Lopez v. Lopez CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D084431 · 2025-06-13 · Unpublished

Proceeding: appeal from an order
Trial court: Superior Court of San Diego County · No. 22FL010460C
Trial judge: Lizbet Munoz
Outcome: affirmed — Affirmed.
Area: family
Panel: Michele M. Castillo (author), Laurence D. Rubin, Buchanan

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T02:44Z · confidence high

The trial court granted a two-year domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against the appellant, finding that her conduct disturbed the peace of the respondent and children based on a preponderance of the evidence. The Court of Appeal affirmed the order, holding that the appellant failed to provide an adequate appellate record to demonstrate reversible error, thereby triggering the presumption that the trial court's findings were supported by substantial evidence.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Granting of a two-year Domestic Violence Restraining Order (DVRO) protecting the respondent and minor children from the appellant. “the court found a permanent restraining order necessary.”	abuse of discretion	correct	agree with court The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision. It applied the standard of review for abuse of discretion and noted that the appellant failed to provide a complete record (including testimony and exhibits) to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. Consequently, the court applied the presumption that the trial court's findings were supported by substantial evidence and found no reversible error on the face of the record.

Authorities

relied: In re Marriage of Everard (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 109 — Establishes that the standard of review for orders granting or denying a DVRO is abuse of discretion and that the applicant must show past abuse by a preponderance of the evidence.
relied: Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594 — Establishes the fundamental principle that the trial court's order is presumed correct and that an inadequate record for meaningful review compels the appellate court to affirm the order.
relied: Elena S. v. Kroutik (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 570 — Establishes that a self-represented party is entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration than a party represented by counsel regarding appellate procedural requirements.
relied: Bond v. Pulsar Video Productions (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 918 — Establishes that trial court findings of fact and conclusions of law are presumed to be supported by substantial evidence and are binding on the appellate court unless reversible error appears on the record.
relied: People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847 — Cited generally to support the use of a memorandum opinion for this disposition.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the well-established legal principle that an appellant bears the burden of providing an adequate record to demonstrate error, and that an incomplete record compels affirmance. The court properly cited binding authority (Jameson v. Desta) to support the conclusion that the lack of a verbatim record or exhibits prevented meaningful review of the sufficiency of the evidence.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:30Z · confidence low

After an unreported evidentiary hearing, the San Diego Superior Court granted Kyle Lopez a two-year domestic violence restraining order against his former spouse Vanessa Lopez protecting him and their two minor children, finding Kyle credible, Vanessa not credible, and that her conduct (attending a child's graduation despite a no-visitation order, pulling the children out of class, appearing unannounced at Kyle's home, and initiating group texts) disturbed Kyle's peace. On appeal, Vanessa, self-represented, argued the DVRO lacked substantial evidence; the Court of Appeal affirmed in a memorandum opinion because the appellate record omitted the DVRO application, exhibits, and any meaningful record of testimony, so the presumption of correctness controlled.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Grant of a two-year domestic violence restraining order under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act based on a finding that Vanessa's conduct disturbed Kyle's peace (Fam. Code, §§ 6203, subd. (a)(4), 6320). “Vanessa challenges the evidence supporting the trial court’s DVRO without providing us that evidence.”	abuse of discretion	correct	agree with court The court stated the abuse of discretion standard from In re Marriage of Everard, but the dispositive analysis rested on the Jameson v. Desta presumption of correctness and the Bond rule that factual findings are presumed supported by substantial evidence when the record is inadequate. Appellant failed to designate the DVRO application, supporting declarations, hearing exhibits, or a usable record of testimony; the settled statement added nothing beyond the minute order. On that record a substantial-evidence challenge cannot succeed, and the minute order's findings (violating a no-visitation order by attending a graduation, disrupting school, unannounced visits to the home, unwanted group texts) are not facially insufficient under the broad § 6320(c) definition of disturbing the peace. The result follows directly from settled appellate-procedure authority.

Authorities

relied: Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594 — Trial court orders are presumed correct; appellant bears the burden of showing error on the record presented, and an inadequate record, including lack of a verbatim transcript, requires affirmance.
relied: In re Marriage of Everard (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 109 — A DVRO applicant must prove past abuse by a preponderance of the evidence, and orders granting or denying a DVRO are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
relied: Elena S. v. Kroutik (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 570 — A self-represented litigant is treated like any other party and receives the same, but no greater, consideration than a represented party.
relied: Bond v. Pulsar Video Productions (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 918 — When the appellate record is incomplete, the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are presumed supported by substantial evidence and bind the appellate court unless reversible error appears on the face of the record.
relied: People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847 — Appellate courts may resolve appeals by memorandum opinion where the issues are straightforward.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion correctly applies the presumption of correctness and the inadequate-record rule from Jameson and Bond to a substantial-evidence challenge brought without the underlying evidence, and it fairly accounts for the appellant's pro per status and her attempt at a settled statement. It also checked, albeit briefly, that no reversible error appears on the face of the minute order, which is all that could be reviewed on this record.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

record incomplete

Opinion

Filed 6/13/25 Lopez v. Lopez CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

