4

7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9

10 MASHID WADEEA, individually and on Case No.: 24-cv-01587-H-DDL 11 behalf of all others similarly situated, 12 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S Plaintiff, MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN 13 v. AMENDED COMPLAINT 14 MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC, a 15 Delaware Corporation, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, 16 Defendant. [Doc. No. 72.] 17 18 On July 11, 2024, Plaintiff Mashid Wadeea (“Plaintiff”) filed a class action 19 complaint against Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (“MBUSA”) in the Superior Court of 20 California, County of San Diego. (Doc. No. 1-2, Compl.) On September 6, 2024, MBUSA 21 removed Plaintiff’s complaint to the United States District Court for the Southern District 22 of California. (Doc. No. 1.) On August 8, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file 23 an amended complaint. (Doc. No. 72.) On September 2, 2025, MBUSA filed a response 24 in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion. (Doc. No. 115.) On September 8, 2025, Plaintiff filed 25 a reply. (Doc. No. 121.) On September 16, 2025, MBUSA was granted leave to, and did, 26 file a sur-reply. (Doc. Nos. 129-1, 130.) 27 On September 22, 2025, the Court held a hearing on the motion. Ahren A. Tiller, 28 Cody R. Padgett, Mitchell M. Breit, and Jason A. Ibey appeared for Plaintiff. Troy M. 1 Hoshino and Shawn R. Obi appeared for MBUSA. For the reasons below, the Court grants 2 Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint. 3 BACKGROUND 4 I. Factual Background 5 The following factual background is taken from the allegations in Plaintiff’s 6 complaint. Plaintiff is a resident of California. (Compl. ¶ 12.) MBUSA is a Delaware 7 corporation with its headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia. (Id. ¶¶ 14–15.) MBUSA 8 manufactures and sells automobiles. (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff brings this action against MBUSA 9 on behalf of persons who purchased Mercedes-Benz S-Class vehicles of model years 2021 10 through 2024 (“Class Vehicles”) in California. (Id. ¶ 1.) 11 On October 29, 2022, Plaintiff purchased a 2023 Mercedes-Benz S580V4, new, for 12 a total consideration of $178,028.08. (Id. ¶ 33.) Plaintiff’s Class Vehicle was 13 manufactured by MBUSA and came with an express warranty. (Id. ¶ 35.) The express 14 warranty provided that, if a defect developed during the warranty period, Plaintiff would 15 be provided repair services at an authorized dealership. (Id.) The Class Vehicles suffer 16 from a defect affecting the 21-inch AMG wheels that causes the tires to bubble along the 17 sidewall, leak air, and blow out while driving. (Id. ¶¶ 34, 37–43.) Between December 5, 18 2022 to March 22, 2024, Plaintiff brought her vehicle to an authorized dealership for repair 19 services due to problems caused by the defect at least six times. (Id. ¶¶ 37–44.) Plaintiff’s 20 vehicle was never adequately repaired or replaced and she does not believe her vehicle is 21 safe for normal operation. (Id. ¶¶ 44-45, 130.) 22 Beginning in mid-2022, consumers complained about the defect affecting the Class 23 Vehicles on internet forums and social media accounts monitored by MBUSA. (Id. ¶ 74– 24 75.) MBUSA’s authorized dealers were aware of the defect as early as 2022 and reported 25 incidents of tire blowouts resulting from the defect directly to MBUSA. (Id. ¶ 76.) 26 MBUSA has issued recalls on other vehicles it manufactures for similar tire issues but has 27 not issued a recall for tires installed on the Class Vehicles. (Id. ¶¶ 77–80.) 28 // 1 II. Procedural Background 2 On July 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed a class action complaint against Mercedes-Benz in 3 the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego, alleging claims for: (1) violations 4 of California’s Song Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“Song Beverly Act”), California 5 Civil Code §§ 1790 et seq.; (2) violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law 6 (“UCL”), California Business & Professional Code §§ 17200 et seq.; (3) breach of express 7 warranty; (4) breach of implied warranty; (5) unjust enrichment; and (6) fraudulent 8 concealment. (Compl. ¶¶ 128–222.) 9 On December 6, 2024, the Court denied MBUSA’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s 10 complaint. (See Doc. No. 21.) On January 3, 2025, MBUSA answered the complaint. 11 (Doc. No. 22.) In its answer, it denied that it is the manufacturer of the Class Vehicles. 12 (Id. ¶ 15, 16, 17.) On March 4, 2025, the Court issued a scheduling order. (Doc. No. 28.) 13 The scheduling order set April 4, 2025 as the deadline for the parties to file any motions to 14 join other parties or to amend the pleadings. (Id. ¶ 1.) The scheduling order also set August 15 6, 2025 as the deadline for the substantial completion of production of documents. (Id. ¶ 16 4.) 