Aguila v. Jason Barraza and family
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Janis L. Sammartino (author)
Analysis
The court considered Plaintiff Rosa Pineda Aguila's Complaint and Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (IFP). The court denied the IFP application without prejudice and dismissed the complaint without prejudice for failure to prepay the filing fee, granting the plaintiff 30 days to pay the fee or refile a complete IFP application.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Denial of Plaintiff's Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (IFP Application) without prejudice“The Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s IFP Application” | agree with court The court correctly applied the standard that an IFP applicant must allege poverty with particularity and definiteness. The order recites that the application was 'nearly blank' and failed to provide required descriptions of expected income changes, which prevents the court from analyzing whether the plaintiff has sufficient assets. Denying the application without prejudice is the standard procedural remedy for a deficient IFP filing, allowing the plaintiff to cure the defects. |
Dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint without prejudice for failure to prepay the filing fee“Plaintiffs Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to prepay the filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)” | agree with court Under 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), a civil action must be accompanied by the filing fee unless the plaintiff is granted IFP status. Because the IFP application was denied, the complaint could not proceed. Dismissing without prejudice is appropriate because the defect (failure to pay) is curable, and the court provided a 30-day window to cure the defect. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the statutory requirements for IFP status and the filing fee. It applies the Ninth Circuit standard that indigency must be alleged with particularity. The factual finding that the application was 'nearly blank' and lacked required descriptions supports the conclusion that the court could not determine indigency. The remedy (denial without prejudice and dismissal without prejudice with a 30-day cure period) is standard and appropriate for a deficient IFP filing. The reasoning is complete and supported by the cited authorities.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ROSA PINEDA AGUILA, Case No.: 25-CV-2090 JLS (AHG)
12 Plaintiff, ORDER (1) DENYING WITHOUT 13 v. PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN 14 JASON BERRAZA AND FAMILY, DISTRICT COURT WITHOUT 15 Defendants. PREPAYING FEES OR COSTS AND (2) DISMISSING WITHOUT 16 PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF’S 17 COMPLAINT 18 (ECF No. 2) 19 20 21 Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Rosa Pineda Aguila’s Complaint (“Compl.,” 22 ECF No. 1) and Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs 23 (“IFP Appl.,” ECF No. 2). Having carefully considered Plaintiff’s Complaint, Application, 24 and the applicable law, the Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s IFP 25 Application and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Complaint. 26 All parties instituting a civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the 27 United States, other than a petition for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $405. 28 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a party’s failure to pay the filing fee 1 only if the party is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2 § 1915(a)(1).1 3 Section 1915(a)(1) provides: 4 [A]ny court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or 5 proceeding . . . without prepayment of fees or security therefor, 6 by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such [person] possesses that the person is unable to pay 7 such fees or give security therefor. 8 9 As § 1915(a)(1) does not itself define what constitutes insufficient assets to warrant IFP 10 status, the determination of indigency falls within the district court’s discretion. See Cal. 11 Men’s Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Section 1915 typically 12 requires the reviewing court to exercise its sound discretion in determining whether the 13 affiant has satisfied the statute’s requirement of indigency.”), reversed on other grounds 14 by, 506 U.S. 194 (1993). “An affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient where 15 it alleges that the affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” 16 Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Adkins v. E.I. Du Pont 17 de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)). “One need not be absolutely destitute to 18 obtain benefits of the [IFP] statute.” Jefferson v. United States, 277 F.2d 723, 725 (9th Cir. 19 1960). “Nonetheless, a plaintiff seeking IFP status must allege poverty ‘with some 20 particularity, definiteness[,] and certainty.’” Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234. 21 The Court cannot find that Plaintiff has alleged with sufficient certainty that she 22 would be unable to afford the necessities of life should she be required to pay the requisite 23 filing fee. Plaintiff’s IFP Application is nearly blank in its entirety, with the lone 24 exceptions being questions nine and ten, in which Plaintiff indicates, respectively, that she 25 26 1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $55. See 27 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. 28 Dec. 1, 2023)). The additional $55 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed 1 ||expects a major change to her income or expenses over the next twelve months and that 2 will not be incurring legal fees in conjunction with this matter. IFP Appl. at 5. 3 || Question nine, however, also requires a description of any expected major changes to her 4 ||income or expenses, yet Plaintiff provides none. Jd. Such a “failure to properly complete 5 || the application does not permit a thorough analysis of whether [Aguila] has enough income 6 assets, as compared to expenses, to warrant IFP status.” Kamau v. Ertifai, 7 || No. CV-25-02863-PHX-SHD, 2025 WL 2373718, at*1 Ariz. Aug. 14, 2025). 8 || Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's IFP Application. Said denial, however, is 9 || WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Plaintiff refiling an IFP application that cures the 10 || above-noted deficiencies. If Plaintiff wishes to refile her IFP application, she “should note 11 the IFP application specifically instructs applicants not to leave any blanks, and to 12 |/instead response [sic] ‘0,’ ‘none,’ or ‘not applicable (N/A)’ as necessary.” Herta v. 13 || Wiblemo, No. 22-cv-1679-BAS-BGS, 2022 WL 17573923, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2022). 14 In light of the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 15 1. Plaintiff's IFP Application (ECF No.2) is DENIED WITHOUT 16 || PREJUDICE; 17 2. Plaintiffs Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED WITHOUT 18 || PREJUDICE for failure to prepay the filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); and 19 3. Plaintiff is GRANTED an additional thirty (30) days from the date on which 20 ||this Order is electronically docketed to either (1) pay the entire $405 statutory and 21 administrative filing fee, or (2) file a new [FP application alleging that she is unable to pay 22 ||the requisite fee. Should Plaintiff fail to either pay the filing fee or file a new IFP 23 application, the Court will convert this dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint into dismissal 24 || of this civil action without prejudice. 25 IT IS SO ORDERED. 26 llDated: August 26, 2025 jae LL. Li moma 27 on. Janis L. Sammartino 28 United States District Judge
Cites, in this corpus
- Leroy Jefferson v. United States of America, Undocketed 723 · 1960-04-25