gno.law

P v. Jackson CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D083160 · 2025-06-09 · Unpublished

Proceeding
appeal from a judgment
Trial court
Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCN414079
Trial judge
Sim Von Kalinowski
Outcome
affirmed — Affirmed.
Area
criminal
Panel
O'Rourke (author), Joan K. Irion, Julia C. Kelety

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T03:47Z · confidence high

The trial court convicted Eric J. Jackson of simple mayhem and child abuse, sentencing him to 12 years in state prison. On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, finding substantial evidence supported the simple mayhem conviction despite Jackson's argument that the surgical removal of his victim's appendix was not a direct, natural, and probable consequence of his abuse.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Sufficiency of the evidence for the simple mayhem conviction (specifically regarding causation of the loss of the appendix and disfigurement).
“We conclude substantial evidence supports Jackson’s simple mayhem conviction. We affirm the judgment.”
substantial evidencecorrectagree with court
The appellate court correctly applied the substantial evidence standard, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the prosecution. The court relied on established California precedent (People v. Cartier, People v. Carney) to determine that injuries requiring surgical intervention to prevent further harm constitute a 'deprivation' or 'disabling' of a body part, and that the resulting scars are a natural and probable consequence of the initial assault. The reasoning is supported by the medical testimony linking the blunt force trauma to the internal injuries and the necessity of surgery.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40 — Defines the standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence as whether, upon no hypothesis, there is sufficient substantial evidence to support the verdict.
  • relied: People v. Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250 — Establishes that the testimony of a single witness may constitute substantial evidence if it is not physically impossible or inherently improbable.
  • relied: People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619 — Clarifies that the possibility of a different verdict does not render the evidence supporting the current verdict insubstantial.
  • relied: People v. Ferrell (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 828 — States that simple mayhem does not require proof of a specific intent to cause a disabling or disfiguring injury.
  • relied: People v. Thomas (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 507 — Defines a disabling injury as one that is more than slight and temporary.
  • relied: People v. Newby (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1341 — Establishes that a disfiguring injury must be permanent, even if cosmetic repair is medically feasible.
  • relied: People v. Carney (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1130 — Defines causation in the context of criminal liability, stating an act causes an injury if it is the direct, natural, and probable consequence and the injury would not have happened without the act.
  • relied: People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248 — Defines a natural and probable consequence as one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes.
  • relied: People v. Nunes (1920) 47 Cal.App. 346 — Requires proof that the defendant acted maliciously or with unlawful intent and that the actions resulted in the loss or disfigurement of a body part.
  • relied: People v. Cartier (1960) 54 Cal.2d 300 — Holds that it is mayhem if the injury inflicted deprives the person injured of the usual uses of the severed organ.
  • relied: People v. Sekona (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 443 — Illustrates that the inability to use a body part (specifically an eye) due to defendant's actions constitutes mayhem.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the substantial evidence standard and relies on binding California Supreme Court and Court of Appeal precedent to establish that surgical removal of an organ caused by assault constitutes a 'deprivation' or 'disabling' of a body part for purposes of simple mayhem. The court effectively addresses the appellant's causation argument by linking the initial assault to the necessary medical intervention through the 'natural and probable consequence' framework.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:29Z · confidence low