VANESSA VERGARA LOPEZ, D084431

Appellant, v. (Super. Ct. No. 22FL010460C)

KYLE KALOKAHIMAIKALANIMAI LOPEZ, SR., Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Lizbet Muñoz, Judge. Affirmed. Vanessa Vergara Lopez, in pro. per., for Appellant. No appearance by Respondent. Vanessa Vergara Lopez challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the domestic violence restraining order entered against her protecting her former spouse Kyle Kalokahimaikalanimai Lopez, Sr. and their two minor children. Resolving this matter by memorandum opinion (see generally People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847), we affirm. I. Following an unreported evidentiary hearing, the court granted Kyle’s request for a DVRO protecting him and the couple’s minor children from Vanessa for two years. At the hearing, both Vanessa and Kyle testified, and Kyle introduced copies of Vanessa’s communications as exhibits. In its minute order, the court found Kyle’s testimony credible but “d[id] not find [Vanessa] credible.” The court noted Vanessa “showed up at one of the child[ren]’s graduation when she was previously ordered to not . . . have any visitation with the children.” Vanessa also “continues to pull them out of class and is a disruption.” In addition, Vanessa “has shown up unannounced at [Kyle’s] home” and “is initiating group texts with the family.” The court found Vanessa’s actions were “damaging to [Kyle’s] peace” and “there is a disturbance of [Kyle’s] calm.” As a result, and because Kyle “met his burden of proof beyond a preponderance of [the] evidence,” the court found a permanent restraining order necessary. II. We briefly outline the relevant law for DVROs before explaining why the incomplete appellate record compels us to affirm. A. The Domestic Violence Protection Act seeks to prevent acts of domestic violence and to separate the persons involved for a period sufficient to resolve the underlying causes. (Fam. Code, §§ 6200, 6220.) It defines domestic violence as “abuse” perpetrated against certain individuals, including a former spouse or a party’s children. (§ 6211.) As relevant here, “abuse” includes disturbing the peace of the other party. (§§ 6203, subd. (a)(4); 6320, subd. (a).) Disturbing the peace of the other party “refers to conduct that, 2 based on the totality of the circumstances, destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party.” (§ 6320(c).) To obtain a DVRO, the applicant must show past abuse by a preponderance of the evidence. (In re Marriage of Everard (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 109, 122.) We review orders granting or denying a DVRO for abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 123.) B. Vanessa contends the court erred in granting the DVRO “due to lack of substantial evidence.” The incomplete appellate record, however, prevents us from meaningfully reviewing her claim of error. As a “fundamental principle of appellate procedure,” we presume the trial court’s order is correct. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608- 609.) Because of this presumption, “the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Id. at p. 609.) “A necessary corollary to this rule is that if the record is inadequate for meaningful review,” we should affirm the order. (Ibid. [cleaned up].) Such is the case here. Vanessa represents herself in this appeal, and we are mindful that the technical requirements of the appellate process may be difficult for those without legal training to navigate. Even so, a self-represented party “is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration than” a party represented by counsel. (Elena S. v. Kroutik (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 570, 574.) As a result, Vanessa needed to comply with the rules for preparing an adequate appellate record. Vanessa challenges the evidence supporting the trial court’s DVRO without providing us that evidence. When designating the appellate record, 3 she did not include Kyle’s DVRO application or any supporting declarations that might have been attached, the exhibits Kyle presented at the evidentiary hearing, or a useful record of the hearing testimony. The evidentiary hearing was unreported, making it more difficult to provide an adequate record. (Jameson, 5 Cal.5th at p. 608 [The “lack of a verbatim record of such proceedings will frequently be fatal to a litigant’s ability to have his or her claims of trial court error resolved on the merits by an appellate court.”].) To Vanessa’s credit, she submitted a settled statement, which can substitute “as the record of the oral proceedings.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.137.) But the court’s order on the settled statement notes it “does not recall the specifics of the testimony presented—other than what is noted in the court’s minute order,” which we summarized above. The incomplete record means “[t]he trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are presumed to be supported by substantial evidence and are binding on the appellate court, unless reversible error appears on the record.” (Bond v. Pulsar Video Productions (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 918, 924.) Vanessa does not identify—and we discern no—reversible error on the face of the record. Given the incomplete appellate record and the resulting presumptions, we are unable to grant the relief Vanessa requests.

4 III. We affirm. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

BUCHANAN, Acting P. J.

RUBIN, J.

Cites, in this corpus

Jameson v. Desta S230899 · 2018-07-05
Elena S. v. Kroutik D068831 · 2016-05-18
People v. Garcia F034831 · 2002-04-17
Bond v. Pulsar Video Productions C021443 · 1996-11-07