Ellman v. County of San Diego

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Ilan ELLMAN, Case No.: 24-cv-2132-AGS-MMP 4 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART 5 v. DEFENSE’S MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF 5) 6 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al., 7 Defendants. 8 9 Plaintiff Ilan Ellman is suing San Diego County and employees “Does 1–10” for 10 “violating” his “constitutional rights” while in custody. (ECF 1, at 2, 4.) In his sole federal 11 claim, which involves only “Does 1–10,” Ellman doesn’t allege enough details about those 12 unidentified defendants. So, his complaint must be dismissed. 13 According to the complaint, Ellman “suffers from schizophrenia that is normally 14 well controlled via medication.” (ECF 1, at 3.) He was allegedly arrested while “having a 15 psychotic episode” and “brought to the San Diego County Central Jail.” (Id.) While being 16 “processed for intake” “he spoke with defendant Does 1–10.” (Id.) It “was obvious to these 17 defendants that his ideation was strange and delusional, and that Ellman was seriously 18 mentally ill.” (Id.) Ellman “told the individual defendants that he believed he was ‘God’ 19 and ‘Jesus’ and explained to the individual defendants that he was prescribed Seroquel and 20 lithium to control the symptoms of his schizophrenia.” (Id.) Yet the “defendants did not 21 make any suggestion that Ellman should be classified as needing special housing because 22 of his psychosis” nor did they “take any action to ensure that Ellman would be provided 23 with Seroquel or lithium.” (Id.) Unmedicated and unable to “safely navigate” the jail’s 24 “general population,” he was seriously “injured” and “taken advantage of financially” 25 while in custody. (Id. at 3–4.) Now out of custody, he brings a three-count complaint, 26 including a single federal cause of action: a Fourteenth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. 27 § 1983 against the Doe defendants only. (Id. at 4–7.) The defense moves to dismiss that 28 1 federal claim “with prejudice” because Ellman “fails to allege facts” from which any “Doe 2 Defendants could be reasonably identified.” (ECF 5-1, at 7, 9.) 3 When “the identity of alleged defendants will not be known prior to the filing of a 4 complaint,” plaintiffs may refer to them as “Doe” defendants and “should be given an 5 opportunity through discovery to identify” them. Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 6 (9th Cir. 1980). But plaintiffs still “must set forth specific facts as to each individual 7 defendant’s” behavior. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). This often 8 involves using descriptive placeholders that identify the Doe’s role in the alleged 9 constitutional violation. For example, in Wakefield v. Thompson—the case Ellman 10 principally relies on—the plaintiff’s complaint identified the Doe defendant as “the officer 11 handling [plaintiff’s] release procedure.” 177 F.3d 1160, 1162 (9th Cir. 1999). And in 12 Powe v. Nevada—also relied on by Ellman—the plaintiff identified the Doe defendants as 13 the individuals who “responded to his” medical “kites” complaints. No. 14 17-cv-0470-JAD-GWF, 2019 WL 918982, at *3 (D. Nev. Feb. 22, 2019). 15 By contrast, Ellman’s entire description of the Doe defendants is that they are 16 “employees of the County of San Diego” who “performed the relevant acts within the 17 course and scope of their employment.” (ECF 1, at 2.) This leaves defendants, and the 18 Court, guessing as to which individuals plaintiff is suing. For example, are these “Doe” 19 defendants the officers who “arrested and brought” Ellman “to the San Diego County 20 Central Jail?” (See id. at 3.) Or the employees who “processed” Ellman “for intake to the 21 Central Jail?” (See id.) Of those, is Ellman leveling his claims against just the officers? 22 Medical staff? Other county employees? Ellman’s Doe allegations are too general to, as 23 the defense suggests, “reasonably identif[y]” any individual defendant. (See ECF 5-1, at 7); 24 cf. Segura v. City of La Mesa, 647 F. Supp. 3d 926, 941 (S.D. Cal. 2022) (allowing claim 25 to proceed against a “DOE Defendant” who was “either a La Mesa police officer or SDSD 26 Deputy” that “fired the projectile that struck” plaintiff); Estate of Schuck by & through 27 Schuck v. County of San Diego, No. 23-cv-0785-DMS-AHG, 2024 WL 500711, at *2, *6, 28 *12 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2024) (permitting claim against the “Doe Medical Provider 1 || defendant[]” who was the “mental health provider present during [plaintiff's] medical 2 ||intake” screening but dismissing claims against other “Doe Medical Provider[s]’’). 3 Thus, Ellman’s federal section 1983 claim—brought only against the Does and not 4 ||the County—must be dismissed. But it “can possibly be cured by additional factual 5 || allegations,” so the Court grants leave to amend. See Salameh v. Tarsadia Hotel, 726 F.3d 6 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013). 7 Because the Court has dismissed Ellman’s only federal claim, it “may decline to 8 ||exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over the remaining state-law claims. See 28 U.S.C. 9 || $ 1367(c). “In the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the 10 ||balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial 11 |}economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—will point toward declining to exercise 12 jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 13 ||550, 561 (9th Cir. 2010). Unless plaintiff states a federal cause of action, the Court declines 14 || to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. 15 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART the defense’s motion and DISMISSES 16 || Ellman’s complaint with leave to amend. By June 12, 2025, Ellman must file any amended 17 ||}complaint. The June 17, 2025 hearing 1s vacated. 18 || Dated: May 15, 2025 20 Hon. Andrew G. Schopler 71 United States District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28