Doljanin v. Ellis
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Janis L. Sammartino (author)
Analysis
The court considered defendants' motions to dismiss the case because the pro se plaintiff failed to file a consolidated complaint by the court-ordered deadline. The court granted the plaintiff an extension of time to file the consolidated complaint by September 11, 2025, denied the motions to dismiss as moot, and vacated the hearing.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Granting Plaintiff's request for an extension of time to file the Consolidated Complaint“In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's request for an extension of time to file the operative complaint in this case.” | agree with court The court applied the 'excusable neglect' standard from Rule 6(b)(1)(B) and the Ninth Circuit's equitable factors (Briones). The court found that the plaintiff's temporary homelessness constituted excusable neglect, outweighing the prejudice to defendants. This is a defensible application of the law to the facts recited in the order. |
Denying Defendants' Motions to Dismiss as Moot“Consequently, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 33, 34) are DENIED AS MOOT without prejudice.” | agree with court Because the court granted the extension of time to file the complaint, the basis for the motions to dismiss (failure to comply with the order to file) was rendered moot. Denying them as moot is the correct procedural outcome. |
Vacating the hearing set for August 21, 2025“Accordingly, the Court VACATES the hearing set for August 21, 2025, pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1).” | agree with court The hearing was likely set to address the motions to dismiss. Since the motions were denied as moot, the hearing is no longer necessary. This is a standard administrative action. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the legal standard for extending a deadline after it has expired (Rule 6(b)(1)(B) and the Briones factors). It applies the standard to the specific facts (temporary homelessness) and reaches a defensible equitable conclusion. It also appropriately cautions the pro se plaintiff about the limits of leniency, citing relevant Ninth Circuit authority. The reasoning is complete and supported by the cited authorities.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOHN-THOMAS DOLJANIN, Lead Case No.: 24-CV-1689 JLS (SBC) Consolidated Case No.: 25-CV-469 JLS 12 Plaintiff, (DDL) 13 v. ORDER: 14 REUBIN ELLIS; SHANNON SMITH;
WILLIAM BERKELEY; TERRY 15 (1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF CONSIDINE; SUSAN BONANO; ADDITIONAL TIME TO FILE 16 RODNEY BRUCE; GEOFF POOLE; CONSOLIDATED COMPLAINT, BETH HART; SAMANTHA ADAMS; 17 HARRY TURNER; JOSEPH ELLIS; (2) VACATING HEARING, AND 18 IONE ELLIS; RAM HILL COUNTRY CLUB; T2 PALMS, LLC; T1 19 (3) DENYING DEFENDANTS’ HOLDINGS; T2 HOLDINGS; MOTIONS TO DISMISS AS MOOT 20 BORREGO WATER DISTRICT, 21 Defendants.
22 (ECF Nos. 33, 34) 23 24 On June 4, 2025, this Court granted Plaintiff John-Thomas Doljanin’s request to 25 “merge” this action, Doljanin v. Ellis, Case No. 24-cv-01689-JLS-SBC, with Doljanin v. 26 State of California, Case No. 25-cv-00469-JLS-DDL. See ECF No. 32 (“Order”). In its 27 Order, the Court directed Plaintiff to file an amended complaint entitled “Consolidated 28 1 Complaint,” by July 1, 2025. Order at 3. 2 After July 1 came and went, Defendants Beth Hart; Geoff Poole; Borrego Water 3 District; Susan Bonanno; Shannon Smith; Terry Considine; Rodney Bruce; Harry Turner; 4 Rams Hill Gold Club; T2 Palms, LLC; T2 Holding, LLC dba T2 B Holding LLC; and 5 Reuben Ellis filed a Motion to Dismiss. See ECF No. 33. Thereafter, Defendant City of 6 Indio, erroneously sued as Indio Police Department, also filed a Motion to Dismiss. See 7 ECF No. 34. The County of San Diego and County of Riverside then filed Joinders to 8 those Motions to Dismiss. See ECF Nos. 35, 36. Defendants largely argue they are entitled 9 to dismissal as Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Court’s Order directing him to file a 10 consolidated complaint. See generally ECF Nos. 33, 34. 11 Plaintiff subsequently filed an “Opposition to Any Dismissal by All Parties.” ECF 12 No. 37 (“Opp’n”). In this filing, Plaintiff asks for leniency regarding his “tardy filings” 13 and indicates such tardiness was caused by “temporary homelessness caused by City of 14 Indio Employees.” Opp’n at 1. The Court construes this as a request for an extension of 15 time to file his consolidated complaint. This request is, as Defendants note in their Reply, 16 untimely, as his Opposition was filed more than a month after this complaint was due. ECF 17 No. 38 (“Reply”) at 1. 18 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(1)(B) states that a court “may, for good cause, 19 extend the time . . . on [a] motion made after the time has expired if the party failed to act 20 because of excusable neglect.” Though Rule 6(b)(1)(B) does establish that requests to 21 enlarge an already lapsed deadline must be made via motion, it is also “to be liberally 22 construed to effectuate the general purpose of seeing that cases are tried on the merits.” 