A San Diego County jury convicted Eric Jackson of simple mayhem (Pen. Code, § 203) and child abuse (§ 273a, subd. (a)) for beating his girlfriend's four-year-old daughter, causing a liver laceration, perforated bowel, and other internal injuries that required emergency surgery including removal of her appendix, and the court sentenced him to 12 years. On appeal Jackson argued only that the mayhem conviction lacked substantial evidence of causation because the appendix loss and abdominal scar resulted from surgery rather than directly from his blows; the Court of Appeal held the appendix and bowel were disabled by the beating itself, the surgery and resulting scar were foreseeable consequences of the abuse, and affirmed.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Jury verdict of simple mayhem: sufficiency of evidence that Jackson's abuse deprived Avery of, or disabled, a member of her body (appendix and bowel) and that the loss was caused by his act notwithstanding the intervening surgery
“A reasonable person would know that internal injuries, like damage to the appendix, are likely to require surgical repair.”
substantial evidencecorrectagree with court
Viewing the record most favorably to the verdict, medical testimony that the blunt force trauma inflamed the appendix and perforated the bowel supports a finding that the organs were disabled before any surgery, which fits Cartier and Sekona on deprivation of the use of a body part. Medically necessary surgery to treat injuries comparable to a 20-foot fall is a direct, natural, and probable consequence under Carney and Prettyman, so the court correctly rejected the claim that Jackson's not personally removing the appendix defeats causation.
Jury verdict of simple mayhem: sufficiency of evidence that the abdominal surgical scar was a disfigurement caused by Jackson's abuse
“However, there is no requirement that the defendant directly creates a scar to be liable for mayhem. Scars are a known and obvious result of surgery.”
substantial evidencecorrectunsure
The court's causation point is sound, but it recited Newby's rule that a disfiguring injury must be permanent and then did not analyze whether the record established the scar's permanence beyond Avery's testimony that she still has it, nor whether a scar created by treating physicians rather than the defendant qualifies as disfigurement under section 203. Because the deprivation/disabling theory independently supports the verdict, the gap does not affect the result, but the reasoning on this theory is thin.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40 — Substantial evidence standard: reverse only if upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence; review whole record in light most favorable to prosecution for whether a rational trier of fact could find the elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • relied: People v. Cartier (1960) 54 Cal.2d 300 — It is mayhem if the injury inflicted deprives the victim of the usual uses of the organ; deprivation of a member of the body is mayhem.
  • relied: People v. Sekona (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 443 — Inability to use a body part (eye) that the defendant injured constitutes mayhem.
  • relied: People v. Carney (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1130 — An act causes an injury if the injury is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act and would not have happened without it.
  • relied: People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248 — A natural and probable consequence is one a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes.
  • relied: People v. Newby (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1341 — A disfiguring injury for mayhem must be permanent even if cosmetic repair is medically feasible.
  • relied: People v. Ferrell (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 828 — Simple mayhem is a general intent crime not requiring specific intent to disable or disfigure.
  • relied: People v. Thomas (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 507 — A disabling injury for mayhem must be more than slight and temporary.
  • relied: People v. Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250 — Testimony of a single witness may constitute substantial evidence unless physically impossible or inherently improbable.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court applied the correct substantial evidence standard and the correct causation framework, and the medical testimony that the beating itself inflamed the appendix and perforated the bowel answers Jackson's argument that surgery broke the causal chain. It did not, however, analyze whether an internal organ such as the appendix is a 'member' within section 203 or whether the record satisfies Newby's permanence requirement for the surgical scar, leaving those points asserted rather than reasoned.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 6/9/25 P v. Jackson CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D083160

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN414079)

ERIC J. JACKSON, Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Sim von Kalinowski, Judge. Affirmed. Heather E. Shallenberger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and Liz Olukoya, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. A jury convicted Eric J. Jackson of simple mayhem and child abuse.

