People v. Anguiano CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from an order
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Bernardino County · No. FWV036394
- Trial judge
- Ingrid Adamson Uhler
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed and remanded with instructions.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Michele M. Castillo (author), Judith D. McConnell, Laurence D. Rubin
Analysis
The trial court resentenced the defendant under Penal Code section 1172.75, declining to strike certain firearm enhancements, delegating the recalculation of custody credits to CDCR, and issuing an abstract of judgment that included expired restitution fines and omitted a pronounced enhancement. The Court of Appeal affirmed the sentence but remanded with instructions to recalculate credits, vacate the fines, and correct the abstract of judgment to match the oral pronouncement.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Trial court's decision to decline to strike firearm enhancements on counts 1 and 2“We conclude Anguiano forfeited his claim as to the firearm enhancement by failing to object.” | unclear | correct | agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the forfeiture rule from People v. Scott, holding that the claim was waived because the defendant did not object at the time of sentencing. The reasoning is supported by the cited authority and the procedural history provided in the opinion. |
Trial court's delegation of custody credit recalculation to CDCR“The court erred in delegating this task. (Buckhalter, 26 Cal.4th at p. 29.)” | de novo | error | agree with court The court correctly identified that under People v. Buckhalter and Penal Code section 2900.5(d), the trial court has the duty to determine and apply custody credits, not delegate that task to CDCR. The application of the de novo standard to a question of the court's authority is appropriate. |
Inclusion of restitution fines on the abstract of judgment“Given these fees were not discussed at resentencing and imposed over 10 years ago, they should be vacated. (Ibid.)” | unclear | error | agree with court The court correctly applied Penal Code section 1465.9(d), which renders restitution fines unenforceable ten years after imposition. Since the fines were imposed in 2009 and not addressed at the 2024 resentencing, they were properly vacated. |
Omission of firearm enhancement on count 1 from the abstract of judgment“Since the oral pronouncement is controlling, the abstract of judgment should be corrected to include the enhancement. (Mitchell, 26 Cal.4th at p. 185.)” | unclear | error | agree with court The court correctly applied the principle from People v. Mitchell that the oral pronouncement of judgment controls over a contradictory abstract of judgment. The omission was a clerical error that could be corrected on remand. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331 — A party must raise an issue at the time of sentencing to preserve a claim of abuse of discretion for appellate review.
- relied: People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20 — When a sentence is modified, the trial court must recalculate and apply time served to the subsequent sentence.
- relied: People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181 — The oral pronouncement of judgment controls over a contradictory abstract of judgment, and discrepancies are clerical errors.
- relied: People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340 — Questions regarding the trial court's authority are reviewed de novo.
- relied: People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847 — Memorandum opinions may be used to resolve matters where the issues are not suitable for publication.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies established California law regarding forfeiture of sentencing claims, the trial court's duty to calculate custody credits, and the primacy of oral pronouncements over abstracts of judgment. The reasoning is concise and directly addresses the arguments raised by the parties with appropriate authorities.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionAt a 2024 resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, the San Bernardino Superior Court declined to strike the section 12022.53 firearm enhancements, ordered CDCR to recalculate custody credits, and issued an amended abstract of judgment that still listed 2009 restitution fines and omitted the count 1 firearm enhancement. The Court of Appeal held the enhancement claim forfeited for lack of objection, accepted the People's concessions that the credit delegation and abstract errors were improper, affirmed, and remanded with instructions to recalculate credits, vacate the restitution fines, and correct the abstract.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Trial court's refusal to strike the section 12022.53 firearm enhancement on count 2 under section 1385“At resentencing, Anguiano did not object to the trial court’s exercise of discretion in declining to strike the firearm enhancement.” | abuse of discretion | not reached | agree with court People v. Scott holds that claims involving the trial court's discretionary sentencing choices are forfeited absent a timely objection; a decision not to strike an enhancement under section 1385 is such a choice, and appellant identified no exception to forfeiture. The court's application of Scott is straightforward and correct. |
