Gonzales v. Madden
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Daniel E. Butcher (author)
Analysis
Plaintiff, a pro se state prisoner, moved for the appointment of counsel in a civil rights action, arguing that his illiteracy and Spanish-speaking status warranted assistance. The court denied the motion without prejudice, finding that the plaintiff had demonstrated the ability to articulate his claims and that the record was not sufficiently developed to determine the likelihood of success on the merits.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Motion for Appointment of Counsel denied without prejudice“In sum, the Court does not find the required exceptional circumstances present for appointment of counsel. Plaintiff's motion, therefore, is DENIED without prejudice to renewal at a later stage of the proceedings.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the Ninth Circuit standard for appointment of counsel in civil cases, requiring a showing of 'exceptional circumstances' based on the likelihood of success and the plaintiff's ability to articulate claims. The court noted that the plaintiff's filings demonstrated literacy and that the complaint survived initial screening, but correctly identified that the likelihood of success on the merits could not yet be determined. Denying the motion without prejudice is the standard procedural outcome when the record is not yet developed enough to make a final determination on the merits-based prong of the test. |
The order itself: sound — The order is legally sound. It correctly identifies the lack of a constitutional right to counsel in civil cases and applies the appropriate statutory and circuit standards for discretionary appointment. The court properly balances the plaintiff's pro se status (by acknowledging the liberal construction rule) with the specific requirements for appointment (likelihood of success and ability to articulate). The decision to deny without prejudice is procedurally correct given that the merits of the case have not yet been litigated, making it impossible to fully assess the 'likelihood of success' prong of the test.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 HELIDORO GONZALES, Case No.: 23-cv-2181-AGS-DEB 11 Plaintiff, 12 ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR v. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 13 RAYMOND MADDEN, et al., 14 Defendants. [DKT NO. 25] 15 16 17 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel. Dkt No. 25. 18 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis on a claim filed 19 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dkt. No. 9 at 1–2. Plaintiff claims he is “illiterate/Spanish- 20 speaking” and, therefore, appointment of counsel is warranted in the instant action. Dkt. 21 No. 25 at 1 (Pl.’s Mot. to Appoint Counsel.). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s 22 motion is DENIED without prejudice. 23 There is no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case. Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 24 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Storseth v. Spellman, 654 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981)). 25 An indigent’s right to appointed counsel exists “only where the litigant may lose his 26 physical liberty if he loses the litigation.” Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cty., 27 N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). In “exceptional circumstances,” however, a court may 28 exercise its discretion and “request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford 1 counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); Palmer, 560 F.3d at 970. The court must consider both 2 “‘the likelihood of success on the merits as well as the ability of the [Plaintiff] to articulate 3 his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.’” Palmer, 560 F.3d 4 at 970 (quoting Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983)). 5 There is currently no basis to support a finding of exceptional circumstances in this 6 case. Plaintiff’s complaint and filings evidence he can effectively articulate his claim 7 (perhaps with assistance) with proper spelling, grammar, and handwriting. See Dkt. No. 1 8 (Compl.); see also Dkt. No. 2 at 2-4 (Pl.’s Mot. for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis); 9 Dkt. No. 10 at 1 (Pl.’s Notice of Intent to Proceed); Dkt. No. 25 at 1. Moreover, Plaintiff’s 10 complaint survived the Court’s screening. See Dkt. No. 9 at 4–12 (granting Plaintiff’s 11 Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis, granting Plaintiff’s Motion to File Additional Pages, 12 and finding that eight of Plaintiff’s eleven claims survive 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) screening). 13 Although Plaintiff’s complaint survived screening, the record is not sufficiently 14 developed for the Court to determine whether Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits, 15 and Plaintiff makes no such showing in his Motion. Palmer, 560 F.3d at 970 (holding that 16 “[w]hen determining whether ‘exceptional circumstances’ exist, a court must consider ‘the 17 likelihood of success on the merits. . .’”). 18 “In civil rights cases where the plaintiff appears pro se, the court must construe the 19 pleadings liberally and must afford plaintiff the benefit of any doubt.” Jackson v. Carey, 20 353 F.3d 750, 757 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted). This also applies to motions. 21 Bernhardt v. Los Angeles Cty., 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Courts have a duty to 22 construe pro se pleadings liberally, including pro se motions. . .”). Accordingly, the Court 23 will take Plaintiff’s pro se status into consideration when his filings are reviewed and afford 24 him “the benefit of any doubt.” Jackson, 353 F.3d at 757. 25 \\ 26 \\ 27 \\ 28 l In sum, the Court does not find the required exceptional circumstances present for 2 ||appointment of counsel. Plaintiff's motion, therefore, is DENIED without prejudice to 3 renewal at a later stage of the proceedings. 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 _ 6 Date: July 3, 2025 Selon 7 Honorable Daniel E. Butcher United States Magistrate Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28