P.v. Fregoso CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D086000 · 2025-07-22 · Unpublished

Proceeding: appeal from an order
Trial court: Superior Court of Riverside County · No. RIF10004623, RIF1100623, SWF10001920
Trial judge: Walter H. Kubelun
Outcome: reversed — Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Area: criminal
Panel: Michele M. Castillo (author), O'Rourke, Julia C. Kelety

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T03:44Z · confidence high

The trial court denied Fregoso's request for compassionate release, finding he posed an unreasonable risk to public safety. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded with instructions to vacate the order, holding the trial court lacked jurisdiction because it was no longer the sentencing court under In re Brissette.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Denial of compassionate release under Penal Code section 1172.2 “Riverside County Superior Court did not have jurisdiction over Fregoso’s compassionate release request because by then it was not the sentencing court.”	de novo	error	agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the new rule from In re Brissette, which establishes that the last court to impose a sentence (the Thompson term) is the sole sentencing court for compassionate release purposes. Since Kern County imposed the most recent sentence, Riverside County lacked fundamental jurisdiction, rendering its order void. The court properly reversed without reaching the merits.

Authorities

relied: In re Brissette (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 147 — The last court to impose a sentence is the sentencing court for compassionate release purposes; a court that imposed an earlier sentence no longer has authority to rule on such requests.
relied: People v. Ford (2015) 61 Cal.4th 282 — A court fundamentally lacks jurisdiction when it has no authority over the subject matter, and such a ruling is void.
relied: In re Thompson (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 256 — A Thompson term for an in-prison felony does not begin to run until after the defendant completes the term for out-of-prison offenses.
relied: People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847 — Memorandum opinions may be used to resolve matters.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the newly published In re Brissette decision to determine that the trial court lacked fundamental jurisdiction. The reasoning is concise and directly addresses the threshold jurisdictional issue raised by the appellant, rendering the merits arguments moot.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:29Z · confidence low

The Riverside County Superior Court denied Randy Fregoso's request for compassionate release under Penal Code section 1172.2 after finding he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, even though Kern County Superior Court had later imposed a Thompson term and had already granted release as to that term. The Court of Appeal, applying In re Brissette, held that Kern County was the only 'sentencing court' authorized to rule on the request, deemed the Riverside order void for lack of fundamental jurisdiction, reversed, and remanded with instructions to vacate the order without reaching the merits.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Riverside County Superior Court's exercise of authority to rule on the section 1172.2 compassionate release request after Kern County Superior Court had imposed a later Thompson term “Here, Riverside County Superior Court did not have jurisdiction over Fregoso’s compassionate release request because by then it was not the sentencing court.”	de novo	error	unsure The court applied Brissette's holding that the last court to impose a sentence (including a Thompson term) is the sole 'sentencing court' under section 1172.2, which is the only published authority on point and supports the conclusion that Riverside should not have ruled. However, the opinion labels the defect one of 'fundamental' jurisdiction rendering the order void, without analyzing whether a superior court of general jurisdiction acting on the wrong statutory authorization commits a merely voidable act in excess of jurisdiction under the Ford/American Contractors distinction; because that characterization is asserted rather than analyzed, I cannot confidently say the court was right or wrong.
Riverside County Superior Court's finding that Fregoso posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety (merits denial of compassionate release) “As a result, we do not consider the parties’ arguments on the merits of whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding Fregoso was an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.”	unclear	not reached	agree with court Having found the order void, the court declined to review the dangerousness finding; this is a logical consequence of the jurisdictional holding, though it leaves the dangerousness question unresolved and gives no direction as to how the Riverside portion of the sentence will be reviewed given Kern County's prior disclaimer of authority over the Riverside case.

Authorities

relied: In re Brissette (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 147 — Section 1172.2 requires a single court, the sentencing court, to resolve a compassionate release request; where a Thompson term is imposed the defendant still has one sentence and the last court to impose a sentence is the sentencing court, so the earlier court no longer has authority to rule.
relied: People v. Ford (2015) 61 Cal.4th 282 — A court lacks fundamental jurisdiction when it has no authority over the subject matter or no power to hear or determine the case; such rulings are void and the defect may be raised for the first time on appeal.
relied: In re Thompson (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 256 — A term for an in-prison felony (Thompson term) does not begin to run until the defendant completes the term for the out-of-prison offenses.
relied: People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847 — Authorizes resolution of an appeal by memorandum opinion.
missed: People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 653 — Distinguishes a lack of fundamental jurisdiction (entire absence of power over subject matter or parties, rendering an act void) from an act in excess of jurisdiction by a court that has fundamental jurisdiction (rendering the act merely voidable and subject to forfeiture or estoppel); the opinion should have explained why a superior court of general jurisdiction ruling on a request the statute assigns to a different superior court falls in the former category.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion correctly identifies Brissette as controlling on which court may rule under section 1172.2 and reaches a defensible result by vacating the Riverside order, but it treats the defect as a fundamental jurisdictional void without addressing the void/voidable distinction that Ford itself and American Contractors require. It also leaves unaddressed the practical consequence that Kern County had already disclaimed authority over the Riverside case, giving no guidance on how Fregoso's request as to that portion of his sentence is to be heard.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

Opinion

Filed 7/22/25 P.v. Fregoso CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D086000, D086001, D086002

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. Nos. RIF10004623, RIF1100623, SWF10001920) RANDY DAVID FREGOSO, Defendant and Appellant.

