People v. Baker CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCE421524
- Trial judge
- John M. Thompson
- Outcome
- reversed in part — Reversed in part and remanded with instructions, and otherwise affirmed.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Michele M. Castillo (author), Richard D. Huffman, Sr., Truc T. Do
Analysis
The trial court sentenced the defendant to five years and four months in prison and awarded 125 days of jailtime credit but failed to award custody or conduct credits for his presentence home detention. The Court of Appeal reversed in part and remanded for the trial court to calculate the required custody and conduct credits, while affirming the rest of the judgment.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Trial court's failure to award custody credits for presentence home detention under Penal Code section 2900.5“Accordingly, Baker is entitled to custody credits during his presentence home detention.” | de novo | error | agree with court agree with court |
Trial court's failure to determine eligibility for conduct credits for presentence home detention under Penal Code section 4019“the trial court should determine if Baker earned any section 4019 conduct credits during his presentence home detention.” | de novo | error | agree with court agree with court |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847 — Establishes the procedure for resolving matters by memorandum opinion.
- relied: Fletcher v. Superior Court (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 386 — Questions of legal principles are reviewed de novo.
- relied: People v. Yanez (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 91 — Section 4019 applies to individuals held in presentence home detention, allowing them to earn conduct credits.
- relied: People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067 — A defendant need not satisfy all technical statutory requirements of section 1203.018 to be awarded credits if the terms of release are as 'custodial' as the statutory home detention program.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the statutory framework of sections 2900.5 and 4019 to the facts of the defendant's home detention. It relies on binding precedent (Yanez and Gerson) to establish that the defendant's conditions met the 'custodial' threshold for credit eligibility.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe trial court sentenced Baker to five years four months in prison and awarded only 125 days of jail custody credit, declining to award custody or conduct credits for his presentence home detention beyond what probation recommended. The Court of Appeal accepted the People's concession, held Baker's electronically and alcohol-monitored home confinement was sufficiently custodial under Penal Code section 1203.018 to earn section 2900.5 custody credits, reversed in part, and remanded for calculation of custody credits and determination of section 4019 conduct credit eligibility, otherwise affirming.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of presentence custody credits under Penal Code section 2900.5 for time Baker spent in presentence home detention (court awarded only the 125 days recommended by probation)“As the People concede, Baker thus satisfies the custodial nature requirements of section 1203.018. Accordingly, Baker is entitled to custody credits during his presentence home detention.” | de novo | error (law misapplied) | agree with court Section 2900.5, subdivision (a) expressly credits days served in home detention under section 1203.018, and Gerson holds a defendant need not meet every technical statutory requirement so long as the release terms are as custodial as the statutory program. Baker's restrictions (leaving home only for work or medical care, no driving, GPS and continuous alcohol monitoring, stay-away order, arrest warrant on violation) match or exceed those found sufficient in Gerson, so the court's application is consistent with the cited authority. The result also rests on an express concession by the Attorney General. |
Failure to determine eligibility for and award section 4019 conduct credits for presentence home detention“As the People also concede, the trial court should determine if Baker earned any section 4019 conduct credits during his presentence home detention.” | de novo | error (law misapplied) | agree with court Yanez held section 4019 conduct credits are available to defendants held in presentence home detention, and section 2900.5 incorporates section 4019 credits into the custody-credit calculation. Remanding for the trial court to determine eligibility and calculate any credits, rather than awarding them outright, is the appropriate course because the record on appeal does not establish compliance with program rules. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847 — Appellate courts may resolve straightforward matters by memorandum opinion.
- relied: Fletcher v. Superior Court (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 386 — Questions of legal principle, including the application of credit statutes, are reviewed de novo.
- relied: People v. Yanez (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 91 — Section 4019 conduct credits apply to defendants held in presentence home detention.
- relied: People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067 — A defendant need not satisfy every technical requirement of section 1203.018 to earn home detention custody credits so long as the release terms are as custodial as the statutory program.
