Fernandez v. Duarte
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Cynthia Ann Bashant (author)
Analysis
Defendant moved to seal portions of his Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting evidence from both the public and the pro per Plaintiff. The Court denied the motion, holding that due process requires the Defendant to disclose any information relied upon to the Plaintiff, and ordered the Defendant to choose between disclosing the material or withdrawing reliance on it.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Motion to Seal (ECF No. 136) is denied.“For the reasons stated above, the Motion to Seal (ECF No. 136) is DENIED.” | agree with court The court correctly identifies that the presumption of access applies to judicial records and that the 'compelling reasons' standard applies because the motion is related to the merits. More importantly, the court correctly applies the fundamental due process requirement that a party cannot rely on evidence in a summary judgment motion without providing that evidence to the opposing party. Denying the seal to prevent the defendant from withholding evidence from the plaintiff is a legally sound application of due process principles in civil litigation. |
Defendant is ordered to notify the Court by July 11, 2025, whether he will withdraw reliance on the sealed information or disclose it to the Plaintiff.“Defendant is ordered to notify the Court on the docket by Friday, July 11, 2025, whether he plans to withdraw his reliance on this information or disclose it to the Plaintiff.” | agree with court This is a procedural order designed to enforce the due process ruling. It provides a clear path forward for the defendant to either comply with disclosure or limit his arguments to the redacted record. This is a reasonable and necessary procedural step. |
The order itself: sound — The order is legally sound. It correctly applies the Ninth Circuit's framework for sealing judicial records, identifying the correct standard ('compelling reasons') for documents related to the merits. Crucially, it goes beyond the sealing standard to address the fundamental due process violation inherent in the defendant's request to withhold evidence from the opposing party in a summary judgment motion. The court's reasoning that due process prohibits ex parte submission of facts relied upon for judgment is correct and well-supported by basic principles of civil procedure. The order provides a clear, workable solution for the defendant.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 FRANK J. FERNANDEZ, Case No. 22-cv-0446-BAS-VET 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S 13 v. MOTION TO SEAL (ECF No. 136) 14 E. DUARTE, ISU Sergeant, 15 Defendant. 16 17 Defendant in this case moves to seal portions of his Motion for Summary Judgment, 18 along with some of the supporting evidence, not only from the public but also from the 19 Plaintiff, who is appearing pro per. (ECF No. 136.) Ironically, Defendant simultaneously 20 opposes Plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel. (ECF No. 138.) Requesting that 21 the Court rely on facts, while hamstringing Plaintiff from responding to those facts, violates 22 the very essence of due process. Hence, the Court DENIES the Motion to Seal (ECF No. 23 136). 24 “[T]he courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public 25 records and documents, including judicial records and documents.” Nixon v. Warner 26 Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). “Unless a particular court record is one 27 ‘traditionally kept secret,’ a ‘strong presumption in favor of access’ is the starting 28 point.” Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 1 2006) (citing Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003)). 2 “The presumption of access is ‘based on the need for federal courts, although 3 independent—indeed, particularly because they are independent—to have a measure of 4 accountability and for the public to have confidence in the administration of justice.’” Ctr. 5 for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting United 6 States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995)). 7 A party seeking to seal a judicial record bears the burden of overcoming the strong 8 presumption of access. Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135. The showing required to meet this burden 9 depends upon whether the documents to be sealed relate to a motion that is “more than 10 tangentially related to the merits of the case.” Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1102. When 11 the underlying motion is more than tangentially related to the merits, the “compelling 12 reasons” standard applies. Id. at 1096–98. When the underlying motion does not surpass 13 the tangential relevance threshold, the “good cause” standard applies. Id. An action’s 14 complaint, and its associated exhibits, are more than tangentially related to the merits of 15 the case. Id. at 1098. Similarly, a party’s opposition to a motion to dismiss is more than 16 tangentially related to the merits of the case. Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1098. 17 In this case, the underlying motion is more than tangentially related to the merits, so 18 the “compelling reasons” standard applies. However, even if the Defendant meets the 19 compelling reasons standard, which it may well do with the concerns about security, the 20 basic tenets of due process prohibit submitting information to a judge ex parte without 21 giving the other party a chance to respond.1 22 The Court is cognizant that such a rule requires Defendant to make judgment calls 23 about what information he wants to rely on and how much he can realistically disclose. 24 Those sorts of decisions are made frequently in criminal cases, when law enforcement 25 assesses the need, for example, of a confidential informant’s testimony against disclosure 26 27 1 Out of curiosity, if this case goes to trial, how does Defendant plan to proceed: ask Plaintiff to leave the courtroom during part of the trial so he does not hear the facts on which the Defendant plans to 28 1 the defendants. At any rate, any information which Defendant plans to present to the 2 || Court and rely on in support of his Motion for Summary Judgment must be disclosed first 3 Plaintiff. Defendant, therefore, has the option of relying solely on the redacted Motion 4 ||for Summary Judgment and withdrawing any reference to anything in those redactions, or 5 ||turning over an unredacted version to Plaintiff.2 The Court would consider sealing the 6 ||information from the public docket, but the Court cautions Defendant that he may not be 7 to keep this information confidential at a public trial. 8 Defendant is ordered to notify the Court on the docket by Friday, July 11, 2025, 9 || whether he plans to withdraw his reliance on this information or disclose it to the Plaintiff. 10 If the latter, Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to file a sur-reply in response to these 11 documents. 12 For the reasons stated above, the Motion to Seal (ECF No. 136) is DENIED. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 15 || DATED: July 1, 2025 (atta Bahar 16 Hon. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge 7 United States District Court 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 || ——_—— 28 2 The Court would be open to other protections for this material, such as disclosing the information to Plaintiff without allowing him to keep copies. □□□