People v. Lopez CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCE417025
- Trial judge
- Frank L. Birchak
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Truc T. Do (author), Joan K. Irion, Buchanan
Analysis
The trial court denied Lopez's motion to withdraw his guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter, finding no legal basis for withdrawal and that he had received effective representation. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment after an independent review under People v. Wende, finding no reasonably arguable issues on appeal.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of motion to withdraw guilty plea“The trial judge found Lopez was provided with effective representation, there was no legal basis for Lopez to withdraw his plea, and denied the Marsden motion.” | unclear | not reached | unsure The appellate court did not explicitly review the trial court's denial of the motion to withdraw the plea under a specific standard of review (such as abuse of discretion). Instead, the court conducted an independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende and found no reasonably arguable issues for reversal, effectively affirming the judgment without addressing the specific merits of the withdrawal motion in the discussion section. |
Advisement of Boykin/Tahl rights“After reviewing the entire record as required by Wende and Anders, we conclude he was properly advised of his Boykin/Tahl constitutional rights before his guilty plea and, further, we have not discovered any arguable issues for reversal or modification on appeal.” | de novo | correct | agree with court The court reviewed the record to determine if the defendant was properly advised of his constitutional rights. The record shows a signed waiver form, a colloquy with the judge confirming understanding, and the defendant's admission that he was not induced by promises other than the stipulated sentence. The court concluded the advisement was proper. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 — Requires independent review of the record by appellate counsel when no issues are raised, to ensure no reasonably arguable issues are overlooked.
- relied: Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 — Establishes the procedure for appointed counsel to file a brief identifying no meritorious issues while notifying the defendant of the right to file a supplemental brief.
- relied: Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 — Requires that a guilty plea be entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, with specific advisements of constitutional rights.
- relied: In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 — California case requiring specific advisements of rights waived by a guilty plea, often cited alongside Boykin.
- relied: People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 — Establishes the procedure for a hearing to determine if a defendant has a conflict of interest with their appointed counsel.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion is a standard Wende/Anders memorandum. It correctly applies the procedural framework for independent review. It identifies the specific issue raised by counsel (Boykin/Tahl advisement) and resolves it based on the record. It does not address the merits of the motion to withdraw the plea, which is consistent with the finding of no reasonably arguable issues, though it leaves the specific legal basis for the trial court's denial unanalyzed.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe trial court accepted Lopez's guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter with a firearm enhancement and strike prior, denied his Marsden motion after finding no legal basis to withdraw the plea, and imposed the stipulated 26-year sentence. On a Wende/Anders appeal with no supplemental brief, the Court of Appeal independently reviewed the record, found Lopez was properly advised of his Boykin/Tahl rights and that no arguable issues existed, and affirmed.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Acceptance of guilty plea as knowing, voluntary, and intelligent with proper Boykin/Tahl advisements and a factual basis“we conclude he was properly advised of his Boykin/Tahl constitutional rights before his guilty plea and, further, we have not discovered any arguable issues for reversal or modification on appeal.” | de novo | correct | agree with court The record quoted in the opinion shows a completed and initialed Boykin/Tahl waiver form, counsel's attestation, the trial judge's on-the-record colloquy confirming understanding and absence of other promises, and a stipulated factual basis. Nothing in the opinion suggests any advisement defect, and the Wende independent review found none. |
Denial of Marsden motion and finding of no legal basis to withdraw the guilty plea“The trial judge found Lopez was provided with effective representation, there was no legal basis for Lopez to withdraw his plea, and denied the Marsden motion.” | unclear | correct | agree with court Lopez praised his counsel, disclaimed any conflict, and admitted counsel correctly told him he would serve 85 percent of 26 years with no reduction; he simply did not believe her and relied on rumors about a nonexistent 'new law.' A unilateral misunderstanding contradicted by counsel's accurate advice and the plea form does not establish good cause under section 1018, and his belated intoxication claim contradicted his signed sobriety acknowledgment. The opinion does not state the abuse-of-discretion standard or analyze section 1018 expressly, but the Wende posture does not require it and the result is plainly supported. |
Imposition of stipulated 26-year sentence (upper term of 11 years doubled for strike plus 4 years firearm enhancement, concurrent with other case)“the court imposed the upper term of 11 years on the voluntary manslaughter, doubled for the strike prior to 22 years, and 4 years on the section 12022.5, subdivision (a), firearm enhancement, for a total of 26 years.” | unclear | correct | agree with court The sentence matched the stipulated plea agreement that Lopez acknowledged on the form and in the colloquy, and the components (upper term doubled for an admitted strike, plus the admitted section 12022.5(a) enhancement) are lawful on their face. The opinion does not discuss the upper-term basis under section 1170(b), but a stipulated sentence in a plea bargain generally forecloses that challenge. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 — When appointed appellate counsel finds no arguable issues, the Court of Appeal must independently review the entire record for arguable error.