Order directing CDCR, rather than the court, to recalculate custody credits after resentencing“The court erred in delegating this task.” | de novo | error (law misapplied) | agree with court Sections 2900.1 and 2900.5(d) and People v. Buckhalter place the duty on the trial court at resentencing to calculate all actual custody credits through the date of the new sentence; delegating that task to CDCR is error, and the People conceded. Remand for recalculation is the proper remedy. |
Inclusion of the 2009 section 1202.4(b) and 1202.45(b) restitution fines on the second amended abstract of judgment“Given these fees were not discussed at resentencing and imposed over 10 years ago, they should be vacated.” | de novo | error (other) | agree with court Under People v. Mitchell the oral pronouncement controls and the appellate court may order clerical discrepancies corrected; the fines were not orally imposed at resentencing and the opinion relies on section 1465.9(d), which the court reads as rendering such fines unenforceable ten years after imposition. With the People's concession, the result is defensible, though the court's analysis of section 1465.9(d) is conclusory and I cannot independently verify the statutory text from the opinion alone. |
Omission of the count 1 section 12022.53 firearm enhancement from the abstract of judgment despite oral pronouncement“Since the oral pronouncement is controlling, the abstract of judgment should be corrected to include the enhancement.” | de novo | error (other) | agree with court Mitchell squarely holds that an abstract that fails to reflect the oral pronouncement contains a clerical error correctable on appeal at the parties' request; the correction was unopposed. The ruling is correct. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331 — Claims involving the trial court's failure to properly make or articulate discretionary sentencing choices are forfeited if not raised at sentencing.
- relied: People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20 — When a sentence is modified on remand, the trial court must recalculate and credit all actual days of custody served through the date of resentencing.
- relied: People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181 — The oral pronouncement of judgment controls over a contradictory abstract of judgment; discrepancies are clerical errors an appellate court may order corrected.
- relied: People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340 — Questions concerning the scope of a trial court's authority are reviewed de novo.
- relied: People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847 — Appellate courts may resolve straightforward matters by memorandum opinion.
The appellate opinion: sound — The court correctly applied Scott's forfeiture rule to the unpreserved section 1385 claim and relied on Buckhalter and Mitchell, the controlling Supreme Court authorities, to accept the People's concessions on custody credits and the abstract of judgment. The treatment of section 1465.9(d) is brief and does not quote or explain the statute, but with the concession and the Mitchell principle the result is well supported.
Opinion
Filed 7/3/25 P. v. Anguiano CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D084681
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. FWV036394)
PAUL GILBERT ANGUIANO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, Ingrid A. Uhler, Judge. Affirmed and remanded with instructions. Laura Arnold, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Mandel and James Spradley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Paul Gilbert Anguiano appeals from a 2024 resentencing order, claiming (1) the trial court abused its discretion in declining to strike a firearm enhancement, (2) the trial court erred by failing to recalculate custody credits, and (3) the restitution fines listed on the abstract of judgment should be vacated. We conclude Anguiano forfeited his claim as to the firearm enhancement by failing to object. The People concede error as to the custody credits and restitution fines, which concessions we accept. Thus, resolving this matter by memorandum opinion (see generally People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847), we affirm and remand with instructions to correct certain errors in the abstract of judgment. I. In 2008, a jury found Anguiano guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1), attempted murder (§§ 664/187(a); counts 2, 3, and 4), and being a felon in possession of a firearm (former § 12021(a)(1); count 5). The jury also found true certain firearm enhancements (§ 12022.53(c), (d) & (e)(1), counts 1 and 2; § 12022.7(a), count 2; § 12022.53(c) & (e)(1), counts 3 and 4) and that Anguiano committed all offenses for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22(b)(1)). Anguiano was sentenced to 50 years to life in prison, three life sentences, and a determinate term of 43 years and eight months with 1,256 days of credit for time served. He was also ordered to pay $400 total in restitution fines and additional restitution to the victims. Anguiano was resentenced on June 27, 2024, under section 1172.75. During resentencing, the trial court decided not to strike the firearm enhancements on counts 1 and 2. (§ 12022.53(c), (d) & (e)(1).) Anguiano was resentenced to 75 years to life plus a determinate term of 12 years and four months. The court then ordered the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to recalculate the custody credits based on time already served. The custody credits listed on the second amended abstract of judgment, however, reflect those given originally.
