People v. Williams CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCD139596
- Trial judge
- David J. Danielsen
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- O'Rourke (author), Judith D. McConnell, Joan K. Irion
Analysis
The trial court granted Williams's motion for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, striking invalid prison prior enhancements and reducing his sentence by one year, but denied his request to strike a serious felony prior enhancement based on a finding that a lesser sentence would endanger public safety. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the trial court was not required to make a dangerousness finding for the section 1172.75 reduction it granted, and that the dangerousness finding related to the section 1385 motion was not an abuse of discretion.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of motion to strike serious felony prior enhancement under Penal Code section 1385 based on dangerousness finding“the court reasonably concluded this progress did not overcome Williams’s substantial history of dangerous conduct.” | abuse of discretion | not reached | agree with court The appellate court did not review the section 1385 denial for abuse of discretion because it determined the dangerousness finding was not required for the section 1172.75 resentencing relief granted. The court noted that even if the finding were required under section 1172.75, Williams failed to show an abuse of discretion, but the primary holding was that the finding was unnecessary for the relief obtained. |
Requirement to make a dangerousness finding under Penal Code section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1) when reducing a sentence“Because the court reduced Williams’s sentence under section 1172.75, it was not required to make a dangerousness finding under this provision.” | de novo | not reached | agree with court The court held that because the trial court granted the resentencing petition and reduced the sentence, the statutory exception for dangerousness findings (which applies when the court declines to reduce the sentence) was not triggered. This is a legal interpretation of the statute. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050 — Section 1172.75 renders pre-2020 prison prior enhancements legally invalid and entitles defendants to resentencing.
- relied: People v. Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848 — A dangerousness analysis under section 1172.75 is required only where the sentencing court declines to reduce a defendant’s sentence; review of such findings is for abuse of discretion.
- relied: People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367 — The burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary.
- relied: People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215 — In section 1385 dismissals, courts must consider factors like potential release date and parole board review; the court distinguished this case as inapplicable to section 1172.75 resentencing.
- relied: People v. Williams (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1057 — Resentencing analyses should conduct a 'forward looking-inquiry' to determine if resentencing poses an unreasonable risk of danger to society.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion correctly interprets the statutory structure of section 1172.75, noting that the dangerousness finding is a condition for *not* reducing a sentence, not a prerequisite for reducing it. It properly distinguishes the section 1385 motion from the section 1172.75 resentencing, resolving the appellant's confusion about which legal standard applied to the trial court's findings.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionOn a Penal Code section 1172.75 resentencing, the trial court struck Williams's executed and stayed prison prior enhancements, reducing his sentence by one year to 75 years to life plus five years, but declined to strike his five-year serious felony prior enhancement under section 1385 after finding by clear and convincing evidence that a lesser sentence would endanger public safety. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding the trial court did not deny the petition, was not required to make a dangerousness finding under section 1172.75(d)(1) because it reduced the sentence, and in any event did not abuse its discretion in finding dangerousness.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Whether the trial court 'denied' the section 1172.75 resentencing motion and was required to make a dangerousness finding under section 1172.75(d)(1)“it is apparent from the court’s cumulative orders and actions that it did not deny Williams’s resentencing petition under section 1172.75, as Williams contends.” | unclear | correct | agree with court Section 1172.75(d)(1) requires a dangerousness finding only when the court declines to impose a lesser sentence; here the court struck both prison priors and reduced the sentence by one year, so the statutory trigger for a dangerousness finding was absent. The court's reading of the statute and reliance on Garcia is consistent with the text. The court did not articulate a standard of review, but the question is legal and the conclusion follows from the statute. |
Refusal to strike the five-year serious felony prior enhancement under section 1385 based on a clear-and-convincing finding that a lesser sentence would endanger public safety“Williams has not shown the court abused its discretion in finding a further reduction in his sentence would endanger public safety.” | abuse of discretion | correct | agree with court The appellate court applied the deferential Carmony standard and found the trial court expressly considered the section 1172.75(d)(3) postconviction factors (clean disciplinary record, rehabilitation, age at parole eligibility) before concluding they did not outweigh Williams's history. On the record described, a reviewing court could not say the weighing was irrational or arbitrary. The opinion does not separately analyze the section 1385(c) framework, but Williams framed his argument only under section 1172.75(d). |
Whether the trial court was required under People v. Gonzalez to consider Williams's potential release date and parole board/Governor review when finding dangerousness“In Gonzalez, we considered the propriety of a sentencing court’s refusal to exercise its discretion to dismiss a sentencing enhancement under section 1385 based on a finding of dangerousness.” | abuse of discretion | correct | agree with court The court's primary ground—that Gonzalez addressed a section 1385 dismissal and so does not govern a section 1172.75 finding—sits uneasily with the opinion's own statement that the trial court made its dangerousness finding in relation to the section 1385 motion. However, the court's alternative ground, that the record shows the trial court actually considered Williams's age at possible parole and conducted a forward-looking inquiry, independently supports the result. Given the alternative holding, I agree with the outcome though the distinction of Gonzalez is thin. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050 — Describes the 2019 amendment eliminating most prison prior enhancements and the retroactive invalidation and resentencing entitlement under section 1172.75.