17 On March 4, 2025, Plaintiff served MBUSA with a set of discovery requests. (Doc. 18 No. 72-2, Melili Decl. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff agreed to extend MBUSA’s deadline to respond to 19 her discovery requests by a total of 60 days. (Id. ¶¶ 9–10.) On May 5, 2025, MBUSA 20 responded to Plaintiff’s discovery requests. (Id. ¶ 11.) In its responses, MBUSA stated 21 that it did not design or manufacture the Class Vehicles. (Id. ¶ 12.) On May 15, 2025, the 22 parties held a meet and confer on this issue, where MBUSA again confirmed it did not 23 design or manufacture the Class Vehicles, and that any information or documents 24 maintained by Mercedes-Benz AG and Mercedes-Benz Group AG were not in its 25 possession, custody, or control. (Id. ¶ 14.) 26 On July 23, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion for issuance of letters rogatory in order to 27 seek document discovery from Mercedes-Benz Group AG. (Doc. No. 49.) On August 4, 28 2025, the Court issued an amended scheduling order. (Doc. No. 64.) The amended 1 scheduling order extended the fact discovery cutoff deadline, among others, by one month. 2 (Id.) The amended scheduling order did not alter the deadline to join parties, amend the 3 pleadings, or substantially complete production of documents. (Id.) On August 8, 2025, 4 Plaintiff filed the present motion for leave to amend her complaint. (Doc. No. 72.) 5 Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 15.1(b), Plaintiff submitted a redlined copy of the proposed 6 FAC attached to its motion. (Doc. No. 72-9.) On August 22, 2025, the Court denied 7 Plaintiff’s motion for issuance of letters rogatory. (Doc. No. 92.) 8 By the present motion, Plaintiff moves pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9 15(a)(2) for leave to file an amended complaint. (Doc. No. 72.) Specifically, Plaintiff 10 moves to amend its complaint: (1) to add Mercedes-Benz Group AG and Mercedes-Benz 11 AG as parties to this action in order to seek discovery; (2) to add the word “wheel” to its 12 descriptions of the defect as alleged in the complaint; and (3) to change references in the 13 complaint from the California Code of Civil Procedure to the applicable Federal Rules of 14 Civil Procedure and to remove DOE defendants. (Doc. No. 72-1 at 10–11.) 15 DISCUSSION 16 I. Legal Standards 17 A. Rule 16(b)(4) 18 Generally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) governs motions for leave to 19 amend pleadings when a party seeks to amend after twenty days from the date when the 20 initial complaint was served. However, where, as here, the motion for leave to amend is 21 filed after entry of the Rule 16 scheduling order, Rule 16’s standards govern. Johnson v. 22 Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992). Rule 16(b)(4) provides 23 that a scheduling order “may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s 24 consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). “Unlike Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment policy which 25 focuses on the bad faith of the party seeking to interpose an amendment and the prejudice 26 to the opposing party, Rule 16(b)’s ‘good cause’ standard primarily considers the diligence 27 of the party seeking the amendment.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. 28 1 Good cause under Rule 16(b) requires that the party seeking to modify a scheduling 2 order exercise diligence in complying with court-ordered deadlines. To demonstrate 3 diligence under Rule 16’s “good cause” standard, the party seeking to modify the 4 scheduling order must show the following: “(1) that it was diligent in assisting the Court 5 in creating a workable Rule 16 order; (2) that its noncompliance with the scheduling order’s 6 deadline occurred or will occur notwithstanding her diligent efforts to comply ‘because of 7 the development of matters which could not have been reasonably foreseen or anticipated 8 at the time of the Rule 16 scheduling conference;’ and (3) that it was diligent in seeking 9 amendment of the Rule 16 order, once it became apparent that she could not comply with 10 the order.” United States v. Boyce, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1078 (S.D. Cal. 2001) (quoting 11 Jackson v. Laureate, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 605, 608 (E.D. Cal. 1999)). 12 “The district court may modify the pretrial schedule ‘if it cannot reasonably be met 13 despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.’” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609 14 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee’s notes (1983 amendment)). “The focus 15 of the inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking modification.” Id. If the 16 party seeking modification was not diligent, the “inquiry should end” and the motion 17 should be denied. Id. Only after a showing of good cause under Rule 16(b)(4) has been 18 made will the district court apply Rule 15(a). Id. at 608. 