- missed: People v. Raygoza (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 593 — Held that a defendant released on bail subject to electronic monitoring was not entitled to section 2900.5 custody credits because the monitoring was not a home detention program under section 1203.018; this contrary authority was distinguished in Gerson but not acknowledged here.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion correctly applies section 2900.5, Gerson, and Yanez to facts that closely parallel Gerson and reaches a defensible result, aided by the People's concession. Because it is a brief memorandum opinion resting on concession, it does not acknowledge contrary Court of Appeal authority such as Raygoza on whether monitored release as a bail condition qualifies as section 1203.018 home detention, nor does it recite the precise terms or source of Baker's release order.
Opinion
Filed 5/23/25 P. v. Baker CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D084414
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE421524)
GARY LUMUNDI BAKER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, John M. Thompson, Judge. Reversed in part and remanded with instructions, and otherwise affirmed. Michael Reed, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Donald W. Ostertag and Robin Urbanski, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. After being held in presentence home detention, Gary Lumundi Baker pled guilty to committing a hit and run resulting in death (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (b)(2); count 1), unlawfully driving another’s vehicle without consent (§ 10851(a); count 2), receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496d; count 3), and dissuading a witness from testifying (§ 136.1(a)(1); count 4). The court sentenced him to a total term of five years and four months in prison and awarded 125 days of jailtime credit. When Baker’s counsel asked about presentence home detention custody credits, the trial court responded it would give Baker the credits requested by probation. On appeal, Baker contends he is entitled to both custody and conduct credits for his presentence home detention. The People concede as much. Resolving this matter by memorandum opinion (see generally People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847), we accept the People’s concession, reverse in part, and remand with instructions. In all other respects, we affirm. We review questions of legal principles de novo. (Fletcher v. Superior Court (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 386, 390-391.) Section 2900.5, subdivision (a) of the Penal Code states in relevant part: “[W]hen the defendant has been in custody . . . all days of custody of the defendant . . . credited to the period of confinement pursuant to Section 4019, and days served in home detention pursuant to Section . . . 1203.018, shall be credited upon his or her term of imprisonment.” Section 4019 allows individuals to earn conduct credits—specifically work performance and good behavior credits—under various circumstances. People v. Yanez (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 91, 93, concluded section 4019 applies to individuals held in presentence home detention. A defendant ordered to remain home for a specified period and comply with statutory requirements is in home detention. (§ 1203.018(d).) A defendant need not satisfy all the statutory requirements to be awarded credits for home detention, however, so long as the terms of the defendant’s 2 release are “as ‘custodial’” as the statutory home detention program. (People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1089-1090.) In Gerson, the court found the defendant satisfied the custodial nature requirements of section 1203.018 even if he did not meet all the technical statutory requirements because, despite having a few privileges, the defendant had a curfew, wore a GPS monitoring device, signed a Fourth Amendment waiver, was subject to regular drug testing, and had to abstain from alcohol. (Gerson, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 1087, fn. 17.) Similarly, while not satisfying all section 1203.018’s technical requirements, Baker could only leave his home to go to work or medical appointments, could not drive, was subject to electronic monitoring and continuous alcohol monitoring, and could not come within 100 yards of anyone involved with his case. Failure to comply with these requirements would result in a warrant for his arrest. As the People concede, Baker thus satisfies the custodial nature requirements of section 1203.018. Accordingly, Baker is entitled to custody credits during his presentence home detention. As the People also concede, the trial court should determine if Baker earned any section 4019 conduct credits during his presentence home detention. (See Yanez, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 94.)
3 DISPOSITION We reverse in part and remand to the trial court to (1) calculate Baker’s section 2900.5 custody credits earned during his presentence home detention and (2) determine Baker’s eligibility for section 4019 conduct credits and, if so, calculate Baker’s conduct credits earned during his presentence home detention. The court shall forward a certified copy of the amended abstract of judgment to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.
CASTILLO, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
DO, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- Fletcher v. Superior Court A096372 · 2002-07-19
- People v. Garcia F034831 · 2002-04-17