Smith v. TransUnion

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Alvin James SMITH, Case No.: 24-cv-1727-AGS-DTF 4 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 5 v. DISMISS (ECF 17) AND DENYING 6 TRANSUNION, PLAINTIFF’S VARIOUS REQUESTS (ECF 18, 19, 25, 26, 27, 30, 33) 7 Defendant. 8 9 The defense moves to dismiss the second amended complaint, and once again 10 plaintiff’s pleading fails to state a claim. But this version is much closer to legal sufficiency, 11 so the Court will provide plaintiff one last chance to amend. 12 BACKGROUND 13 Shorn of its legal conclusions and digressions, Smith’s second amended complaint 14 alleges that TransUnion is a “nationwide consumer reporting agency” that “offers various 15 credit reporting and information products and services to businesses and consumers.” 16 (ECF 16, at 9.) This time, however, Smith has shifted his claims substantially from being 17 about personally identifiable information to a more traditional basis for a claim against a 18 credit reporting agency: including unverified information on his credit report even after he 19 disputed it. 20 Smith asserts that after he requested his TransUnion credit report, he noticed it 21 “contained inaccurate information tied to two Navy Federal Credit Union tradelines.” 22 (ECF 16, at 12.) Smith details at some length his efforts to contest those tradelines, listing 23 more than a dozen “written dispute communications” he sent to TransUnion about them. 24 (See id. at 13–37.) In each case, Navy Federal purportedly “responded” to the 25 communication by designating the information “UN-VERIFIED AS REPORTED” or 26 “UN-VERIFIED AS DELETED REPORTED.” (See, e.g., id. at 13, 27.) Despite this, 27 TransUnion “failed to update and did not correct Plaintiff’s information.” (Id. at 13.) As a 28 result, Smith “was unable to obtain lower interest rates on” startup capital loans for 1 business investments and was “forced to take out two high interest loans” instead. (Id. 2 at 11.) 3 Smith consequently alleges that TransUnion violated the federal Fair Credit 4 Reporting Act and California’s Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act. Specifically, he 5 claims that TransUnion (1) provided inaccurate information after a dispute, (2) violated 6 legal duties as the “furnisher” of inaccurate information, and (3) intentionally inflicted 7 emotional distress on him in violation of California law. (ECF 16, at 10–40.) TransUnion 8 moves to dismiss. (See generally ECF 17.) Smith did not file an opposition to the motion 9 to dismiss, although he filed several other papers. (See ECF 18; ECF 19; ECF 25; ECF 26; 10 ECF 27; ECF 30; ECF 33.) 11 DISCUSSION 12 MOTION TO DISMISS 13 To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain enough facts to “state a 14 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 15 All “sufficient factual matter” in a complaint is “accepted as true.” Id. When plaintiffs 16 proceed without an attorney, like Smith, their pleadings “are to be liberally construed.” 17 Capp v. County of San Diego, 940 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2019). Still, such allegations 18 “require[] more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of 19 a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 20 Once again, Smith has “waived” and “abandoned” his current claims because he 21 failed to “address any of [defendant’s] arguments concerning them” in his opposition to 22 the motion to dismiss. See American Ice Mach. Co. v. Modern Ice Equip. Co., 763 F. Supp. 23 3d 1149, 1156 (S.D. Cal. 2025). In fact, he never filed an opposition at all. But the second 24 amended complaint is far closer to stating a claim than the original, so the Court will briefly 25 address defendants’ arguments, as Smith will be given one last opportunity to amend his 26 complaint to remedy those defects. 27 28 1 A. Intelligibility 2 TransUnion first argues that Smith’s second amended complaint must be dismissed 3 as a “shotgun pleading” that violates the federal rules by being too verbose and confusing. 4 (ECF 18, at 10.) A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement showing that the 5 pleader is entitled to relief” with allegations that are “simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. 6 Civ. P. 8(a)(2), (d)(1). This rule is “not meant to impose a great burden upon a plaintiff.” 7 Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005). But the complaint must give “fair 8 notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 9 at 555 (cleaned up). Typically, “verbosity or length by itself is not a basis for dismissing a 10 complaint.” United States ex rel. Cafasso v. General Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 11 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2011). Instead, dismissal “is usually confined to instances in which 12 the complaint is so verbose, confused and redundant that its true substance, if any, is well 13 disguised.” Hearns v. San Bernardino Police Dep’t, 530 F.3d 1124, 1131 (9th Cir. 2008) 14 (cleaned up). 