Pineda Aguila v. Restriction Order to Every Person on the system
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Cathy Ann Bencivengo (author)
Analysis
The court reviewed a pro se plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis and her complaint against vague, non-legal entities. The court denied the IFP motion for failure to demonstrate poverty and dismissed the complaint with prejudice for failing to state a claim and lacking subject matter jurisdiction.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Denial of Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis“Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP is DENIED.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the requirement that a plaintiff must allege poverty with particularity. The order notes the application was 'almost entirely blank' and failed to explain how the plaintiff survives without spending money, which is a valid basis for denial under Ninth Circuit precedent. |
Dismissal of Complaint with Prejudice“As such, the Court dismisses this action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).” | agree with court The complaint names 'Every Person on the System' and 'People on the Cognition System' as defendants and asserts a claim against 'every inappropriate illegal act.' This fails to identify specific defendants or a legal cause of action. Dismissal with prejudice is appropriate for a complaint that is 'largely incomprehensible' and lacks an arguable basis in law or fact, particularly where the plaintiff is pro se and the deficiencies are fundamental to the pleading's validity. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the deficiencies in the IFP application and the complaint. It relies on appropriate Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court authority to support the denial of IFP status and the dismissal of the complaint. The reasoning is concise but sufficient for a pro se complaint that is facially deficient and incomprehensible.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ROSA PINEDA AGUILA, Case No.: 3:25-cv-01484-CAB-MMP 12 Plaintiff, ORDER 13 v. (1) DENYING IFP APPLICATION; 14 “WILEALDO PINEDA PEREZ,” et al., and 15 Defendants. (2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT 16 WITH PREJUDICE 17 19 On June 10, 2025, Plaintiff Rosa Pineda Aguila, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint 20 against Wilealdo Pineda Perez, “Every Person on the System”, and the “People on the 21 Cognition System.” [Compl. at 5.] At the time of filing, Plaintiff did not prepay the civil 22 filing fees 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) requires. Instead, Plaintiff filed a motion to proceed in 23 forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). [Doc. No. 2.] For the reasons 24 discussed below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s IFP motion and DISMISSES this 25 complaint with prejudice. 26 28 1 I. Motion to Proceed IFP 2 Generally, all parties instituting a civil action in this Court must pay a filing fee. See 3 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); CivLR 4.5(a). But under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), the Court may 4 authorize any suit’s commencement, prosecution, or defense without payment of fees if the 5 plaintiff submits an affidavit, including a statement of all his or her assets, showing he or 6 she is unable to pay filing fees or costs. “An affidavit in support of an IFP application is 7 sufficient where it alleges that the affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the 8 necessities of life.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). “[A] 9 plaintiff seeking IFP status must allege poverty with some particularity, definiteness and 10 certainty.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Granting or denying leave to proceed 11 IFP in civil cases is within the district court’s sound discretion. Venable v. Meyers, 500 12 F.2d 1215, 1216 (9th Cir. 1974) (citations omitted). 13 Plaintiff motion to proceed IFP is almost entirely blank. [Doc. No. 2.] Assuming 14 Plaintiff has no income, Plaintiff does not explain how they live without spending anything 15 on rent, food, cloth, transportation, etc. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP is 16 DENIED. 17 II. Screening of the Complaint Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 18 A plaintiff seeking to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is subject to sua 19 sponte dismissal if the complaint is “frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim on which 20 relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from 21 such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 22 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); 23 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only 24 permits but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to 25 state a claim.”). Congress enacted this safeguard because “a litigant whose filing fees and 26 court costs are assumed by the public . . . lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing 27 frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) 28 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). 1 Plaintiff's complaint is largely incomprehensible. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 2 ||639, 640-41 (9th Cir. 1989) (a complaint may be dismissed as frivolous if it lacks an 3 || arguable basis in law or fact), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. 4 || Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff asserts a “claim [against] every 5 || inappropriate illegal act on the system.” [Doc. No. | at 6.] This pleading does not state a 6 ||cause of action or provide a basis for subject matter jurisdiction. As such, the Court 7 || dismisses this action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). 8 Hil. Conclusion 9 Plaintiff's IFP application is DENIED and the complaint DISMISSED with 10 || prejudice. 11 It is SO ORDERED. 12 13 Dated: June 13, 2025 (ib 14 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 15 United States District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28