CONSOLIDATED APPEALS from an order of the Superior Court of Riverside County, Walter H. Kubelun, Judge. Reversed and remanded with instructions. John F. Schuck, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Christine Y. Friedman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Randy David Fregoso appeals the denial of his request for compassionate release under Penal Code section 1172.2. Relying on In re Brissette (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 147, Fregoso argues the denial order is void because Riverside County Superior Court was not authorized to rule on the request. Resolving this matter by memorandum opinion (see generally People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847), we reverse and remand with instructions. I. In 2011, Riverside County Superior Court sentenced Fregoso to a total of 16 years in prison for offenses arising from two different cases, including two counts of willful harm or injury to a child each with a firearm enhancement (Pen. Code, §§ 273a(a), 12022.5(a)) and one count of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245(a)(1)). In 2019, while incarcerated in Kern County, Fregoso was convicted of an in-prison felony, for which Kern County Superior Court sentenced him to an additional four years in prison. This term for an in-prison felony, known as a Thompson term, would not begin to run until after Fregoso completed the term for his out-of-prison offenses. (See In re Thompson (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 256, 260.) In 2023, Fregoso was diagnosed with glioma, an incurable cancerous brain tumor. Based on that diagnosis, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation informed the courts in both Riverside and Kern Counties that Fregoso met the clinical criteria for compassionate release under section 1172.2. Kern County Superior Court granted compassionate release and recalled the Thompson term it imposed. The court determined it “ha[d] no authority on the Riverside case whatsoever.”

2 In a subsequent hearing, Riverside County Superior Court denied compassionate release after finding Fregoso posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. II. Fregoso argues Riverside County Superior Court’s order denying his request for compassionate release is void because it lacked jurisdiction. The People respond we should affirm on the merits. Fregoso has the better argument. Section 1172.2 creates a presumption in favor of recall and resentencing an incarcerated defendant who (1) has a serious and advanced illness with an end-of life trajectory or (2) is permanently medically incapacitated, unless the court finds the defendant poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. (§ 1172.2(b).) Brissette recently interpreted section 1172.2 to require a single court— the sentencing court—to resolve a defendant’s request for compassionate release. (Brissette, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 162.) Brissette also determined “when a court imposes a Thompson term/section 1170.1(c) term,” the defendant still has “only one sentence” because the Thompson term is a “separate and distinct component of [the defendant’s] single total sentence.” (Id. at p. 172.) In such a situation, the last court to impose a sentence “is considered to be the sentencing court” for compassionate release purposes. (Id. at p. 173.) A court that imposed an earlier sentence is “no longer the sentencing court.” (Ibid.) Thus, that earlier court no longer has authority to rule on a compassionate release request. (Ibid.) A court fundamentally lacks jurisdiction “when it has no authority at all over the subject matter . . . or when it lacks any power to hear or determine the case.” (People v. Ford (2015) 61 Cal.4th 282, 286.) If a court 3 lacks such jurisdiction, its ruling is void. (Ibid.) A claim based on a lack of fundamental jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal. (Ibid.) Brissette was issued after briefing was complete in this case, so we asked the parties to submit supplemental briefing about its impact, if any, on this appeal. In response, Fregoso argues Brissette means Riverside County Superior Court lacked authority to rule on his compassionate release request and thus its ruling is void. The People, who filed their supplemental brief eight days after Fregoso’s, do not address this voidness argument. Instead, they contend Brissette is not implicated here because the only issue on appeal is whether the superior court properly denied the request. But a court lacking fundamental jurisdiction over an issue cannot properly rule on it, so this question of jurisdiction is a threshold matter in assessing the denial of compassionate release. Here, Riverside County Superior Court did not have jurisdiction over Fregoso’s compassionate release request because by then it was not the sentencing court. Kern County Superior Court imposed Fregoso’s most recent sentence, the Thompson term, in 2019. At that point, Kern County Superior Court replaced Riverside County Superior Court as “the sentencing court” for compassionate release purposes. (See Brissette, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 173.) Consequently, when Riverside County Superior Court ruled on Fregoso’s compassionate release request in 2024, it had no authority to do so. And because Riverside County Superior Court lacked authority over the request, it lacked jurisdiction and its ruling is thus void. (Ford, 61 Cal.4th at p. 286.) A void order cannot stand, so we will reverse it and instruct the court to vacate the order. As a result, we do not consider the parties’ arguments on 4 the merits of whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding Fregoso was an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. III. We reverse the Riverside County Superior Court order denying Fregoso’s request for compassionate release and remand with instructions for the court to vacate the order.

CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

KELETY, J.

Cites, in this corpus

People v. Ford S212940 · 2015-05-28
People v. Garcia F034831 · 2002-04-17
In Re Thompson F005090 · 1985-09-18