Rincon Bohorquez v. Warden of the Otay Mesa Detention Facility
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Andrew G. Schopler (author)
Analysis
The court considered a motion to proceed in forma pauperis and a habeas petition filed by a petitioner who had been removed to El Salvador. The court granted the motion to proceed in forma pauperis and declined to dismiss the petition at this early stage, ordering the respondents to respond by July 2, 2025.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis Granted“Based on these facts, the Court finds that the petitioner has sufficiently shown an inability to pay the initial fee.” | agree with court The petitioner submitted a declaration stating he has no assets, no cash, and is supported by family. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, a party is entitled to proceed in forma pauperis if they cannot afford the filing fee. The court correctly applied the standard that a party need not be completely destitute to qualify. The facts recited in the order support the finding of inability to pay. |
Petition Not Dismissed at Screening“While the Court’s authority to hear or provide relief in this case is unclear, the Court declines to dismiss the petition at this early stage without further briefing from the parties.” | agree with court The court applied the screening standard of Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 4, which requires dismissal if it plainly appears the petitioner is not entitled to relief. The court noted that the petitioner's claims fall within the 'core' of habeas corpus under Trump v. G. G. (2025). However, the court explicitly stated its authority to hear the case is 'unclear' and deferred the decision to allow for briefing. This is a procedural decision to allow the case to proceed to the merits rather than a final ruling on the merits or jurisdiction. It is a defensible procedural step to allow the parties to address the jurisdictional issues raised by the court. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly grants IFP status based on the petitioner's declaration. It correctly identifies the screening standard under Rule 4. It correctly cites Trump v. G. G. to establish that the claims are habeas in nature. The decision to not dismiss at this stage, despite acknowledging unclear jurisdiction, is a reasonable procedural choice to allow the parties to brief the jurisdictional issues. The order is sound in its procedural handling.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionOpinion
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Omar Jose RINCON BOHORQUEZ, Case No.: 25-cv-1375-AGS-MSB 4 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 5 v. (ECF 2) 6 WARDEN, et al., 7 Respondents. 8 9 Petitioner Omar Jose Rincon Bohorquez was detained by Immigration and Customs 10 Enforcement in this district before being “transfer[r]ed to El Salvador on March 15, 2025.” 11 (ECF 1, at 2–3.) The petitioner now seeks habeas and other relief, and moves to proceed 12 without paying the filing fee. (See ECF 2, 3); 28 U.S.C. § 2441. 13 Typically, parties petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus must prepay a $5 filing fee. 14 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). But if granted the right to proceed in forma pauperis, the “action may 15 proceed despite failure to pay the filing fees.” Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 16 (9th Cir. 1999); Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 3(a) (stating petition “must be 17 accompanied by” “the applicable filing fee” or “a motion for leave to proceed in forma 18 pauperis”).1 19 Rincon Bohorquez “does not own any assets,” “does not have any cash or money 20 held in bank accounts,” and is supported by family. (ECF 2, 3.) Based on these facts, the 21 Court finds that the petitioner has sufficiently shown an inability to pay the initial fee. See 22 Blount v. Saul, No. 21-cv-0679-BLM, 2021 WL 1561453, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2021) 23 (“It is well-settled that a party need not be completely destitute to proceed IFP.”). 24 25 26 1 The Rules Governing § 2254 Cases may also apply to “a habeas corpus petition not 27 covered by” the rules, such as this § 2241 petition. See Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 1(b). 28 1 At this stage, the Court “must dismiss the petition” if “it plainly appears . . . that the 2 || petitioner is not entitled to relief.” Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 4. It appears from 3 || the face of the petition that Rincon Bohorquez may be entitled to habeas relief. See Trump J. G. G, 145 S. Ct. 1003, 1005 (2025) (“Regardless of whether the detainees formally 5 ||request release from confinement, because their claims for relief necessarily imply the 6 invalidity of their confinement and removal under the [Alien Enemies Act], their claims 7 || fall within the ‘core’ of the writ of habeas corpus and thus must be brought in habeas.” 8 ||(cleaned up)). While the Court’s authority to hear or provide relief in this case is unclear, 9 || the Court declines to dismiss the petition at this early stage without further briefing from 10 || the parties. 11 By July 2, 2025, respondents must respond to the petition. Rincon Bohorquez’s 12 |/reply is due July 23, 2025. In addition to the other allegations in the petition, the parties 13 || must address this Court’s jurisdiction to hear this case in their briefing. 14 Dated: June 4, 2025 15 a | / 16 Hon. rew G. Schopler United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28