(Pen. Code,1 §§ 203, 273a, subd. (a).) The court sentenced Jackson to 12 years in state prison. On appeal, Jackson challenges only his conviction for simple mayhem, contending there is insufficient evidence that his abuse against the victim resulted in loss or disfigurement to a member of her body. We conclude substantial evidence supports Jackson’s simple mayhem conviction. We affirm the judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. People’s Evidence In approximately late December 2019, Jackson met Cierra D., and they began dating shortly thereafter. In March 2020, Cierra, her four-year-old daughter Avery G., Cierra’s grandmother Margaret L., and Jackson moved into a two-bedroom apartment. On May 4, 2020, Margaret asked Jackson to move out. Cierra left with Jackson, taking Avery with her. Cierra booked and paid for a hotel room in Carlsbad, where they stayed for two weeks. For the first few days, things were “normal.” Thereafter, Cierra noticed that Jackson would get “very irritable,” “lash out,” and physically abuse her, including hitting and choking her in Avery’s presence. During one of their arguments, Jackson placed a gun to Cierra’s forehead and inside her mouth, threatening to pull the trigger if she “didn’t shut the F up.” Cierra routinely left Avery alone with Jackson when she went out to buy food. During their stay in the hotel, Cierra noticed that Avery had lost her appetite and had bruises on her back and shoulders. Cierra asked about the bruises, and Avery confided that Jackson hit her. Cierra confronted Jackson. He denied hitting Avery, claiming she must have fallen. Cierra decided to 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 take Avery and leave Jackson. Jackson stopped Cierra by putting a gun to the back of her head. The following day, Jackson, Cierra, and Avery moved to another hotel. Shortly thereafter, Cierra noticed that Avery was not feeling well. Avery went into the bathroom and vomited “green mucous and blood.” Cierra asked Avery if Jackson had “hit her again and she said[,] ‘Yes.’ ” That night, Cierra waited for Jackson to fall asleep before she and Avery attempted to leave. Awakened by the commotion, Jackson strangled Cierra until she lost consciousness. After Cierra regained consciousness, she waited for Jackson to fall back asleep, located her cell phone in his backpack, and messaged a relative, stating their location and asking her to call the police. The relative called Margaret who alerted the hotel and called the police. On the morning of May 19, 2020, a police negotiator called Cierra’s room. The officer asked Cierra to go down to the lobby for a welfare check. Fearful of Jackson, Cierra hung up the phone. A few minutes later, the officer called back and instructed Cierra to respond by saying only yes or no, and to take her daughter and immediately leave. Instead, Cierra told Jackson about the police. As soon as Jackson opened the front door, the police tackled him. Cierra ran to Avery, who was laying on the bed. During a lawful search, police found in Jackson’s backpack a 9-millimeter gun with three unspent bullets. Officers at the scene described Avery as “distraught,” in “pretty rough shape,” and lethargic and concluded she needed prompt medical care. An ambulance rushed Avery to the hospital where an examination revealed bruises on her head, shoulders, arms, face, chest, and abdomen. She complained of significant abdominal pain. An emergency ultrasound revealed fluid in Avery’s abdomen, indicating significant intraabdominal 3 injury and internal bleeding. Doctors diagnosed Avery with a grade-three laceration of the liver, contusions on both kidneys, traumatic injury to the pancreas, a perforated bowel, and a compression fracture at T8 vertebrae. Avery underwent emergency surgery to prevent septic shock, cardiac arrest, and death. Due to her “blunt force trauma,” doctors removed her inflamed appendix. Avery’s doctor explained that the “severe extent” of her injuries were similar to those seen in “serious car crashes and . . . falls over 20 feet.” The doctor opined her injuries were not accidental but “definitely inflicted.” Approximately three days after her surgery, Avery confided to her nurse that Cierra had “a friend named Eric [Jackson] who punched [her] in [the] stomach.” Avery testified that while her mother was out getting food or in the shower, Jackson would hit her, including in the face, causing her to “pass out,” and if she screamed or made a sound he would get “even more mad[ ],” and that she still has a scar on her abdomen from the emergency surgery due to the attack. B. Defense Evidence Jackson denied ever being aggressive or violent towards Avery. He testified that while in the hotels, Cierra did not feed or bathe Avery; and that Cierra used “drugs” and yelled and got physical with her daughter. The day before his arrest, Jackson saw Cierra jump “knees first” onto Avery’s back and repeatedly hit her daughter. Jackson stopped the attack by restraining Cierra.2 He had planned to leave Cierra the next day, but police took him into custody before he could leave.