- relied: Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 — Appointed counsel who finds an appeal wholly frivolous may so advise the court and request to withdraw, accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.
- relied: Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 — A guilty plea is invalid unless the record affirmatively shows the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived the privilege against self-incrimination, right to jury trial, and right to confrontation.
- relied: In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 — The record must expressly show the defendant was advised of and waived the three Boykin constitutional rights before a guilty plea is accepted.
- relied: People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 — When a defendant seeks substitution of appointed counsel, the trial court must allow the defendant to state the reasons and inquire into the alleged inadequacy of representation.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion follows the Wende/Anders procedure, recounts the plea colloquy, the Marsden hearing, and the sentence in enough detail to show that the only potential issue—withdrawal of the plea based on a misunderstanding about a 'new law'—was contradicted by counsel's accurate advice and Lopez's own admissions. It does not separately articulate the standards for plea withdrawal or Marsden review, but in a no-issue Wende affirmance that omission does not undermine the result.
Opinion
Filed 5/15/25 P. v. Lopez CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D084077
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE417025)
JOHN DAVID LOPEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Frank L. Birchak, Judge. Affirmed. Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance by Plaintiff and Respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION John David Lopez appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence following a guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter. His appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders). We notified Lopez of his right to file a supplemental brief, and he has not done so. Based on our independent review of the record, we find no reasonably arguable appellate issues and affirm the judgment. I. Background In an amended information, Lopez was charged with murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a) (all further references are to the Penal Code)) with firearm enhancements pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (d), and section 12022.5, subdivision (a). It was further alleged he had two serious felony priors and two strike priors based on felony assault convictions from 1985 and 2016. Three aggravating circumstances were also alleged in support of an upper term sentence. On March 11, 2024, Lopez pled guilty to the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) and admitted the section 12022.5, subdivision (a), firearm enhancement and one strike prior. With the assistance of counsel, Lopez completed and signed a Boykin/Tahl1 waiver form, initialing each line acknowledging the constitutional rights he waived and the consequences of his plea. Relevant here, he initialed the acknowledgements: (1) “I have not been induced to enter this plea by any promise or representation of any kind, except” the stipulated agreement he would be sentenced to “26 years to run concurrent with [case No.] SCD296684.” (2) He was subject to the maximum exposure of 32 years state prison and his conviction will be a strike resulting in substantially increased penalties. (3) His attorney explained to him other possible consequences, including reduced conduct/work credits as follows, “b. Violent Felony (No credit or max. 15%)” and “c. Prior Strike(s) (No credit to max. 20%).” He 1 Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 and In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 (Boykin/Tahl). 2 agreed to the following factual basis: “I unlawfully killed David Martinez. I intentionally discharged a firearm. I have suffered a previous strike offense. I have previously been to prison.” Lopez’s attorney signed the waiver form, attesting she personally read and explained the entire contents of the plea form and any attached addendum to him; discussed all charges, possible defenses, and consequences with him; and concurred in his plea and waiver of constitutional rights.