15 Like the prior iterations, Smith’s second amended complaint is far from a model of 16 clarity. For example, he includes a seemingly pointless introductory section that appears to 17 take aim at the Court’s last dismissal order. (See generally ECF 16, at 1–7.) He also quotes 18 an entire paragraph from a Pennsylvania district court’s 1964 opinion about summary 19 judgment, which is not at issue in the pleading stage. (Id. at 7.) And he continues to inject 20 confusing, sovereign-citizen-esque jargon, albeit mostly confined to the first several pages: 21 “Plaintiff makes these allegations based on personal knowledge and investigation 22 conducted by and through Alvin-James: Smith who is a natural true man and living being 23 with blood flowing in body [Non- Citizen American National] private being of sound mind 24 comes in equity to the aide of the legally disabled to set the ALVIN JAMES SMITH 25 (captured) free.” (Id. at 2 (unmatched quotation marks omitted, brackets in original).) 26 Although he disclaims the “sovereign citizen” label in his second amended complaint, 27 courts have universally held that such “theories should be rejected summarily, however 28 they are presented.” United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 767 (7th Cir. 2011). 1 Nonetheless, these problems are insufficient to justify dismissal based on a lack of 2 intelligibility. Smith’s second amended complaint is “logically organized, divided into a 3 description of the parties, a chronological factual background, and a presentation of 4 enumerated legal claims, each of which lists the liable Defendants and legal basis therefor.” 5 See Hearns, 530 F.3d at 1132. Despite its flaws, it is “intelligible and clearly delineate[s] 6 the claims” such that the defense can meaningfully answer them. See id. So the Court 7 declines to dismiss the complaint as unintelligible. 8 B. Inaccurate Credit Reporting (Count I) 9 In Smith’s first cause of action, he claims to have “experienced harm due to factual 10 inaccuracies under both 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) and 15 U.S.C. § 1681i.” (ECF 16, at 12.) 11 The former provision requires a credit reporting agency to “follow reasonable procedures 12 to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about 13 whom the report relates.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b); see also Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.14(b) 14 (parallel California provision, which mirrors the federal language requiring credit reporting 15 agencies to “follow reasonable procedures”). The latter provision—15 U.S.C. § 1681i— 16 mandates that, after a “dispute[] by the consumer,” a credit reporting agency must “conduct 17 a reasonable reinvestigation to determine whether the disputed information is inaccurate.” 18 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A); Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.16(a) (parallel California provision, 19 which directs that, after a dispute, credit reporting agencies must “reinvestigate and record 20 the current status of the disputed information”). Although Smith doesn’t explicitly mention 21 either of the California versions of these rules, it’s a reasonable inference that he meant to, 22 given that he mentions otherwise irrelevant California Consumer Credit Reporting 23 Agencies Act provisions. (See generally ECF 16, at 11–37); see also Moss v. U.S. Secret 24 Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (requiring the Court to draw “reasonable 25 inferences from [the complaint’s] content” in deciding “a motion to dismiss”). 26 The problem, however, is that Smith does not allege sufficient facts to show that his 27 credit report was inaccurate. “[T]o sustain either a § 1681e or a § 1681i claim, a consumer 28 must first make a prima facie showing of inaccurate reporting.” Shaw v. Experian Info. 1 Sols., Inc., 891 F.3d 749, 756 (9th Cir. 2018). The same is true for the corresponding 2 California causes of action. See Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 890 3 (9th Cir. 2010) (requiring a plaintiff to show the “disputed item was inaccurate” for both 4 Cal Civ. Code § 1785.16 and § 1785.14(b) claims). And the standard for inaccuracy is not 5 trifling: plaintiffs must demonstrate that the information “either is patently incorrect or is 6 misleading in such a way and to such an extent that it can be expected to adversely affect 7 credit decisions.” Shaw, 891 F.3d at 756 (cleaned up). 8 Smith repeatedly insists that his credit report “contained inaccurate information tied 9 to two Navy Federal Credit Union tradelines.” (ECF 16, at 12.) But he never identifies 10 those errors. The closest he comes is a somewhat confusing statement that his report 11 included “several inaccuracies including incorrect names and tradelines containing 12 misleading and inaccurate [sic] that did not belong to Plaintiff.” (Id.) He never reveals what 13 these incorrect names or tradelines were or how they were either “patently incorrect” or so 14 misleading as to “adversely affect credit decisions.” See Shaw, 891 F.3d at 756 (cleaned 15 up). Without more, Smith has not cleared the plausibility bar, so the § 1681e(b) and § 1681i 16 claims must be dismissed. 