People v. Thompson CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCD215338
- Trial judge
- David L. Berry
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed and remanded with instructions.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Michele M. Castillo (author), Joan K. Irion, Buchanan
Analysis
The trial court failed to recalculate the defendant's custody credits at resentencing and did not vacate the remaining balance of a restitution fine that had become unenforceable under new law. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in all other respects but remanded with instructions to correct these two errors.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Trial court's failure to recalculate custody credits up to the date of resentencing“But when the court resentenced Thompson, it needed to do that calculation. (Buckhalter, 26 Cal.4th at p. 29.)” | de novo | error | agree with court agree with court |
Trial court's failure to vacate the remaining balance of the restitution fine“As the restitution fine was imposed well over 10 years ago, it is no longer enforceable or collectible and must be vacated. (§ 1465.9(d).)” | de novo | error | agree with court agree with court |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20 — When a prison term is modified on remand, the sentencing court must recalculate and credit all actual time served.
- relied: People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340 — Questions of a trial court's authority and statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo.
- relied: People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847 — General authority for resolving matters by memorandum opinion.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion correctly applies the de novo standard of review to questions of statutory interpretation and court authority. It accurately cites People v. Buckhalter for the duty to recalculate custody credits and correctly applies the new statutory provision (Section 1465.9(d)) to vacate the unenforceable restitution fine.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionAt a June 11, 2024 full resentencing, the San Diego Superior Court reimposed a 40-year-4-month term but left the 2009 award of 278 days of custody credits in place, stating that recalculating credits was CDCR's purview, and left intact the balance of an $8,000 restitution fine imposed in 2009 under Penal Code section 1202.4(b). On appeal the People conceded both points; the Court of Appeal held the trial court was required to recalculate credits itself under section 2900.5(d) and Buckhalter, held the restitution fine balance must be vacated under newly effective section 1465.9(d), remanded with instructions on both points, and otherwise affirmed.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Trial court declined to recalculate custody credits at resentencing, deferring to CDCR and reimposing the 2009 award of 278 days“when the court resentenced Thompson, it needed to do that calculation.” | de novo | error (law misapplied) | agree with court Section 2900.5(d) places the duty to determine total credits on the sentencing court, and Buckhalter squarely holds that on an appellate remand modifying a prison term in progress the sentencing court must recalculate and credit all actual time served. The trial court's belief that CDCR bore that responsibility was a legal error, and the People conceded it; the appellate court's reasoning and authorities fully support the result. |
Remaining balance of the $8,000 section 1202.4(b) restitution fine imposed in 2009 left in place at resentencing“As the restitution fine was imposed well over 10 years ago, it is no longer enforceable or collectible and must be vacated.” | de novo | error (other) | agree with court Section 1465.9(d), effective January 1, 2025, by its terms renders unenforceable and requires vacatur of any balance on section 1202.4 restitution fines more than 10 years after imposition; the 2009 fine plainly falls within it. The trial court could not have applied a statute not yet in effect at the June 2024 resentencing, so this is really an intervening change in law applied on appeal rather than a trial-court mistake, but the appellate court's application of the statute's plain text to a judgment still on appeal is correct and was conceded by the People. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20 — When a prison term already in progress is modified on an appellate sentence remand, the sentencing court must recalculate and credit against the modified sentence all actual time the defendant has already served.
- relied: People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847 — An appellate court may resolve an appeal by memorandum opinion where the issues are straightforward or conceded.
- relied: People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340 — Questions of the trial court's sentencing authority and of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion correctly identifies the controlling statutes (sections 2900.1, 2900.5(d), 1465.9(d)) and the Supreme Court's decision in Buckhalter, which directly resolve the custody-credit question, and the restitution-fine issue turns on the unambiguous text of a new statute. Both issues were conceded by the People, and the remand instructions are tailored to the two errors identified without disturbing the balance of the sentence.