- relied: People v. Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848 — A dangerousness analysis under section 1172.75(d) is required only when the sentencing court declines to reduce the sentence, and such a finding is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
- relied: People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367 — The party attacking a sentence bears the burden to show the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary; otherwise the court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives.
- relied: People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215 — In refusing to dismiss an enhancement under section 1385 on dangerousness grounds, a court should consider the defendant's potential release date and that release is subject to parole board and gubernatorial review; distinguished here as a section 1385 case.
- relied: People v. Williams (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1057 — Dangerousness in resentencing (there under section 1170.126) is a forward-looking inquiry into whether resentencing would pose an unreasonable risk of danger.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion correctly identifies that section 1172.75(d)(1)'s dangerousness requirement is triggered only when no lesser sentence is imposed, and it applies the proper deferential standard to the trial court's weighing of postconviction factors. It is less careful in distinguishing Gonzalez: having acknowledged the dangerousness finding was made on the section 1385 motion, it then faults Williams for not showing Gonzalez applies to a section 1172.75 finding, though the alternative holding that the court did consider age and release date cures the tension.
Opinion
Filed 9/17/25 P. v. Williams CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D083922
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD139596)
HENRY LEE WILLIAMS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, David J. Danielsen, Judge. Affirmed. Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher P. Beesley, and Evan Stele, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Henry Lee Williams appeals from an amended judgment after resentencing pursuant to Penal Code,1 section 1172.75. Williams contends the sentencing court erred by denying his motion for resentencing based on an erroneous dangerousness finding. We reject Williams’s arguments and affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2 A jury convicted Williams of seven counts of lewd acts with a child under 14 years old. (§ 288, subd. (a).) In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true that Williams had a felony sex prior (§ 667.61, subds. (a), (c), & (d)), two prison priors (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), a serious felony prior (§§ 667, subd. (a)(1); 1192.7, subd. (c)(3)), and two prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12), and that he qualified as a habitual sex offender (§ 667.71, subd. (a)). The court sentenced Williams to a prison term of 75 years to life plus six years, composed of three consecutive, and four stayed, Three Strikes terms of 25-years-to-life for each count of lewd acts; a consecutive five-year enhancement for his serious felony prior; and one consecutive, and one stayed, one-year enhancements for his prison priors. The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation identified Williams as currently serving a sentence that included at least one newly invalid prison prior enhancement, rendering him eligible for resentencing under section 1172.75. In February 2024, Williams filed a motion for resentencing under section 1172.75. He requested the sentencing court strike his invalid executed prison prior enhancement under section 1172.75, and exercise its discretion to strike his five-year serious felony prior enhancement 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 The facts of Williams’s conviction are not material to the issues presented in this appeal. 2 under section 1385. At the resentencing hearing, the court struck both Williams’s executed and stayed prison prior enhancements. However, it declined to strike Williams’s serious felony prior enhancement, finding “by clear and convincing evidence that the lesser sentence would endanger public safety . . . .” The court’s order reduced Williams’s sentence by one year, to 75 years to life plus five years.3 DISCUSSION Before 2019, section 667.5, subdivision (b), required trial courts to “ ‘impose a one-year term for each prior separate prison term or county jail term’ served for a felony . . . .” (People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050 1054 (Rhodius).) In 2019, the Legislature amended section 667.5, subdivision (b), “to eliminate prior-prison-term enhancements for all prior crimes except for ‘sexually violent offense[s] as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.’ ” (Rhodius, at p. 1054.) The Legislature then made this change retroactive through the enactment of current section 1172.75, which provides: “Any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense 3 The original record before us did not contain an amended abstract of judgment reflecting the sentencing court’s striking of the two prior prison enhancements. After we ordered supplemental briefing in this matter, the sentencing court issued an amended abstract of judgment, and the People attached a copy of the amended abstract as an exhibit to their supplemental brief. The amended abstract reflects the sentencing court’s striking of the prison prior enhancements, as well as the resulting reduced sentence of 75 years to life plus five years. The parties agree Williams’s new sentence is 75 years to life plus five years, as reflected in the amended abstract of judgment. We construe the People’s attachment of the exhibit to their supplemental brief as a motion to augment the record with the amended abstract of judgment. We grant the motion. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).) 3 as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code is legally invalid.