17 Yet Smith’s case still has a ray of hope. In the documents attached to his 18 judicial-notice motion—disputes written to TransUnion—Smith mentions that the 19 tradelines in question were the result of “Identity Theft.” (ECF 18-33, at 2.) As best the 20 Court can tell, Smith protests that he never owed those amounts to begin with. If that’s 21 true, and those amounts are being reported delinquent, then the quoted lines would be 22 “patently false” or sufficiently misleading to hurt his creditworthiness. Since it’s not 23 impossible for Smith to state a claim based on facts that it seems he could allege, the Court 24 will grant him one final opportunity to amend this claim. See Salameh v. Tarsadia Hotel, 25 726 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that courts should grant leave to amend when 26 a pleading “can possibly be cured by additional factual allegations”). 27 28 1 C. Furnishing Inaccurate Information to Credit Reporting Agency (Count II) 2 Smith next contends that TransUnion “routinely furnishes information to credit 3 reporting agencies,” did so inaccurately as to him as explained above, and thus has violated 4 “Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.25(a).” (ECF 16, at 38–39.) Although he doesn’t mention the 5 federal FCRA provision covering the same behavior, it’s a reasonable inference that he 6 intended to. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2. But as this Court’s previous order explained, “the 7 FCRA imposes this duty on ‘sources that provide credit information to’ credit reporting 8 agencies.” (ECF 15, at 4 (emphasis added) (quoting Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 9 584 F.3d 1147, 1153 (9th Cir. 2009)).) 10 Once again, “Smith fails to provide any facts to suggest TransUnion provided 11 information to other credit reporting agencies as a ‘furnisher.’” (See ECF 15, at 4.) He now 12 identifies one such potential furnisher of information—Navy Federal Credit Union—but 13 “[n]owhere does he explain to what credit reporting agency TransUnion furnished 14 information, nor how that information was inaccurate.” (See id.) So, yet again, he fails to 15 state a claim under § 1681s-2 or California Civil Code § 1785.25(a). But unlike the 16 inaccurate-reporting claim, nothing in his filings suggests that Smith has additional facts 17 that could cure this problem, which he has already been given notice of. Thus, this 18 furnisher-related claim is dismissed without leave to amend. See Fidelity Fin. Corp. v. 19 Federal Home Loan Bank of S.F., 792 F.2d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that when 20 “the court has already given the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint” on the 21 same point, the “district court’s discretion to deny leave to [further] amend is particularly 22 broad”). 23 D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count III) 24 Finally, Smith alleges that TransUnion “continues to report inaccurate information 25 for no . . . purpose other than to cause Plaintiff emotional distress.” (ECF 16, at 39–40.) He 26 seeks damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress related to his resulting 27 “severe emotional distress and mental anguish including but not limited to anger, 28 frustration, anxiety, embarrassment, and loss of sleep.” (Id. at 40.) 1 “Under California law, the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress” 2 are: “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, 3 or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s 4 suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of 5 the emotional distress by defendant’s outrageous conduct.” Sabow v. United States, 93 F.3d 6 1445, 1454 (9th Cir. 1996). “In order to be considered outrageous, the conduct must be so 7 extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Langan 8 v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 69 F. Supp. 3d 965, 987–88 (N.D. Cal. 2014). “The conduct 9 must be such that it would cause an average member of the community to immediately 10 react in outrage.” Gomon v. TRW, Inc., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 256, 264 (Ct. App. 1994). 11 Because the second amended complaint doesn’t even specify the credit report’s 12 inaccuracies, Smith has not plausibly alleged that reporting those inaccuracies—or leaving 13 them in the report—was outrageous. For the same reasons as Count I, the Court dismisses 14 Count III but grants leave to amend it one final time, since additional allegations and clarity 15 may cure this problem. 16 SMITH’S ADDITIONAL PAPERS 17 In lieu of an opposition to the motion to dismiss, Smith filed a series of other papers. 18 (See ECF 18; ECF 19; ECF 25; ECF 26; ECF 27; ECF 30; ECF 33.) These include two 19 250-page requests for judicial notice, attaching several documents he presumably intends 20 to use to prove his claim. (See generally ECF 18; ECF 19.) But we’re not at the proof stage 21 of this proceeding: the pleadings are unsettled, no summary-judgment motion or trial is 22 imminent, and Smith does not explain why or how these documents—or, more importantly, 23 judicial notice of them—responds to defendant’s arguments. Regardless, many of the 24 submitted documents are not eligible for judicial notice, see Fed. R. Evid. 201, and there 25 is no need for judicial notice of others because they are mentioned and integral to his 26 amended complaint, see Coto Settlement v. Eisenberg, 593 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010) 27 (noting that the “doctrine of incorporation by reference” allows the Court “to consider 28 documents in situations where the complaint necessarily relies upon a document or the 1 || contents of the document are alleged in a complaint” even though it is not attached). In any 2 event, since Smith never explains how any of this responds to defendant’s arguments, the 3 ||requests for judicial notice are denied without prejudice to being raised in the future if 4 ||necessary. 