Lugo v. USAA General Indemnity Company

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 ANAHI LUGO, Case No.: 3:25-cv-01365-BTM-AHG 13 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING JOINT MOTION TO CONTINUE EARLY NEUTRAL 14 v. EVALUATION CONFERENCE AND 15 USAA GENERAL INDEMNITY CASE MANAGEMENT COMPANY, CONFERENCE 16 Defendant. 17 [ECF No. 7] 18 Before the Court is the parties’ Joint Motion1 to Continue the Early Neutral 19 Evaluation (“ENE”) and Case Management Conference (“CMC”) currently set for 20 July 25, 2025. ECF No. 7. 21 Parties seeking to continue an ENE must demonstrate good cause. Chmb.R. at 2 22 (stating that any request for continuance requires “[a] showing of good cause for the 23 request”); ECF No. 4 at 6–7 (same); see FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b) (“When an act may or must 24 be done within a specified time, the court may, for good cause, extend the time”). Courts 25 have broad discretion in determining whether there is good cause. See, e.g., Johnson v. 26 27 28 1 1 Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1992); Liguori v. Hansen, No. 2 2:11cv492-GMN-CWH, 2012 WL 760747, at *12 (D. Nev. Mar. 6, 2012). “Good cause” 3 is a non-rigorous standard that has been construed broadly across procedural and statutory 4 contexts. Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1259 (9th Cir. 2010). The 5 good cause standard focuses on the diligence of the party seeking to amend the scheduling 6 order and the reasons for seeking modification. Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609 (“[T]he focus of 7 the inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking modification.... If that party was 8 not diligent, the inquiry should end.”) (internal citation omitted). Therefore, “a party 9 demonstrates good cause by acting diligently to meet the original deadlines set forth by the 10 court.” Merck v. Swift Transp. Co., No. CV-16-01103-PHX-ROS, 2018 WL 4492362, at 11 *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 19, 2018). 12 Here, the parties seek a 60-day continuance of the ENE and CMC. ECF No. 7. They 13 explain that “[a] brief2 continuance of approximately 60 days will allow them to continue 14 meaningful negotiations and potentially resolve the case without the need for discovery or 15 further pretrial proceedings.” Id. at 2. The parties argue that “continuing the ENE and CMC 16 would promote judicial economy and conserve both Court and party resources by allowing 17 the Parties additional time to pursue informal resolution efforts.” Id. The parties represent 18 that “Plaintiff’s counsel recently conveyed a settlement demand and Defendant’s counsel 19 is in the process of obtaining authority to respond.” Id. However, the parties do not expand 20 further. Forty-eight days have elapsed since the Court issued its Order setting the ENE, and 21 the Court notes that the parties have not provided the date Plaintiff’s counsel conveyed the 22 demand,—since “recently” could imply one day ago or one month ago—which could have 23 24 25 2 The Court notes that a 60-day continuance of an ENE is not “brief.” Local Rule 16.1(c) requires that an ENE take place within forty-five (45) days of the filing of the first answer. 26 Unfortunately, the Court’s calendar did not allow for compliance with the 45-day deadline 27 in this case, and the Court set the ENE for the earliest date available on its calendar. ECF No. 4 at 1 n.1. If a 60-day continuance was granted, the ENE would occur 119 days after 28 1 shown diligence. The parties also do not explain what steps they plan to take during their 2 proposed 60-day extension period. Further, the parties did not address whether they had 3 complied with other deadlines in the Court’s Order, such as the June 26, 2025, meet and 4 confer deadline, or the July 10, 2025, initial disclosure deadline. See ECF No. 4 at 3–4. 5 Again, this omission belies a finding of diligence. The Court also notes that the parties 6 failed to provide a declaration from counsel, as required by the Court’s Chambers Rules 7 and the Court’s Order setting the conferences. Chmb.R. at 2 (requiring that the joint motion 8 for continuance include a “declaration from counsel seeking the continuance that describes 9 the steps taken to comply with the existing deadlines, and the specific reasons why the 10 deadlines cannot be met”); ECF No. 4 at 6–7 (same). Aside from being required, a 11 declaration would have been helpful to the Court in resolving the many omissions noted 12 above. 13 Upon due consideration, the Court does not find good cause for a continuance. 14 Therefore, the Court DENIES the parties’ joint motion. ECF No. 7. The Court finds that 15 an “informal discussion between the attorneys and the settlement judge of every aspect of 16 the lawsuit in an effort to achieve an early resolution of the case,” (ECF No. 4 at 2), would 17 be beneficial to the parties at this time. The Court will, however, modify the conferences 18 as follows: 19 1. The ENE set for July 25, 2025 at 2:00 p.m. via videoconference before the 20 Honorable Allison H. Goddard remains on calendar. The Court reiterates its attendance 21 requirements for the ENE. See ECF No. 4 at 1, 2, 5. 22 2. The CMC and pre-CMC deadlines (such as the Joint Case Management 23 Statement filing deadline, which was July 14, 2025) are CONTINUED. The Court will 24 reschedule the CMC and its related deadlines during the ENE. 25 3. The deadlines for lodging the Confidential ENE Statements and Participant 26 Lists, which were due on July 18, 2025 (see ECF No. 4 at 2, 5–6) are slightly continued, 27 and must now be emailed to efile_goddard@casd.uscourts.gov no later than 3:00 p.m. on 28 June 24, 2025. 1 4. All other videoconference procedures and requirements set forth in the 2 || Court’s original Order setting the ENE and CMC remain in place. See ECF No. 4 at 4-6. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 ||Dated: July 16, 2025 JpwornH. Xho Honorable Allison H. Goddard 6 United States Magistrate Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28