In re A.A. CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from orders
- Trial court
- Superior Court of Imperial County · No. JJP001393
- Trial judge
- William D. Quan
- Outcome
- reversed — Reversed and remanded.
- Area
- dependency
- Panel
- Truc T. Do (author), Judith D. McConnell, O'Rourke
Analysis
The trial court terminated the parents' rights to A.A. without conducting a proper inquiry into the child's Indian status as required by ICWA. The appellate court conditionally reversed the order and remanded the case for the limited purpose of conducting the required ICWA inquiry.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Order terminating parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26“The orders entered by the juvenile court on January 22, 2025, made pursuant to a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, are conditionally reversed.” | unclear | error (procedure) | agree with court The court found that the Department failed to comply with its duties under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and the California Indian Child Welfare Act, specifically failing to provide biographical information to tribes and failing to make an affirmative order regarding ICWA. The parties stipulated to this error, and the court granted a conditional reversal under Code of Civil Procedure section 128 to allow for the proper inquiry to be conducted on remand. |
Authorities
- relied: In re Rashad H. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 376 — Stipulated reversal materially advances the pace of the decision-making process, benefiting potential adoptive parents, and public trust is advanced by resolving judicial error.
- relied: Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (1978) 25 U.S.C. ch. 21, § 1901 et seq. — Federal statute requiring specific procedures and inquiries when there is reason to believe a child is an Indian child.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is procedurally sound as it correctly applies the statutory requirements for stipulated reversal under Code of Civil Procedure section 128. It relies on established case law (In re Rashad H.) to justify that reversing for judicial error serves the public interest and benefits the child's permanency.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe Imperial County juvenile court sustained a dependency petition as to four-month-old A.A., denied reunification services, and on January 22, 2025 terminated the parental rights of Mother and Father under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 without ever making an ICWA finding, although both parents had reported possible Native American ancestry and the Department had contacted tribes without supplying biographical information. On appeal the parents and the Department jointly stipulated that the ICWA inquiry was deficient, and the Court of Appeal, applying Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(8), granted the stipulated motion, conditionally reversed the termination orders, and remanded for proper ICWA inquiry and notice with directions to reinstate the orders if no tribe claims the child.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Juvenile court's termination of parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 without ensuring the Department completed an adequate ICWA/Cal-ICWA inquiry and without making any ICWA finding“The Department contacted the identified tribes, but it did not provide biographical information. Department reports note that ICWA “does or may apply.”” | unclear | error (procedure) | agree with court Both parents reported possible Indian ancestry and Father named relatives and tribes, which triggered the Department's duty of further inquiry under Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2; contacting tribes without biographical information and the court's failure to make any ICWA finding at the jurisdiction or 366.26 hearings is a facial statutory deficiency, and the Department conceded the error. The appellate court did not independently review the record under a stated standard because the matter came up on stipulation, but the recited facts support the conceded error. |
Appellate court's acceptance of the parties' joint stipulation for conditional reversal under Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(8)“Because the parties have satisfied the requirements of section 128, we grant the request.” | de novo | error | agree with court Section 128(a)(8) requires findings that nonparty and public interests are not adversely affected and that the reasons for reversal outweigh erosion of public trust and reduced settlement incentives; the court made each finding and grounded them in In re Rashad H., which addressed stipulated reversals in the dependency context and held that correcting judicial error by stipulation advances rather than erodes public trust. The reasoning tracks the statute and the controlling authority, and a limited conditional reversal is the remedy California courts routinely use for ICWA inquiry errors. |
Authorities
- relied: In re Rashad H. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 376 — A stipulated reversal in a dependency case satisfies Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(8) where it speeds the decisionmaking process to the benefit of prospective adoptive parents and corrects judicial error, which advances rather than erodes public trust.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion correctly applies the three statutory prerequisites of Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(8) and relies on In re Rashad H., the directly applicable dependency authority, to reach a conditional reversal that matches the remedy California courts use for conceded ICWA inquiry errors. It does not cite the Supreme Court's recent ICWA decisions such as In re Dezi C. or analyze the specific section 224.2 duties breached, but given the parties' stipulation that omission does not undermine the result.