2 Cierra and Avery each denied Cierra abused Avery.

4 DISCUSSION Jackson challenges his simple mayhem conviction, arguing there is insufficient evidence that the loss of Avery’s appendix3 or disfigurement to her abdomen were the direct, natural and probable consequence of his abuse. A. Guiding Principles We will not reverse the judgment “ ‘ “unless it appears that ‘upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support’ ” ’ ” the jury’s verdict. (People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 87.) Substantial evidence is “evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value . . . .” (Ibid.) The testimony of a single witness may constitute substantial evidence as long as it is not physically impossible or inherently improbable. (People v. Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 281.) “That the evidence might lead to a different verdict does not warrant a conclusion that the evidence supporting the verdict is insubstantial.” (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 669.) To determine whether substantial evidence supports Jackson’s simple mayhem conviction, we review the whole record to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (Manibusan, at p. 87.) We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. (Ibid.) To convict a person of simple mayhem, the prosecution must prove the defendant “unlawfully and maliciously deprive[d] a human being of a member of his [or her] body, or disable[d], disfigure[d], or render[ed] it useless, or cut[ ] or disable[d] the tongue, or put[ ] out an eye, or slit[ ] the nose, ear, or lip.” (§ 203.) Simple mayhem does not require proof of a specific 3 Jackson repeatedly references the removal of Avery’s pancreas; however, the medical testimony describes bruising to her pancreas and removal of her appendix. For accuracy, we treat Jackson’s references to Avery’s removed pancreas as references to her appendix. 5 intent to cause a disabling or disfiguring injury. (People v. Ferrell (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 828, 832-833.) A disabling injury must be more than “slight and temporary.” (People v. Thomas (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 507, 512.) A disfiguring injury must be permanent even if cosmetic repair is medically feasible. (People v. Newby (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1347.) Someone acts maliciously when he intentionally does a wrongful act or when he acts with the unlawful intent to vex, annoy, or injure someone else. (§ 7, subd. (b)(4).) An act causes an injury if the injury is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act, and the injury would not have happened without the act. (See People v. Carney (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1130, 1138.) A natural and probable consequence is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. (People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 291.) B. Analysis Jackson argues the prosecution must prove a “general intent to willfully commit the act under such circumstances that the direct, natural, and probable consequence would be the deprivation, disabling, or disfiguring” of Avery’s body. The law requires proof that a defendant acted “maliciously” or with unlawful intent. The defendant’s actions must also result in the loss or disfigurement of a member of Avery’s body. (See People v. Nunes (1920) 47 Cal.App. 346, 349.) The parties agree there is “no dispute that appellant abused Avery” and that the trial court found true aggravating factors including great violence and great bodily harm. Jackson argues that “there is no evidence in the record that the injuries she sustained to her [appendix] and the resulting surgical scar were a natural and probable consequence of the abuse” he inflicted. Specifically, he claims there is insufficient proof of causation and 6 that “the defendant’s act must cause the disabling or disfiguring injury.” We disagree. First, even before medical intervention, Jackson’s conduct of beating Avery disabled her appendix and bowel. (People v. Cartier (1960) 54 Cal.2d 300, 310 [“It is mayhem if the injury inflicted deprives the person injured of . . .the usual uses of the severed organ.”].) Avery’s doctor explained that removing her appendix was necessary because it was inflamed and could spread infection inside of her abdomen. Moreover, to stop the leakage of “fluid, stool, [and] bacteria,” she needed a bowel resection to repair the perforation to her bowel. Thus, Jackson’s conduct directly resulted in Avery’s inability to use her appendix and bowel. (See, e.g., People v. Sekona (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 443, 457 [inability to use eye that defendant kicked constituted mayhem].) Second, Jackson argues that because he “did not directly remove Avery’s [appendix] he cannot be held liable for mayhem.” While it is true that Jackson himself did not remove Avery’s appendix, because the “severe extent” of the injuries Jackson inflicted were similar to those seen in “serious car crashes and . . . falls over 20 feet,” surgery was foreseeable. Additionally, the “blunt force trauma that [Jackson inflicted on Avery’s] abdomen . . . led to sheering forces applied to that part of the organ that . . . created inflammation . . . of the appendix.” Thus, as a direct result of Jackson’s act, the appendix needed to be removed so it would not spread infection inside her abdomen. (See People v. Carney, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1138 [injury would not have happened without act].) A reasonable person would know that internal injuries, like damage to the appendix, are likely to require surgical repair. (People v. Cartier, supra, 54 Cal.2d at p. 310 [deprivation of member of person’s body is mayhem].)

7 Finally, Jackson argues that the scar on Avery’s abdomen was not a natural and probable consequence of the abuse he inflicted. However, there is no requirement that the defendant directly creates a scar to be liable for mayhem. Scars are a known and obvious result of surgery. Here, the injuries were the direct, natural and probable consequence of Jackson beating Avery, and the appendix removal, bowel resection, and scarring would not have happened without Jackson’s act. DISPOSITION Jackson’s judgment of conviction is affirmed.

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, J.

KELETY, J.

Cites, in this corpus