5 Next, Smith has filed a series of papers about an apparent alteration of a joint motion. 6 || (See ECF 25; ECF 26; ECF 27; ECF 30.) As is normal practice under the Local Rules, the 7 ||motion to dismiss originally had a hearing date for oral arguments. See CivLR 7.1(e). 8 ||Defense counsel filed a purportedly joint motion to appear remotely at that hearing on 9 || behalf of both parties. (See ECF 22.) According to Smith, after he and defense counsel 10 |}exchanged emails about the motion, counsel removed Smith’s signature from a 11 functionally identical, but slightly different, joint motion to appear remotely and filed one 12 || without Smith’s approval. (ECF 30, at 7.) Comparing the two versions, it appears that in 13 || Smith’s signed version, he inserted “ALVIN JAMES SMITH (Captured) (‘Plaintiff’)” into 14 || the first line and changed the signature block to: 15 Alvin-James: Smith, Sui Juris, In Equity Law 16 Non-Citizen American National 18 By □□ PAA Ah st ny AS err FA American National Non-Citizen 19 By: Alvin- James: Smith. Fiduciary Trustee for: ALVIN JAMES SMITH (Captured) 20 Without Prejudice/ Without Recourse 1 All Rights Reserve 22 23 || (See ECF 30-2, at 4-5.) By contrast, the original (and ultimately filed) version listed him 24 |/as “Plaintiff Alvin James Smith (‘Plaintiff’) on the first line and had a more traditional 25 signature block: 26 27 28 1 2 || PRO SE PLAINTIFF 3 By:_Alvin- Jame : Smith» TT EF Alvin James Smith 5 4351 Hamilton St. #6 6 San Diego, CA 92014 7 || (See ECF 22, at 1, 3.) Otherwise, the substance of the motion and requested relief was the 8 |}same. The Court ultimately denied that motion as “moot,” as it took the matter “under 9 submission” without oral arguments. (See ECF 23.) 10 Despite that, Smith seeks discovery and sanctions arising from counsel’s alleged 11 |}manipulation of his signature. (See ECF 27; ECF 30.) Those requests are denied. The 12 || parties are admonished to carefully ensure that any representation of a “joint” filing is, in 13 ||fact, joint. But here—even assuming everything Smith says is true—no substance was 14 misrepresented to the Court and there was ultimately no harm. 15 Finally, Smith docketed a “notice of suspected court filing tampering,” although he 16 || does not identify who he believes has tampered with court filings. (See ECF 33.) The gist 17 || of this document is that he disagrees with how the Clerk of Court has separated and filed 18 || some of his submissions and how the Clerk has titled others. (See, e.g., id. at 2 (complaining 19 ||about ECF 29 being a standalone docket entry instead of “Exhibit C” of “Docket 20 || Line 26”).) That docket issue, however, was already fixed when Smith called the Clerk’s 21 || Office, so the Court is unclear what else Smith asks the Court to do. His next grievance is 22 difficult to decipher that the Court is again at a loss as to the relief sought: 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 Line 30 on docket as the record reflects July 15, 2025, which contains The 3 || Original Wet Ink Signature with Seal By plaintiff was signed JOINT 4 REQUEST TO APPEAR BY VIEDO CONFERENCE AT THE HEARING 5 6 ON DEFENDANT TRANSUNION LLC MOTION TO DISMISS. 7 However, it is retailed to NOTICE of MOTION and MOTION to Move 8 Under Rule 60(d)(3). Which is a manipulation and altering of court records. 9 10 || Ud. at 3.) And his final objection regarding ECF 26 is similarly hard to parse: 11 Docket Line 26: Documentation name was changed from "Joint MOTION for Leave to Appear by Video Conference" filed on Wednesday, July 16, 13 2025, This entry is not a motion filed by Alvin James Smith with wet blue 14 . ‘ ink seal , TO NOTICE of Motion to Move Under Rules 60(d)(3) and Under 15 6 Fed.R.Evid 201 and Fed.R.Civl.P. 11 and Request for Judicial Notice of 7 Adjudicative Facts of the Forged Evidence Document Attached in Exhibits 13 Filed by Alvin 19 || Ud.) Whatever these objections are supposed to mean, docket entries ECF 26 and ECF 30 20 substantively identical. Even if the Clerk duplicated the filings or renamed ECF 26, no 21 ||harm was done. Nor would it matter. Both filings are substantively meritless, regardless of 22 || their titles. 23 CONCLUSION 24 TransUnion’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part. Smith’s second amended 25 ||complaint is DISMISSED. Smith is granted leave to amend only the claims within Counts 26 and III. Count II is dismissed without leave to amend. By October 7, 2025, Smith may 27 || file a third amended complaint, remedying the identified deficiencies. “If a plaintiff does 28 ||not take advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the 10 1 || dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the entire action.” Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 2 || 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005). All of Smith’s other requests are DENIED. 3 ||Dated: August 26, 2025 5 Hon. rew G. Schopler United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1]