Clinton v. Allison
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Cathy Ann Bencivengo (author)
Analysis
Defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (SAC) in a civil rights action. The court granted the motion, dismissing most claims and all Doe defendants with prejudice, while allowing two specific claims against named officers to proceed.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Granting the motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint in part“The Court grants Defendants’ motion and partially dismisses the SAC with prejudice.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, citing Iqbal and Twombly, to dismiss claims that were previously screened out and for which no new facts were alleged. The dismissal with prejudice is supported by the finding of futility. |
Dismissing claims based on the Fourteenth Amendment, ADA, Equal Protection, First Amendment Retaliation, and Eighth Amendment Medical Care“The Court again dismisses Plaintiff’s claims based on failure to protect based on the Fourteenth Amendment, ADA and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, retaliation under the First Amendment, inadequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment, and criminal law and administrative law claims.” | agree with court The court relied on its prior screening order (Doc. No. 10) and the lack of new facts to dismiss these claims. While the order does not detail the specific legal deficiencies for each claim, the reliance on the prior screening and the futility of amendment is a standard procedural mechanism in pro se litigation. |
Dismissing all Doe Defendants with prejudice“All remaining Doe Defendants are dismissed from this case with prejudice.” | agree with court The court correctly applied Ninth Circuit precedent (Fifty Associates and Taylor v. List) stating that Doe defendants are disfavored and must be specifically identified with individual conduct in Section 1983 cases. Since the plaintiff failed to identify them or plead specific conduct, dismissal was appropriate. |
Allowing Eighth Amendment failure to protect and conspiracy claims to proceed against named defendants“The only live claims in the operative complaint, the SAC, are (1) an Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim against Defendants Colon and Bingham and (2) the conspiracy allegations against Colon, Allen, and Bingham.” | agree with court The court identified the specific claims that survived the screening process and the motion to dismiss, limiting the case to these two causes of action against the named officers. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly applies the Rule 12(b)(6) standard and Ninth Circuit precedent regarding Doe defendants. It relies on the prior screening order to dismiss claims that were previously found deficient, which is procedurally sound. The reasoning is concise but sufficient for a district court order granting a motion to dismiss in a pro se case.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MARKEITH CLINTON, Case No.: 3:23-cv-01471-CAB-SBC 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 13 v. DISMISS 14 C. ALLEN, et al., [Doc. Nos. 47, 59] 15 Defendants. 16 17 I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 18 The Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s amended complaint but gave Plaintiff 19 (proceeding pro se) leave to file an amended complaint. Defendant-Officers Allen, Colon, 20 and Bingham have filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint 21 (SAC). [Doc. No. 47.] The Court grants Defendants’ motion and partially dismisses the 22 SAC with prejudice. 23 II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 24 The Court screened Plaintiff’s FAC and permitted only two causes of action to 25 proceed: (1) an Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim against John Does 1 and 2 and 26 (2) a conspiracy claim to deprive Plaintiff of his Eighth Amendment right to protection 27 from known and substantial risks of harm involving Defendants Allen, Colon, John Does 28 1-3, and Jane Doe 4. [Doc. No. 20.] Plaintiff then moved to file an amended complaint to 1 identify Defendant Colon as John Doe 1 and Defendant Bingham as John Doe 2. [Doc. 2 No. 39.] The Court granted leave to amend and Plaintiff filed his SAC. [Doc. No. 44.] 3 Defendant Bingham waived service and entered an appearance in this case. [See Doc. No. 4 60.] 5 III. ANALYSIS 6 The Court does not rehash the facts alleged here, only noting that they are similar to 7 those pleaded in the originally dismissed complaint. The familiar standard applies for a 8 motion to dismiss. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) permits a party to file a motion to dismiss for 9 “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” “To survive a motion to dismiss, 10 a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim for relief that is 11 plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. 12 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Vague and conclusory allegations” concerning 13 government involvement in civil rights violations are insufficient to withstand a motion to 14 dismiss. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 15 Plaintiff’s SAC still contains causes of action that the Court previously dismissed 16 when it screened the FAC. No new facts require an alternative outcome. The Court again 17 dismisses Plaintiff’s claims based on failure to protect based on the Fourteenth 18 Amendment, ADA and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, retaliation 19 under the First Amendment, inadequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment, and 20 criminal law and administrative law claims. [See Doc. No. 10.] This dismissal is with 21 prejudice since further amendment would be futile. 22 Second, Plaintiff does not include any Doe Defendants (or Defendants other than 23 Colon, Allen, and Bingham) in the SAC. The use of Doe Defendants is not favored in the 24 Ninth Circuit. See Fifty Associates v. Prudential Ins. Co., 446 F.2d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 25 1970). To plead a claim against a doe defendant in the Section 1983 context, a plaintiff 26 must specifically identify individual conduct that led to an alleged constitutional violation. 27 See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (the inquiry into causation is 28 individualized). All remaining Doe Defendants are dismissed from this case with 1 || prejudice. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[A]n amended 2 || pleading supersedes the original pleading.’’). 3 IV. CONCLUSION 4 The only live claims in the operative complaint, the SAC, are (1) an Eighth 5 Amendment failure to protect claim against Defendants Colon and Bingham and (2) the 6 ||conspiracy allegations against Colon, Allen, and Bingham. All other Defendants are 7 ||terminated from this case. The remaining Defendants should respond to the identified 8 ||claims by June 3, 2025. The Clerk of the Court is directed to change the caption to reflect 9 ||the proper spelling of Defendant Bingham (“Officer P. Bingham’’). 10 11 It is SO ORDERED. 12 € Z 13 || Dated 5/20/2025 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 14 United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28