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a); Rhodius, at p. 1054.) “A defendant serving a term for a judgment that includes a now-invalid enhancement is entitled to resentencing.” (Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th, at p. 1055.) Section 1172.75 mandates that “[r]esentencing pursuant to this section shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety,” and “shall not result in a longer sentence than the one originally imposed.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).) Williams argues the sentencing court erred by denying his resentencing petition under section 1172.75 based on a finding of dangerousness. Specifically, Williams argues the sentencing court erroneously based its dangerousness finding on the facts of Williams’s past offenses, rather than his postconviction conduct, and failed to consider the length of Williams’s sentence or the requirement that any future release would have to first be approved by the parole board. Although portions of the record below reflect some ambiguity in the sentencing court’s analysis, it is apparent from the court’s cumulative orders and actions that it did not deny Williams’s resentencing petition under section 1172.75, as Williams contends. Rather, the court granted Williams’s resentencing petition and conducted a full resentencing hearing, at which it struck both Williams’s prison prior enhancements and reduced his sentence by one year. Williams thus obtained resentencing and was sentenced to a “lesser term,” which is the relief to which he claims entitlement in his briefing. Because the court reduced Williams’s sentence under section 1172.75, it was not required to make a dangerousness finding under this 4 provision. (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1) [“Resentencing pursuant to this section shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.”]; see People v. Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 854, 856 (Garcia) [dangerousness analysis under § 1172.75, subdivision (d), required only where sentencing court declines to reduce a defendant’s sentence].) And, because the sentencing court was not obligated to conduct a dangerousness analysis in connection with its section 1172.75 resentencing decision, Williams’s arguments regarding the propriety of the dangerousness analysis under section 1172.75 necessarily fail. Rather than making a finding of dangerousness with respect to its consideration of Williams’s resentencing motion under section 1172.75, the court made its dangerousness finding in relation to its denial of Williams’s motion to dismiss his five-year serious felony prior enhancement under section 1385. Williams argues only that he is entitled to a further reduction of his sentence—beyond the one-year reduction he obtained—as part of his resentencing under section 1172.75, subdivision (d). But, even if we assume the sentencing court’s dangerousness finding related to, and was required by, section 1172.75, Williams has not shown the court abused its discretion in finding a further reduction in his sentence would endanger public safety. (Garcia, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 856 [we review for abuse of discretion a lower court’s finding that reduction in sentence under § 1172.75 would endanger public safety].) In considering whether a risk to public safety exists under section 1172.75, subdivision (d), “[t]he court may consider postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of 5 rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.” (Id. at subd. (d)(3).) “ ‘ “[T]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review.” ’ ” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376–377.) The sentencing court meaningfully considered the postconviction factors recognized in section 1172.75 and highlighted by Williams here, such as his lack of a prison disciplinary record, his significant efforts at rehabilitation, and his current age and the age he would be at the time of his possible parole. After acknowledging these positive factors, the court reasonably concluded this progress did not overcome Williams’s substantial history of dangerous conduct. Lastly, Williams has not shown the sentencing court was required to consider factors such as the defendant’s potential release date if the enhancement is dismissed and the fact that parole release was subject to review by Board of Parole Hearings and the Governor, as required by this court’s decision in People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215. In Gonzalez, we considered the propriety of a sentencing court’s refusal to exercise its discretion to dismiss a sentencing enhancement under section 1385 based on a finding of dangerousness. (Id. at p. 229.) Williams has not shown Gonzalez has any application to the sentencing court’s finding here 6 that a reduction of Williams’s sentence under the factors recognized in section 1172.75 would endanger public safety. In any event, the record does not reflect that the court disregarded Williams’s age or potential release date when considering dangerousness. As noted, the court considered factors such as the age Williams would be at the time of his possible parole and generally conducted a “forward looking-inquiry” with respect to dangerousness. (See People v. Williams (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1057, 1063 [in conducting resentencing analysis under section 1170.126, court should conduct “forward looking-inquiry” to determine whether resentencing would pose unreasonable risk of danger to society]; § 1172.75, subd. (d)(3).)4 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.
O’ROURKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
IRION, J.
4 In our order for supplemental briefing in this matter, we invited the parties to address whether the trial court properly struck Williams’s previously stayed prior prison enhancement. Neither party challenges the striking of this enhancement, so we do not address this issue. 7
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Carmony No. S115090 · 2004-07-08