19 B. Rule 15(a) 20 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that once a responsive pleading is 21 served, “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or 22 the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “The court should freely give leave when 23 justice so requires.” Id. The Ninth Circuit has instructed that this policy is “‘to be applied 24 with extreme liberality.’” Hoang v. Bank of Am., N.A., 910 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 25 2018) (quoting Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 26 2003)). The decision whether to grant leave to amend “is entrusted to the sound discretion 27 of the trial court.” Pisciotta v. Teledyne Indus., 91 F.3d 1326, 1331 (9th Cir. 1996). When 28 determining whether to grant leave to amend, courts generally consider five factors, known 1 as the Foman factors as stated by the Supreme Court in Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 2 (1962). These factors include: (1) undue delay; (2) bad faith on the part of the party seeking 3 leave to amend; (3) undue prejudice to the non-moving party; (4) futility of amendment; 4 and (5) whether the plaintiff has previously amended the complaint. Foman, 371 U.S. at 5 182; see Desertrain v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.3d 1147, 1154 (9th Cir. 2014); Johnson 6 v. Buckley, 356 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004). “Absent prejudice, or a strong showing 7 of any of the remaining Foman factors, there exists a presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor 8 of granting leave to amend.” Eminence Cap., 316 F.3d at 1052. 9 II. Analysis 10 Under the Court’s March 4, 2025 scheduling order, any motion for leave to amend 11 the pleadings or to join parties needed to be filed by April 4, 2025. (Doc. No. 28 ¶ 1.) 12 Because Plaintiff filed her motion for leave to amend on August 8, 2025, approximately 13 four months after the deadline, her motion must satisfy Rule 16(b)(4)’s good cause 14 standard. Johnson, 975 F.2d at 607–08. 15 Plaintiff seeks to modify the scheduling order to amend her complaint and add 16 Mercedez-Benz AG and Mercedes-Benz Group AG as defendants. (Doc. No. 72-1 at 10– 17 11.) She asserts she has good cause to do so because she only learned after the deadline 18 for amending pleadings that MBUSA was not the manufacturer of the Class Vehicles and 19 that MBUSA did not have information regarding the design and manufacture of the Class 20 Vehicles. (Doc. No. 72-1 at 13; Doc. No. 121 at 4.) Plaintiff also seeks to modify the 21 scheduling order to amend her complaint in order to add the term “wheel” to her description 22 of the defect she alleges affects the Class Vehicles. (Doc. No. 72-1 at 11, 14, 18.) She 23 asserts she has good cause to do so based on new information learned during discovery. 24 (Id.) 25 Plaintiff meets the good cause standard here. This case is in its early stages and 26 discovery is not yet complete. Plaintiff has been diligent in seeking discovery and bringing 27 disputes to the attention of the Court. Given all the factors, Plaintiff has good cause to 28 amend her complaint, especially given the truncated case schedule set in this action. 1 Furthermore, the Foman factors weigh in favor of granting Plaintiff's motion. There 2 ||is no evidence of bad faith or undue delay. Plaintiff has not previously amended its 3 complaint in this action, and there is no apparent prejudice to MBUSA, given that this case 4 still in the discovery phase. As such, after weighing the Foman factors, the Court grants 5 Plaintiff leave to file its proposed amended complaint. (See Doc. No. 72-9.)! 6 CONCLUSION 7 For the reasons above, the Court grants Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a first 8 |}amended complaint. Plaintiff must file its first amended complaint within seven (7) days 9 || of this order. MBUSA must file its response to Plaintiff's first amended complaint within 10 || fourteen (14) days of service of the first amended complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(3). 11 || The Court orders the parties to contact the magistrate judge to set a scheduling conference 12 light of Plaintiff's first amended complaint and directs the parties to proceed diligently 13 || with their Rule 30(b)(6) depositions notwithstanding the first amended complaint. 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 DATED: September 22, 2025 } / | ) | 16 MAALYWYV\ fn HiL hg MARILYN W. HUFF, DistricUtdge 17 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 22 ' The Court also grants Plaintiff leave to amend her complaint to remove DOE defendants and to conform her state court complaint with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.