gno.law

Hodroff v. JPMorgan Chase & Co.

District Court, S.D. California · 3:25-cv-00041 · 2025-05-12 · Unknown

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
Andrew G. Schopler (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T21:05Z · confidence high

The court considered a motion to dismiss a pro se plaintiff's complaint, which alleged a federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) claim and state-law claims arising from debt collection activities. The court granted the motion in part, dismissing the FDCPA claim as time-barred with leave to amend, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims unless a federal claim is reasserted.

What the court decidedThe model
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the FDCPA claim is granted in part; the FDCPA claim is dismissed as time-barred with leave to amend.
“So his FDCPA claim must be dismissed as time-barred. Yet it “can possibly be cured by additional factual allegations,” so the Court grants him leave to amend.”
agree with court
The court correctly applied the one-year statute of limitations for FDCPA claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) and the Ninth Circuit precedent in Brown v. Transworld Sys., Inc., which rejects a continuing violation doctrine. The complaint only alleged a 2017 date, which is outside the limitations period. The court correctly noted that it could not consider facts alleged in the opposition brief (May 1, 2025) for the purpose of the motion to dismiss, per Marder v. Lopez. Granting leave to amend is appropriate when the deficiency is potentially curable by factual allegations.
The court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims unless the plaintiff files an amended complaint stating a federal claim.
“Thus, unless plaintiff states a federal claim, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”
agree with court
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), a district court may decline supplemental jurisdiction when it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. The court cited Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., which supports declining jurisdiction in the usual case where federal claims are eliminated before trial. The court's decision to condition the decline on the failure to file an amended complaint with a federal claim is a procedural mechanism consistent with the grant of leave to amend.

The order itself: sound — The order correctly applies the relevant statute and binding Ninth Circuit precedent to the facts recited in the complaint. It properly distinguishes between the complaint's allegations and the opposition's allegations for the purpose of the motion to dismiss. The decision to grant leave to amend and condition the retention of state claims on the filing of a federal claim is procedurally sound.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Matthew HODROFF, Case No.: 25-cv-0041-AGS-JLB 4 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART 5 v. DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF 7) 6 JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, et al., 7 Defendants. 8 9 Plaintiff Matthew Hodroff, an attorney representing himself, brings this action 10 against defendants JPMorgan Chase Bank and its “National Association.” (ECF 1, at 17.) 11 But his sole federal claim is time-barred. So, unless he files an amended complaint, his 12 remaining claims will be remanded to state court. 13 In 2017, Hodroff “allegedly became indebted on” accounts “owned by Defendants.” 14 (ECF 1, at 22.) According to the complaint, defendants then “persisted in a coordinated 15 attack” “to annoy harass, deceive, and trick [him] into paying for” “disputed” debts. (Id. 16 at 23.) They “continue to claim and report late payments, despite no payments being due,” 17 and Hodroff “has suffered economic damages” because they are “publishing false and 18 misleading information about” him. (Id.) So he filed this suit, alleging a federal Fair Debt 19 Collection Practices Act claim and some state-law claims. (Id. at 17.) Chase Bank moves 20 to dismiss the FDCPA claim without leave to amend because it’s “time-barred.” (See 21 ECF 7, at 13, 30.) 22 “An action to enforce any liability” under the FDCPA “may be brought . . . within 23 one year from the date on which the violation occurs.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). “[E]very 24 alleged FDCPA violation triggers its own one-year statute of limitations,” and “there is no” 25 FDCPA “continuing violation doctrine” nor “discovery rule.” Brown v. Transworld Sys., 26 Inc., 73 F.4th 1030, 1040, 1044 (9th Cir. 2023). So each alleged “occurrence of an FDCPA 27 violation” must, on its own, survive the statute-of-limitations analysis. Id. at 1041. 28 1 Hodroff’s complaint lists only one date in 2017, and he asserts that defendants 2 ||“continue” to engage in FDCPA violations. (ECF 1, at 22—23.) But 2017 lies far outside 3 FDCPA’s “one year” statute of limitations. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). And because 4 || there is no “continuing violation doctrine in the FDCPA context,” he cannot “sweep in a 5 || series of component acts that” have occurred since then to piece together a timely claim. 6 || See Brown, 73 F.4th at 1044. Granted, in his opposition papers, Hodroff alleges that Chase 7 || Bank’s “most recent” FDCPA-violating “conduct” occurred on “May 1, 2025,” which is 8 || within the limitations period. (ECF 9, at 5.) But “the scope of review on a motion to dismiss 9 failure to state a claim is limited to the contents of the complaint.” Marder v. Lopez, 10 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 2006). So his FDCPA claim must be dismissed as time-barred. 11 |} Yet it “can possibly be cured by additional factual allegations,” so the Court grants him 12 || leave to amend. See Salameh v. Tarsadia Hotel, 726 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013). 13 Because the Court has dismissed Hodroff’s only federal claim, it “may decline to 14 exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over the remaining state-law claims. See 28 U.S.C. 15 || § 1367(c). “In the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the 16 ||balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial 17 |}economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—will point toward declining to exercise 18 jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 19 561 (9th Cir. 2010). Thus, unless plaintiff states a federal claim, the Court declines to 20 || exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. 21 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART Chase Bank’s motion and 22 ||DISMISSES Hodroff’s complaint with leave to amend. By June 9, 2025, Hodroff may 23 an amended complaint. If he does not file an amended complaint, his remaining 24 || state-law claims will be remanded to state court. The May 23, 2025 hearing is vacated. 25 Dated: May 12, 2025 26 4 | 27 Hon. Andrew G. Schopler 28 United States District Judge

Cites, in this corpus