gno.law

Claudio v. PIA Industries Inc.

District Court, S.D. California · 3:23-cv-01965 · 2025-08-04 · Unknown

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
Valerie E. Torres (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T20:57Z · confidence high

Defendants moved to set a separate, earlier deadline for filing an exhaustion-based motion for summary judgment, arguing it would promote judicial economy. The Court granted the motion, setting specific dates for the motion, response, and reply, while noting that all other case deadlines remained in effect.

What the court decidedThe model
Defendants' Motion to Set Separate Deadline for Exhaustion-Based Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
“Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the Motion.”
agree with court
The court correctly identifies that summary judgment is the appropriate procedural vehicle for determining PLRA exhaustion, as established by Ninth Circuit precedent. Setting a separate deadline to resolve this threshold issue early is a standard case management practice that promotes judicial economy, particularly when the issue may dispose of the entire case. The court appropriately noted that other deadlines remain in effect.

The order itself: sound — The order is procedurally sound. It correctly applies binding Ninth Circuit precedent (Albino v. Baca) to determine that summary judgment is the proper vehicle for resolving PLRA exhaustion claims. The court's decision to set a separate deadline is a reasonable exercise of case management authority to promote judicial economy, especially given the potential for the motion to dispose of the entire case. The court appropriately noted that other deadlines remain in effect.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ROBERT CLAUDIO, Case No.: 3:23-cv-01965-JAH-VET 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 13 v. MOTION TO SET SEPARATE DEADLINE FOR EXHAUSTION- 14 MICHAEL BIERBAUM and VICTOR BASED MOTION FOR SUMMARY OJEDA, 15 JUDGMENT Defendants. 16 [Doc. No. 32] 17 18 I. INTRODUCTION 19 Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Set Separate Deadline for Exhaustion- 20 Based Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”). Doc. No. 32. The current deadline to 21 file pre-trial motions is February 17, 2026. Defendants request that the Court set an earlier, 22 separate deadline for the filing of an exhaustion-based motion for summary judgment. 23 Because such a motion may dispose of the entire case, Defendants argue that an earlier, 24 separate deadline promotes judicial economy. Doc. No. 32 at 1. Plaintiff, appearing pro se, 25 has “no objection to Defendants’ request,” but simultaneously asks that “the Court deny 26 Defendants’ Motion To Set Separate Deadline for Exhaustion-Based Motion for Summary 27 28 1 Judgment.” See Doc. No. 33 at 1, 5. For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS 2 the Motion. 3 II. DISCUSSION 4 The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that a prisoner exhaust available 5 administrative remedies before bringing a federal action concerning prison conditions. 42 6 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). As explained by the Ninth Circuit, Congress purposefully made 7 exhaustion a precondition to suit, rather than to judgment, to afford corrections officials 8 the opportunity to address complaints internally. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1200- 9 1201 (9th Cir. 2002). 10 However, “an unenumerated motion under Rule 12(b) is not the appropriate 11 procedural device for pretrial determination of whether administrative remedies have been 12 exhausted under the PLRA.” Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2014). Instead, 13 “[t]o the extent evidence in the record permits, the appropriate device is a motion for 14 summary judgment under Rule 56.” Id. Further, “the exhaustion question in PLRA cases 15 should be decided as early as feasible.” Id. at 1170; see also Williams v. Buenrostro, No. 16 17cv2345-MMA (JLB), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51662, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2020) (“a 17 motion for summary judgment is generally the appropriate vehicle for raising the plaintiff’s 18 failure to exhaust administrative remedies because ‘failure to exhaust is an affirmative 19 defense under the PLRA, and . . . inmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate 20 exhaustion in their complaints’”) (quoting Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007)). 21 Accordingly, the Court finds that setting a separate deadline for an exhaustion-based 22 motion for summary judgment is appropriate. Such a deadline also promotes judicial 23 economy and conserves party resources since it has the potential to dispose of the entire 24 case and avoid a trial on the merits. Still, the parties are advised that all other case 25 26 27 1 Plaintiff’s response argues why an exhaustion-based motion for summary judgment would fail. A question the Court will address only after the exhaustion-based motion 28 1 || deadlines remain in effect, see Doc. No. 30, and as such, the Court expects the parties to 2 || continue to exercise diligence in meeting remaining case deadlines. 3 CONCLUSION 4 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the Motion. Accordingly, IT IS 5 || HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants shall file an Exhaustion-Based Motion for 6 ||Summary Judgment by no later than September 8, 2025. Plaintiff's response shall be filed 7 ||no later than October 6, 2025. Any reply shall be filed by October 13, 2025. The Court 8 || will, in its discretion, consider Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment based on the 9 || Motion, Opposition, and Reply briefs submitted by the parties. No oral argument will be 10 || heard and no appearances by either party or counsel will be required. The Scheduling Order 11 |/remains in effect. Doc. No. 30. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. () sA— 13 Dated: August 4, 2025 Honorable Valerie E. Torres 14 United States Magistrate Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28