People v. Rodriguez CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCE409932
- Trial judge
- Selena Dong Epley
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Buchanan (author), Judith D. McConnell, William S. Dato
Analysis
The trial court convicted Rodriguez of assault with a deadly weapon and other firearm-related offenses, imposing a six-year sentence. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, rejecting Rodriguez's argument that the evidence was insufficient to prove the assault element of a present ability to commit a battery.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Sufficiency of evidence for assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (b))“Based on the totality of circumstances, Rodriguez’s threatening conduct in pointing a loaded gun at L.T. in a menacing manner was sufficient to establish an assault.” | substantial evidence | correct | agree with court The court correctly applied the standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence, examining the record in the light most favorable to the judgment. It properly relied on established California law that pointing a loaded gun in a menacing manner, particularly with a finger on the trigger, satisfies the 'present ability' and 'attempt' elements of assault without requiring proof of a specific intent to injure or a completed battery. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997 — Standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence requires examining the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine if substantial evidence supports the conviction.
- relied: People v. Williams (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779 — Assault focuses on the nature of the act; an assault occurs when the next movement would, at least to all appearance, complete the battery, and specific intent to injure is not an element.
- relied: People v. Cruz-Partida (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 197 — Pointing a gun at someone in a menacing manner or under threatening circumstances is enough to establish the requisite mental state for an assault.
- relied: People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1 — An assault is not committed by merely pointing an unloaded gun in a threatening manner, as it fails the 'present ability' element.
- relied: People v. Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th 126 — The fact that a gun was loaded may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, and an assault conviction will be upheld if the inference is reasonable.
- relied: American Drug Stores, Inc. v. Stroh (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1446 — Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are not considered because they deprive the respondent of an opportunity to brief them.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the substantial evidence standard and relies on binding California Supreme Court and Court of Appeal precedents to support the conclusion that pointing a loaded gun in a menacing manner constitutes assault. It also properly addresses the procedural forfeiture of the 'loaded gun' argument while still analyzing the merits to ensure the record supports the conviction.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionA San Diego County jury convicted Marcus Rodriguez of assault with a semi-automatic firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (b)), criminal threats, exhibiting a firearm, and related misdemeanors, with firearm enhancements, and the trial court imposed a six-year sentence after Rodriguez pointed a gun at a neighbor's face during a hallway confrontation. On appeal Rodriguez argued the evidence was insufficient to show an attempt to commit a battery, and the Court of Appeal rejected the argument, held a belated reply-brief claim about whether the gun was loaded forfeited and in any event meritless, and affirmed.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Sufficiency of the evidence that Rodriguez's act of pointing the gun at L.T. constituted an attempt to commit a battery (the act/mental-state element of assault under § 240 and § 245, subd. (b))“Based on the totality of circumstances, Rodriguez’s threatening conduct in pointing a loaded gun at L.T. in a menacing manner was sufficient to establish an assault.” | substantial evidence | correct | agree with court Under Williams, assault requires only a willful act that by its nature will probably and directly result in a battery; specific intent to injure or an actual trigger pull is not required. Cruz-Partida squarely holds that pointing a gun in a menacing manner amid animus or fraught circumstances supplies the mens rea. The record here—threats of a gang attack, displaying the gun, drawing it while advancing, pointing it at L.T.'s face with finger on the trigger, and prior conflict—readily supports the jury's finding. Rodriguez's demand for additional evidence such as squeezing the trigger misstates the law. |
Sufficiency of the evidence of 'present ability' (that the firearm was loaded), raised for the first time in the reply brief“Even if the issue were not forfeited, however, we would find that the jury could have made a reasonable inference that the gun was loaded.” | mixed | correct | agree with court Treating an argument first raised in a reply brief as forfeited is well settled (American Drug Stores v. Stroh). On the merits, Penunuri permits the jury to infer a gun was loaded from circumstantial evidence, and the discovery eleven days later of the same dual-tone pistol stored with a loaded magazine inserted supports that inference. The court did not address that the recovered gun had no round chambered, but People v. Chance holds present ability does not require that every preparatory step (such as chambering a round) be complete, so the omission does not undermine the result. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997 — Substantial evidence standard: the reviewing court views the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment and does not reweigh evidence or reassess credibility.
- relied: People v. Williams (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779 — Assault focuses on the nature of the act, not specific intent; the mental state is satisfied by a willful act that by its nature will probably and directly result in a battery, i.e., where the next movement would to all appearance complete the battery.
- relied: People v. Cruz-Partida (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 197 — Pointing a gun at a person in a menacing manner where there is animus or fraught circumstances is sufficient to establish the mens rea for assault.
- relied: People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1 — Merely pointing an unloaded gun in a threatening manner does not, by itself, constitute an assault.
- relied: People v. Sylva (1904) 143 Cal. 62 — Pointing an unloaded firearm does not satisfy the present-ability element of assault.
- relied: People v. Hartsch (2010) 49 Cal.4th 472 — Threatening use of an unloaded gun may show intent but not present ability to commit a battery.