23 Est. of Taschek v. Fid. Life Ass'n, 740 F. Supp. 3d 1072, 1078–79 (D. Nev. 2024). 24 Accordingly, the Court will evaluate whether Plaintiff’s implicit request for an extension 25 of time in his Opposition demonstrates “excusable neglect.” See United States v. $163,500 26 in U.S. Currency, No. 3:23-cv-00430-MMD-CLB, 2024 WL 1603409, at *2 (D. Nev. Mar. 27 25, 2024) (construing pro se plaintiff’s late responsive filings “as including an implicit 28 motion for extension of time due to excusable neglect”); see also N.L. v. Children's Hosp. 1 L.A., No. CV 15-07200-AB (FFMx) 2019 WL 10854340, at *4 n.2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2 2019) (not requiring formal noticed motion under Rule 6(b)(1)(B) “in the interest of 3 efficiency and judicial economy”). 4 Excusable neglect is an “elastic concept” that is determined by considering, inter 5 alia: “the danger of prejudice to the [party not under scrutiny], the length of the delay and 6 its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it 7 was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good 8 faith.” Briones v. Riviera Hotel & Casino, 116 F.3d 379, 381 (9th Cir. 1997). 9 The Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has shown excusable neglect, as he represents his 10 delay was the result of temporary homelessness. Opp’n at 2. Though the Court appreciates 11 Defendants’ frustrations with Plaintiff’s delay and conduct during the litigation of this case, 12 the Court does not find the length of the delay—and any prejudice to Defendants thereby— 13 outweigh Plaintiff’s justification, particularly considering that the determination of 14 whether a party’s neglect is excusable “is at bottom an equitable one, taking account of all 15 relevant circumstances surrounding the party’s omission.” Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. 16 Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993); see also Livesley v. City of 17 Springfield, No. 6:18-CV-01023-AA, 2019 WL 310121, at *3 (D. Or. Jan. 22, 2019) 18 (concluding that finding excusable neglect in light of pro se plaintiff’s health and 19 circumstances was consistent “with the Ninth Circuit’s approach to treating pro se 20 Plaintiffs fairly and in consideration of their limited means”). Here, in its consideration of 21 all the relevant circumstances, the Court finds Plaintiff’s failure to timely file a 22 consolidated complaint was excusable. 23 However, Plaintiff is reminded that pro se litigants must be familiar with and follow 24 the rules of the court. See United States v. Flewitt, 874 F.2d 669, 675 (9th Cir. 1989) 25 (stating that pro se litigants are subject to the same good-faith limitations imposed on 26 lawyers, as officers of the court); Carter v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 784 F.2d 1006, 27 1008 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Although pro se, [plaintiff] is expected to abide by the rules of the 28 court in which he litigates.”). Plaintiff is also cautioned that failure to comply with the 1 || Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Local Rules of this District, and the orders of this 2 ||court may result in future filings being denied or stricken. Carter, 784 F.2d at □□□□□□□ 3 || (collecting cases) (explaining that a pro se litigant 1s “expected to abide by the rules of the 4 court in which he litigates”); Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995) (reiterating 5 || that although courts “construe pleadings liberally in their favor, pro se litigants are bound 6 || by the rules of procedure”); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1992) (affirming 7 || district court’s dismissal of a pro se plaintiff's complaint for failing to comply with a court 8 || order). 9 In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's request for an extension of 10 |/time to file the operative complaint in this case. Plaintiff SHALL FILE an amended 11 |}complaint entitled “Consolidated Complaint” on or before September 11, 2025. The 12 || Consolidated Complaint must bear both docket numbers now assigned to this consolidated 13 || action, but should only be filed in the lead case, Case No. 24-cv-01689-JLS-SBC; shall 14 || be labeled as “Consolidated Complaint;” and shall be complete in and of itself, i.e., shall 15 ||name all defendants and contain all claims against those defendants the Plaintiff wishes to 16 || pursue without any reference to any of the complaints previously filed in either action, or 17 any other pleading, attachment or document. The Consolidated Complaint shall be the 18 ||operative complaint in this consolidated action. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 19 || Procedure 41(b), if Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within the time provided, 20 || this case may be subject to dismissal for failure to prosecute and/or comply with a court 21 || order. 22 Consequently, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 33, 34) are DENIED AS 23 || MOOT without prejudice. Accordingly, the Court VACATES the hearing set for 24 || August 21, 2025, pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). 25 IT IS SO ORDERED. 26 Dated: August 13, 2025 (ee 77 on. Janis L. Sammartino United States District Judge 28