The trial judge reviewed the plea form with Lopez,2 confirming he read the form, had enough time to speak with his attorney, understood all of the contents of the form, and initialed and signed the form because he understood it and “everything in [it] was true.” Lopez confirmed he understood he would be sentenced to 26 years on the voluntary manslaughter conviction and the section 12022.5, subdivision (a), enhancement, concurrent with the two-year sentence he would receive in case no. SCD296684. The court asked him, “Did anybody promise you anything else in order to get you to plead guilty?” He responded, “No.” It asked him, “Do you believe you understand all of the consequences of your plea of guilty including any potential immigration consequences.” He responded, “I believe I do.” Lopez then pled guilty as indicated. The court found Lopez’s plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered and there was a factual basis for the plea. At the sentencing hearing on April 9, Lopez moved to withdraw his guilty plea. His appointed counsel informed the court that after conducting research, “the law did not appear to support [his request] based on the 2 The court also reviewed the plea form in Case No. SCD296684 at the same time.
3 reason” he provided her. She requested the court conduct a Marsden3 hearing to allow Lopez to explain “what was going on in his mind when he agreed to accept the deal, so the court can take that into consideration, and see whether or not they feel there is any appropriate remedy to be had.” After confirming counsel’s representation with Lopez, the court closed the courtroom except for defense counsel and court staff to conduct a Marsden hearing. Relevant here, on April 8, the day before his sentencing hearing, Lopez filed a handwritten letter to the court asserting he accepted the negotiated plea bargain believing that “15 years were going to come off [his] sentence” and he was “only going to have to do 66 [percent] on 11 [years], not 85 [percent] on 26 [years],” due to a “new law” that became effective in 2023 in which “double-ups and enhancements are automatically coming off of every ones [sic] sentence.” He acknowledged his lawyer “told [him] the truth,” that he would “have to do 85 [percent] on [his] plea bargain,” but asserted: “[W]hen my lawyer told me how much time I was really going to do I told her I could not accept a deal like that.” He maintained, however, he was “lied to, and miss informed [sic] about the [new] law” and that he now understands, from talking to family members of “people who are up state” that “violent offenders double up’s and enhancements do not come off.” He asserted he could no longer “consent to the plea bargain.” In the Marsden hearing, Lopez told the court his appointed counsel “did a great job,” is “a good lawyer,” “one of the best ones that [he has] ever had in [his] life,” and he has “no conflict of issue with her.” He provided the following basis to withdraw his plea: “I was under the impression that there was a new law in effect. Everybody is talking about it. They are coming 3 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118. 4 down from up state talking about the double up and things taken off of everybody’s cases now. When they offered me the deal, 26 without life, the 11 doubled up to 22 with the four year gun enhancement, I thought it doesn’t sound so bad. [¶] I talked to her about it. She told me that is not the case. This is not the case.” He confirmed in response to the court’s direct question that his attorney did inform him he would not be getting any reduction on the stipulated 26-year sentence. But he “did not believe her.” Lopez then added he “got high that day” and “was under the influence,” contrary to his plea form acknowledging, “I am sober and my judgment is not impaired. I have not consumed any drug, alcohol or narcotic within the past 24 hours.” Lopez’s attorney confirmed she repeatedly advised him that “he would do 85 percent.” The trial judge found Lopez was provided with effective representation, there was no legal basis for Lopez to withdraw his plea, and denied the Marsden motion. Proceeding to sentencing, the court imposed the upper term of 11 years on the voluntary manslaughter, doubled for the strike prior to 22 years, and 4 years on the section 12022.5, subdivision (a), firearm enhancement, for a total of 26 years. The sentence was run concurrent with the sentence imposed in case SCD296684. Lopez timely filed a notice of appeal and obtained a certificate of probable cause. II. Discussion Lopez’s appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738, setting forth a statement of the case and statement of facts, urging no grounds for reversal of the judgment, and asking this court to independently review the record for error. Counsel identifies the following issue to assist the court in its review: “Was appellant properly advised of his Boykin/Tahl constitutional rights prior to 5 the acceptance of the guilty plea?” After reviewing the entire record as required by Wende and Anders, we conclude he was properly advised of his Boykin/Tahl constitutional rights before his guilty plea and, further, we have not discovered any arguable issues for reversal or modification on appeal. Competent counsel has represented Lopez on this appeal. III. Disposition The judgment is affirmed.
DO, J.
WE CONCUR:
IRION, Acting P. J.
BUCHANAN, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Wende Crim. 20851 · 1979-10-12
- People v. Marsden Crim. 14119 · 1970-02-26
- In Re Tahl Crim. 13410 · 1969-11-07