- relied: People v. Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th 126 — Whether a gun was loaded may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, and an assault conviction will be upheld if the inference is reasonable.
- relied: American Drug Stores, Inc. v. Stroh (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1446 — Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are not considered because the respondent has no opportunity to respond.
- missed: People v. Chance (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1164 — Present ability for assault exists once the defendant has attained the means and location to strike immediately, even if additional steps (such as chambering a round) remain before injury could actually occur; relevant because the recovered firearm had a loaded magazine but no round in the chamber.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion applies the correct substantial-evidence standard and the controlling Supreme Court definition of assault from Williams, and Cruz-Partida directly supports treating a menacing gun-pointing amid animus as an assault. It reaches a defensible result on the loaded-gun issue but leaves a gap by not addressing the chambered-round point under People v. Chance and by loosely describing the offense as 'assault with a deadly weapon' in the introduction when the conviction was for assault with a semi-automatic firearm.
Opinion
Filed 7/17/25 P. v. Rodriguez CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D084529
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE409932)
MARCUS RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Selena D. Epley, Judge. Affirmed. Reed Webb, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette C. Cavalier and Joy Utomi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Marcus Rodriguez, appeals from a judgment after a jury conviction for assault with a deadly weapon. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (b).)1 Rodriguez argues there is insufficient evidence to support the conviction because the evidence at trial did not establish an attempt to commit a battery. We disagree and affirm the judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. September 2021 Incident L.T. lived with her boyfriend A.M., who was also the property manager of their apartment building. In 2021, Rodriguez moved into an apartment on the opposite side of the hall a few doors down from L.T. and A.M. In September, A.M. reported a disturbance in the building between Rodriguez and Rodriguez’s girlfriend, Marissa C., which A.M. attempted to break up. Later in the same month, a Ring camera outside L.T.’s and A.M.’s apartment was ripped off their door. L.T. suspected Rodriguez was responsible. On the same day L.T. remounted the camera, she noticed it activated when Marissa walked by the apartment. Later that day, L.T. looked through her front door’s peephole and observed Rodriguez acting suspiciously, standing with his body pressed against the wall looking toward her apartment. L.T. stepped partially out into the hall and asked what Rodriguez was doing. Rodriguez told L.T. to “get [her] ass back in the house.” L.T. and Rodriguez went back and forth yelling at each other. Rodriguez eventually stated that “some Lincoln girls” were going to attack L.T. L.T. understood “Lincoln girls” to refer to possible gang members. Rodriguez then lifted his shirt to reveal a firearm tucked into his waistband. L.T. asked why Rodriguez was pointing a gun at her. Rodriguez responded by removing the 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 gun from his waistband, moving forward and pointing the gun directly at L.T.’s face, responding, “Now I’m pointing the gun at you.” L.T. later described the gun as having a dual tone with a black grip and silver “top.” L.T. was fearful because she knew what firearms were capable of and had witnessed previous conflicts with Rodriguez. L.T. stated that Rodriguez had his “finger on the trigger[,]” ready to fire the gun. L.T. again asked Rodriguez why he was pointing a gun at her. She told him she would report the incident to the police. Rodriguez briefly returned to his apartment, reemerging a short time later without the gun but with a cell phone. When Rodriguez returned, he began recording and remarking that he was Mexican. L.T. understood Rodriguez’s remarks to indicate the police would find Rodriguez more credible than her, because L.T. is a Black woman. Another building tenant, R.M., who lived next door to L.T. and A.M., testified that he overheard a loud verbal exchange. He recognized the voices as L.T.’s and Rodriguez’s. R.M. stood in his doorway for five minutes observing the exchange. During this time, R.M. did not observe anything in Rodriguez’s hands. L.T. did not see anyone besides Rodriguez in the hallway. After L.T. returned to her apartment, she called A.M. and 911. A.M. left work and arrived home before the arrival of San Diego County Sheriff’s Deputy Dominic Russo. L.T. was visibly scared and asked for a restraining order. L.T. stated that Rodriguez said he was “going to beat [her] ass” if she did not go back inside her apartment. A.M. showed Deputy Russo several text messages from Rodriguez. In the texts, Rodriguez threatened to sue A.M. and to inform A.M.’s boss that A.M. smoked marijuana. A.M. also received similar text messages from an unknown number. Deputy Russo instructed A.M. not to respond to the text messages.