2 II. A. Anguiano first argues the trial court abused its discretion in deciding not to strike the firearm enhancement on count 2. Section 1385 gives the trial court discretion to strike or dismiss enhancements and provides certain guidelines and factors trial courts must consider in exercising their discretion. Yet for this court to consider a claim regarding abuse of such discretion, a party must have first raised the issue at the time of sentencing, or it is forfeited. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 356.) The People assert this claim is forfeited because Anguiano failed to promptly object to the trial court’s decision to not strike the enhancement. We agree. At resentencing, Anguiano did not object to the trial court’s exercise of discretion in declining to strike the firearm enhancement. Nor does he claim on appeal any exceptions to forfeiture apply. We therefore conclude this claim is forfeited. B. Anguiano next argues the trial court erred by directing CDCR to recalculate custody credits against the newly modified sentence instead of performing the recalculation itself. The People concede error, and we agree. When resentenced, a defendant shall be credited for time served on the sentence declared invalid or modified. (§ 2900.1.) At resentencing, it is the trial court’s duty to determine the total number of days to be credited. (§ 2900.5(d).) Thus, when a defendant’s sentence is modified after a defendant has already served time, the trial court must recalculate and apply the time served to the “subsequent sentence.” (People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 33.)
3 We review a question of the trial court’s authority de novo. (People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, 354.) At the 2024 resentencing hearing, the trial court ordered “[c]ustody credits . . . to be recalculated by” CDCR. The court erred in delegating this task. (Buckhalter, 26 Cal.4th at p. 29.) We accordingly remand to the trial court to calculate Anguiano’s custody credits through the date of his 2024 resentencing. C. Finally, Anguiano contends the $400 total in restitution fines included on the second amended abstract of judgment should be vacated. The People concede as much. The People also ask, without opposition, that we order the trial court to correct a second error, a missing enhancement, on the abstract of judgment. We agree with the People and discuss each error in turn. The oral pronouncement of judgment controls over a contradictory abstract of judgment. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.) Any discrepancy is a clerical error, which an appellate court may order to be corrected on its own motion or upon the application of the parties. (Ibid.) First, the trial court did not address the restitution fines, originally imposed in 2009, at resentencing. Yet the fines are listed on the second amended abstract of judgment. Section 1465.9(d) provides that such fines shall be unenforceable and uncollectable 10 years after the date of imposition. Given these fees were not discussed at resentencing and imposed over 10 years ago, they should be vacated. (Ibid.) Second, the firearm enhancement imposed on count 1 is not listed on the abstract of judgment despite being pronounced at resentencing. Since the oral pronouncement is controlling, the abstract of judgment should be corrected to include the enhancement. (Mitchell, 26 Cal.4th at p. 185.)
4 Accordingly, we remand to the trial court with instructions to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect the oral pronouncement with respect to both the restitution fines and the firearm enhancement on count 1. III. We remand to the trial court to (1) recalculate Anguiano’s custody credits through the date of his June 27, 2024 resentencing, (2) vacate the remaining balance of the sections 1202.4(b) and 1202.45(b) restitution fines, and (3) modify the abstract of judgment to accurately reflect the recalculated custody credits, the vacated sections 1202.4(b) and 1202.45(b) restitution fines, and the imposed section 12022.53, subdivisions (c), (d) and (e)(1) firearm enhancement on count 1. The court shall forward a certified copy of the amended abstract of judgment to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, we affirm.
CASTILLO, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
RUBIN, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Garcia F034831 · 2002-04-17
- People v. Buckhalter S086220 · 2001-08-29
- People v. Mitchell S090791 · 2001-07-19
- People v. Scott No. S037757 · 1994-12-30