Braswell v. San Diego Police Department

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Erica BRASWELL, Case No.: 25-cv-0323-AGS-KSC 4 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IFP MOTION 5 v. (ECF 2) AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT 6 SAN DIEGO POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., 7 Defendants. 8 9 Plaintiff moves to proceed without paying filing fees. If granted the right to proceed 10 in forma pauperis, a plaintiff need not pay the usual $402 in court fees. See Rodriguez v. 11 Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999); 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). Braswell’s only asset is 12 her car, her monthly income and cash hardly cover her monthly expenses, and she has an 13 eight-year-old dependent. (See generally ECF 2.) She thus need not pay the filing fees. 14 See Blount v. Saul, No. 21-CV-0679-BLM, 2021 WL 1561453, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 15 2021) (“[A] party need not be completely destitute to proceed IFP.”). 16 Next, the Court must screen the complaint and dismiss it if it is “frivolous or 17 malicious,” “fails to state a claim,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is 18 immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Braswell’s only federal claims 19 appear to be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against two municipal defendants: the “Police 20 Department of San Diego” and the “City of San Diego.” (ECF 1, at 2.) 21 Generally, “a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a 22 tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a 23 respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 24 (1978). But municipalities “can be sued directly under § 1983.” Id. at 690. There are “three 25 ways” for a “section 1983 plaintiff [to] establish municipal liability”: (1) by “prov[ing] that 26 a city employee committed the alleged constitutional violation pursuant to a formal 27 governmental policy or longstanding practice or custom [that] constitutes the standard 28 operating procedure of the local governmental entity”; (2) by “establish[ing] that the 1 individual who committed the constitutional tort was an official with final policy-making 2 ||authority and that the challenged action itself thus constituted an act of official 3 ||governmental policy”; or (3) by “prov[ing] that an official with final policy-making 4 || authority ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.” 5 || Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346-47 (9th Cir. 1992) (cleaned up). 6 Braswell’s complaint does not state a claim under any of those theories. She claims 7 || that a “white female tenant” “falsely accused Plaintiff of harassment, leading to □□□□□□□□□□□ 8 || wrongful arrest” with “no probable cause.” (ECF 1, at 2.) She further alleges that “officers” 9 || later engaged in “racial discrimination” when they “refused to arrest [her] accuser for filing 10 |ja false police report” during a separate incident. (/d.) But Braswell specifies no 11 ||“governmental policy or longstanding practice or custom” that underlies the alleged 12 |/constitutional violation. See Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1346-47. Nor does the complaint name a 13 employee” that “committed the alleged constitutional violation,” nor any “official 14 || with final policy-making authority.” See id. So her federal claims fail. 15 Because Braswell’s federal claims do not survive screening, this Court “may decline 16 || to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over the remaining state-law claims. See 28 U.S.C. 17 || § 1367(c). “In the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the 18 balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial 19 ||economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—will point toward declining to exercise 20 || jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 21 561 (9th Cir. 2010). So, unless and until plaintiff states a federal claim, the Court will 22 decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state-law claims. 23 Braswell’s IFP request is GRANTED, but her complaint is DISMISSED without 24 || prejudice and with leave to amend. Any amended complaint is due by September 15, 2025. 25 ||Dated: August 4, 2025 26 4 | 27 Hon. Andrew G. Schopler 28 United States District Judge