Opinion
Filed 5/13/25 In re A.A. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re A.A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. D085529 IMPERIAL COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, (Super. Ct. No. JJP001393)
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. P.A. et al., Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Imperial County, William D. Quan, Judge. Reversed and remanded. Robert McLaughlin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant P.A. Marisa L. D. Conroy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant J.A. Kelly Ranasinghe, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. J.A. (Mother) and P.A. (Father) filed notices of appeal after their parental rights were terminated. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) In their opening briefs, they argued the Imperial County Department of Social Services (the Department) failed to comply with its duties under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. ch. 21, § 1901 et seq.). The Department agrees. The parties filed a joint stipulation for conditional reversal and limited remand. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. (a)(8) (all further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure).) Because we conclude the motion has merit, we conditionally reverse the order and remand the matter.
BACKGROUND A. General Background The Department filed a petition after a sheriff’s deputy found four- month-old A.A. alone in a vehicle, while his parents were approximately 35 yards away. The Department alleged A.A. was dirty, with matted hair and a scaly patch on his scalp, a soiled diaper, and a severe diaper rash. His mother appeared to be under the influence of an illicit substance. His father had fled from deputies four days earlier, with A.A., and he made criminal threats against the landlord on the date deputies found A.A. alone. The court found the allegations true at a June 17, 2024 contested jurisdiction hearing. Following a contested disposition trial on August 26, 2024, the court denied reunification services. The court held a trial to terminate parental rights on January 22, 2025. At that hearing, the court terminated parental rights and found A.A. adoptable. B. ICWA Both parents reported to the social worker there was reason to believe A.A. is a Native American child and completed Parental Notification of 2 Indian Status forms. Father identified potential Native American ancestry by his father and grandmother. He provided their names and identified their tribes. Mother thought she may have Native American ancestry through her grandmother or grandfather, without providing names. She was unsure of any tribe. The Department contacted the identified tribes, but it did not provide biographical information. Department reports note that ICWA “does or may apply.” On June 17, 2024, the court noted it had received notices back from two of four Native American tribes contacted. It did not make an affirmative order regarding ICWA at that hearing. It also did not address ICWA at the hearing terminating parental rights on January 22, 2025. After Mother and Father filed their opening briefs, the parties filed a joint motion to conditionally reverse the order and remand the matter to the juvenile court pursuant to section 128, explaining they agree the Department did not conduct a proper inquiry under ICWA and its California counterpart, the California Indian Child Welfare Act (Welf. & Inst. Code § 224.2, et seq.). Because the parties have satisfied the requirements of section 128, we grant the request. DISCUSSION We may not reverse a judgment upon stipulation of the parties unless we find: (1) “There is no reasonable possibility that the interests of nonparties or the public will be adversely affected by the reversal”; and (2) “The reasons of the parties for requesting reversal outweigh the erosion of public trust that may result from the nullification of a judgment and the risk that the availability of stipulated reversal will reduce the incentive for pretrial settlement.” (§ 128, subd. (a)(8)(A), (B).) These requirements are satisfied.
3 First, there is no reasonable probability the interest of nonparties or the public will be adversely affected by the conditional reversal. The only nonparties whose rights are at issue are those of the prospective adoptive parents. “The stipulation to reverse materially advances the pace of the decisionmaking process, which actually on the whole benefits the potential adoptive parents.” (In re Rashad H. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 376, 380–381 (Rashad H.).) Second, the parties’ reasons for reversal outweigh any risk of erosion of public trust. They seek conditional reversal because they agree the juvenile court erred. Public trust is advanced, not eroded, by stipulated reversals to resolve judicial error. (Rashad H., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at pp. 380–381.) Third, there is no evidence that the availability of a stipulated reversal here would reduce incentives for pretrial settlement. Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 does not contemplate pretrial settlement.
4 DISPOSITION The orders entered by the juvenile court on January 22, 2025, made pursuant to a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, are conditionally reversed. The matter is remanded to the juvenile court for the limited purpose of conducting further inquiry as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act and the California Indian Child Welfare Act. After proper inquiry has been completed and any notice requirements are met, if any tribes claim A.A. is a Native American child, the court shall proceed in conformity with ICWA and the parallel California statute. If not, the court shall reinstate the order terminating parental rights. Remittitur shall issue immediately.
DO, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
O’ROURKE, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- In Re Rashad H. B133778 · 2000-03-02