3 B. October Search Warrant Eleven days later, the sheriff’s department executed a search warrant on Rodriguez’s apartment. The team discovered a Smith and Wesson .40- caliber firearm with a silver top slide and a black handle in the bedroom closet. The firearm did not have a round in the chamber, but it did have a loaded magazine inserted. At trial, L.T. identified a photograph of the gun found in Rodriguez’s apartment as the gun pointed at her. C. Verdicts and Sentencing Rodriguez was convicted of making criminal threats (§ 422; count one), assault with a semi-automatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b); count two), drawing or exhibiting a firearm (§ 417, subd. (a)(2); count three), possession of a firearm while under a restraining order (§ 29825, subd. (b); counts four and six), and disobeying a court order (§ 166, subd. (a)(4); counts five and seven). The jury also found true two enhancements — being armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)) and personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). The trial court imposed a three-year term for count two and a consecutive three-year term for the personal use of firearm enhancement. It ordered a two-year term for count one, to be served concurrently. The remaining five counts were misdemeanors for which the court imposed a sentence of credit for time served. The total sentence was six years. DISCUSSION Rodriguez argues there was insufficient evidence to convict him of assault with a firearm because the crime of assault requires proof that his conduct would have directly resulted in a battery. Rodriguez suggests the prosecution failed to prove this element because further evidence of intent is necessary, such as squeezing the trigger or trying to strike someone with the firearm. Finally, for the first time in his reply brief, Rodriguez contends the 4 prosecution failed to prove a battery would immediately follow his actions because there was insufficient evidence to show the firearm was loaded during the incident. We reject these contentions. A. Governing Law 1. Standard of Review In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not determine the facts ourselves. Rather, we examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. (People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1117–1118.) If the circumstances reasonably justify the jury’s findings, the judgment may not be reversed simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding. We do not reweigh evidence or reevaluate a witness’s credibility. (Id. at p. 1118.) 2. Substantive Law Assault is, as defined by section 240, “an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another.” “[T]he crime of assault has always focused on the nature of the act and not on the perpetrator’s specific intent. An assault occurs whenever ‘ “the next movement would, at least to all appearance, complete the battery.” ’ ” (People v. Williams (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779, 786 (Williams).) “As a result, a specific intent to injure is not an element of assault because the assaultive act, by its nature, subsumes such an intent.” (Ibid.) The mental state is established by proof that the defendant willfully committed an act that by its nature will 5 probably and directly result in injury to another, i.e., a battery. (Id. at p. 787.) Pointing a gun at someone in a menacing manner or under threatening circumstances is enough to establish the requisite mental state for an assault. (People v. Cruz-Partida (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 197, 207–210 (Cruz- Partida).) Such conduct “is sufficient to provide the mens rea for an assault charge where there is animus between the defendant and the targeted party and/or the surrounding circumstances are fraught.” (Id. at p. 210.) At the same time, “[a] long line of California decisions hold[] that an assault is not committed by a person’s merely pointing an (unloaded) gun in a threatening manner . . . .” (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11, fn. 3.) Pointing an unloaded firearm in a threatening manner can satisfy the required mental state for assault pertaining to “an unlawful attempt” but will not alone satisfy the “present ability” element. (People v. Sylva (1904) 143 Cal. 62, 64; People v. Hartsch (2010) 49 Cal.4th 472, 507–508.) But direct evidence is not necessary to prove the gun was loaded; instead “the fact that the gun was loaded may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, and we will uphold an assault conviction if the inference is reasonable.” (People v. Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 147 (Penunuri).) B. Analysis For the first time in his reply brief, Rodriguez argues that additional evidence must show the firearm was loaded to prove Rodriguez had the “present ability” to complete a battery. We do not consider arguments made for the first time in a reply brief, because such arguments deprive the respondent of an opportunity to brief them. (American Drug Stores, Inc. v. Stroh (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1453.) In his opening brief, Rodriguez did not argue insufficient evidence of the “present ability” element or contest that 6 the gun was loaded. Even if the issue were not forfeited, however, we would find that the jury could have made a reasonable inference that the gun was loaded. (Penunuri, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 147.) Police discovered the firearm stored in Rodriguez’s closet with a loaded magazine inserted. The jury could reasonably infer that if Rodriguez kept the firearm loaded while storing it in his closet, it would also have been loaded when he carried it on his person and then pointed it at someone threateningly. It would be unusual to load a gun only for storage purposes. Rodriguez separately contends there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate pointing the gun at L.T. would directly result in a battery. Rodriguez does not contest there is sufficient evidence that he pointed the gun at L.T. Nor does he contest the evidence he did so after yelling at L.T. that “some Lincoln girls,” understood to be gang members, were going to attack her. Yelling at L.T. and threatening her created a violent atmosphere, which Rodriguez escalated by lifting his shirt to display his firearm. Rodriguez further intensified the menacing atmosphere by drawing the weapon while moving closer to L.T. Then, the situation reached a climax when Rodriguez pointed the gun at L.T.’s face while he had his “finger on the trigger[,]” indicating, by all appearances, that his “next movement” would be firing the weapon. (Williams, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 786.) There was also evidence of animus between the parties. Based on the totality of circumstances, Rodriguez’s threatening conduct in pointing a loaded gun at L.T. in a menacing manner was sufficient to establish an assault. (Cruz Partida, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at pp. 207–210.) Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence Rodriguez assaulted L.T. with a firearm.
7 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.
BUCHANAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
DATO, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Penunuri S095076 · 2018-05-31
- People v. Hartsch S074804 · 2010-06-28
- People v. Williams S076262 · 2001-08-23
- People v. Rodriguez S066848 · 1999-02-25
- American Drug Stores, Inc. v. Stroh D015010 · 1992-11-13
- People v. Sylva Crim. No. 1092. · 1904-04-18