Opinion
Filed 5/16/25 P. v. Thompson CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D084401
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD215338)
DANNY LAWRENCE THOMPSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, David L. Berry, Judge. Affirmed and remanded with instructions. John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and Jon S. Tangonan, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Following a full resentencing, Danny Lawrence Thompson appeals two aspects of his sentence: (1) the trial court’s deference to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to calculate custody credits up to Thompson’s June 11, 2024 resentencing, and (2) after a change in law, the remaining balance of his restitution fine. The People concede error on both points. Resolving this matter by memorandum opinion (see generally People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847), we accept the People’s concessions and remand with instructions. In all other respects, we affirm. I. In 2009, Thompson was sentenced to a total of 40 years and four months in prison after pleading guilty to eight counts of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) with corresponding firearm enhancements (§ 12022.53(b)) and one count of residential burglary (§§ 459, 460). The trial court awarded Thompson a total of 278 days of custody credits. The court also imposed an $8,000 restitution fine under section 1202.4(b). Years later, after CDCR identified errors in Thompson’s sentence and following remand from this court (People v. Thompson (March 3, 2022, D078648) [nonpub. opn.]), the trial court conducted a new resentencing hearing. On June 11, 2024, the court reimposed the same total sentence of 40 years and four months but did not recalculate Thompson’s custody credits. The court recognized Thompson’s custody credits were “[o]bviously . . . significantly greater” yet stated it “is the purview and the jurisdiction of” CDCR “to calculate” those credits. II. Thompson raises two points on appeal. We address each in turn. A. First, Thompson argues the trial court “erred by failing to calculate” his “custody credit[s] up to the date of the resentencing” and seeks remand “with 2 directions to impose custody credits up to June 11, 2024.” The People concede error, and we agree. Time served in custody shall be credited at resentencing when a judgment is subsequently declared invalid or is modified during the term of imprisonment. (§ 2900.1.) “It is the duty of the court imposing the sentence to determine . . . the total number of days to be credited.” (§ 2900.5 subd. (d).) Thus, “when a prison term already in progress is modified as the result of an appellate sentence remand, the sentencing court must recalculate and credit against the modified sentence all actual time the defendant has already served.” (People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 29.) When there is a question of the trial court’s authority, we review it de novo. (People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, 354.) Here, at the 2024 resentencing, the court imposed the same 278 days of custody credits awarded in 2009. Though it acknowledged “[c]ustody credits can change,” it appears the court mistakenly believed CDCR was charged with recalculating Thompson’s custody credits following resentencing. But when the court resentenced Thompson, it needed to do that calculation. (Buckhalter, 26 Cal.4th at p. 29.) Accordingly, we remand to the trial court with instructions to calculate Thompson’s custody credits up to his June 11, 2024 resentencing. B. Second, Thompson argues his remaining restitution should be vacated under newly effective section 1465.9, subdivision (d). The People also concede this point, and we agree. Effective January 1, 2025, any balance owed on restitution fines imposed under section 1202.4 more than 10 years after the date of imposition “shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment 3 imposing those fines shall be vacated.” (§ 1465.9(d), added by Stats. 2024, ch. 805, § 1.) We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. (Rogers, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 354.) Here, Thompson was ordered to pay an $8,000 restitution fine under section 1202.4 in 2009. As the restitution fine was imposed well over 10 years ago, it is no longer enforceable or collectible and must be vacated. (§ 1465.9(d).) We thus remand to the trial court with instructions to vacate the remaining balance of this restitution fine. III. We remand to the trial court to (1) calculate Thompson’s custody credits up to his June 11, 2024 resentencing, and (2) vacate the remaining balance of Thompson’s section 1202.4(b) restitution fine. The court shall forward a certified copy of the amended abstract of judgment to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.
CASTILLO, J.
WE CONCUR:
IRION, Acting P. J.
BUCHANAN, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Garcia F034831 · 2002-04-17
- People v. Buckhalter S086220 · 2001-08-29