Ossa v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Bryan OSSA, et al., Case No.: 24-cv-2133-AGS-DTF 4 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ 5 v. MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT (ECF 35) 6 JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., et al., 7 Defendants. 8 Plaintiffs Bryan and Kirsten Ossa move to amend their complaint by adding a Fair 9 Credit Reporting Act claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). (See ECF 35.) Defendant 10 TransUnion, LLC, opposes. (See ECF 36.) 11 Courts grant leave to amend “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). 12 Such requests should be permitted with “extreme liberality,” Moss v. United States Secret 13 Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 972 (9th Cir. 2009), and “the party opposing amendment bears the 14 burden of showing prejudice, unfair delay, bad faith, or futility of amendment,” 15 United Steel v. ConocoPhillips Co., No. CV 08-2068 PSG (FFMX), 2009 WL 650730, 16 at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2009). When deciding whether to allow amendment, courts 17 consider the following: (1) “undue prejudice to the opposing party”; (2) “bad faith or 18 dilatory motive on the part of the movant”; (3) “undue delay”; (4) “futility of amendment”; 19 and (5) “repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed.” Foman 20 v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). TransUnion makes no argument about the 21 amendment’s futility (see ECF 36), and this would be plaintiffs’ first amendment, so the 22 Court focuses on the first three factors. 23 TransUnion first argues that allowing amendment would “prejudice” it by forcing it 24 to defend “a new set of claims” “with ten weeks left in discovery.” (ECF 36, at 4.) But the 25 Ninth Circuit has found that “there is no evidence” of prejudice when, as here, the “case is 26 still at the discovery stage with no trial date pending.” See DCD Programs, Ltd. v. 27 Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 188 (9th Cir. 1987). So “there is no evidence that [TransUnion] 28 1 || would be prejudiced.” See id. 2 TransUnion next asserts that plaintiffs’ motion is made in “bad faith” because they 3 ||offer “no explanation as to why they did not allege a §1681le(b) claim in their [initial] 4 || Complaint.” (ECF 36, at 3.) But, in assessing whether a party engaged in “bad faith,” courts 5 ||require more—such as evidence of “sharp practice” litigation that “seek[s] to add a 6 defendant merely to destroy diversity jurisdiction.” SAES Getters S.p.A. v. Aeronex, Inc., 7 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1095 (S.D. Cal. 2002). There is no inkling of such gamesmanship 8 9 Finally, TransUnion accuses plaintiffs of engaging in “[u]ndue [d]elay” by waiting 10 ||roughly five months before requesting leave to amend the complaint. (ECF 36, at 4.) But 11 timing here is hardly concerning. Plaintiffs moved to amend with months of discovery 12 ||remaining. (See ECF 49, at | (extending the cut-off date for fact discovery to September 3, 13 || 2025).) And the requested new cause of action is unlikely to unreasonably expand the scope 14 ||of discovery, if it expands it at all. This factor also favors amendment. Cf. Hurn y. 15 || Retirement Fund Tr. of Plumbing, Heating & Piping Indus. of S. Cal., 648 F.2d 1252 16 Cir. 1981) (allowing amendment “approximately two years after the original 17 ||}complaint was filed”). 18 As all factors tip in plaintiffs’ favor, their motion for leave to amend is GRANTED. 19 || The amended complaint is due by August 12, 2025. 20 ||Dated: July 15, 2025 22 Hon. Andrew G. Schopler 73 United States District Judge 24 25 26 27 28