Bo v. Board of Regents of the University of California
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Andrew G. Schopler (author)
Analysis
Plaintiff Huyun Bo, proceeding pro se, moved for the appointment of counsel under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), and to expedite the trial schedule. The Court denied both motions, finding that Bo failed to state a colorable employment discrimination claim and that no exceptional circumstances existed to warrant appointed counsel, and further denied the request to appear remotely as moot.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Denial of Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5“The Court denies his § 2000e-5 appointment request.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the three-factor test from Johnson v. United States Dep’t of Treasury. While the plaintiff satisfied the financial and effort factors, the court correctly identified that the third factor (merit) was not met because the complaint failed to allege employment, which is a prerequisite for a Title VII claim. Therefore, the denial follows logically from the cited law and the record. |
Denial of Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1)“There are thus no “exceptional circumstances” warranting appointment of counsel in this case.” | agree with court The court applied the 'exceptional circumstances' standard from Palmer v. Valdez. It found that the plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on the merits of his constitutional claims (specifically noting his own concession regarding double jeopardy) and that he was capable of articulating his claims pro se. This aligns with the Ninth Circuit's precedent that appointment is rare and requires a showing of merit and inability to proceed pro se. |
Denial of Plaintiff's Motion to Expedite Trial Schedule“Bo’s counsel-appointment expedited trial requests are DENIED.” | agree with court The court found that being 'in the prime of youth' is not a sufficient ground for expediting a trial, particularly given the lack of merit in the claims. This is a discretionary determination consistent with general case management principles. |
Denial of Plaintiff's Request to Appear Remotely as Moot“As there are no hearings scheduled in this case, his request to appear remotely is DENIED AS MOOT.” | agree with court Since no hearings were currently scheduled, the request for remote appearance had no immediate effect. Denying it as moot while allowing the plaintiff to re-file if hearings are scheduled is procedurally appropriate. |
The order itself: sound — The order is sound. It correctly identifies the applicable legal standards for both statutory provisions under which counsel appointment was sought. It applies the facts of the case (lack of employment allegation for Title VII; lack of merit and ability to articulate for § 1915) to those standards logically. The denial of the expedited schedule is a reasonable exercise of discretion based on the lack of merit. No significant legal arguments or binding authorities appear to be missing or misapplied.
Opinion
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Huyun BO, Case No.: 24-cv-2212-AGS-KSC 4 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 5 v. MOTIONS FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL (ECF 2) AND TO 6 REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF EXPEDITE TRIAL SCHEDULE CALIFORNIA, et al., 7 (ECF 9) Defendants. 8 9 Plaintiff Huyun Bo asks the Court to appoint counsel on his behalf under 42 U.S.C. 10 § 2000e-5 and to expedite the trial schedule. (See ECF 2; ECF 9.) But he does not qualify 11 for counsel appointment and has made no showing that an expedited schedule is warranted. 12 “[I]n such circumstances as the court may deem just, the court may appoint an 13 attorney.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). When determining whether to appoint counsel under 14 this “employment discrimination case” provision, courts consider three factors: “(1) the 15 plaintiff’s financial resources; (2) the efforts made by the plaintiff to secure counsel on his 16 or her own; and (3) the merit of the plaintiff’s claim.” Johnson v. United States Dep’t of 17 Treasury, 939 F.2d 820, 824 (9th Cir. 1991). Bo represents that he is unemployed with 18 only $1,000, and that he unsuccessfully tried to retain three attorneys—so he satisfies the 19 first two factors. (ECF 2, at 3–4, 6.) His request falters, however, at the third factor. 20 To succeed on a Civil Rights Act employment-discrimination claim, Bo “must state 21 a colorable case of employment discrimination.” See In re Farnham, No. C-81-144 MISC, 22 1981 WL 26994, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 1981). But his complaint is void of any allegation 23 that he was ever employed by the defendant, so he cannot have leveled a meritorious 24 employment-discrimination claim. The Court denies his § 2000e-5 appointment request. 25 Still, the Court can separately appoint an attorney to “represent any person unable to 26 afford counsel” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). But it may only do so in “exceptional 27 circumstances.” Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009). “When determining 28 1 || whether ‘exceptional circumstances’ exist, a court must consider the likelihood of success 2 ||on the merits as well as the ability of the petitioner to articulate his claims pro se in light 3 || of the complexity of the legal issues involved.” /d. (cleaned up). 4 At this stage of the analysis, it cannot be said that Bo is likely to succeed in his 5 || “Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment|]” and “double jeopardy” claims. (ECF 1, at 3.) 6 || His lawsuit is premised upon his disagreement with a university’s decision to “suspend[]” 7 || him “from the University of California for four calendar years” after finding that he was 8 || “stalking” his ex-girlfriend on an “extremely and invasive scale” in addition to leveling 9 || “multiple threats” against her, her pet, and her new boyfriend. (ECF 1-2, at 15.) However 10 “unfair and irresponsible” he may believe that the decision was, his complaint does not 11 allege anything that rises to the level of a Fifth, Sixth, or Fourteenth Amendment violation, 12 any double-jeopardy concerns. (See ECF 1, at 3, 8.) Bo even concedes that he faces an 13 || uphill legal battle, acknowledging that the “‘Double Jeopardy Clause’ does not apply in 14 || this case.” Ud. at 16.) So, although he “hopes to advance [the] American judiciary” by 15 || changing that in “this case” (ECF 1, at 16), his admitted lack of a legal basis is a strong 16 ||indication that he is unlikely to succeed, see Palmer, 560 F.3d at 970. And his ability to 17 ||recognize that fact indicates that he is “able to articulate his claims” pro se. See id. There 18 || are thus no “exceptional circumstances” warranting appointment of counsel tn this case. 19 Nor has Bo made a showing that the Court should issue an “expedited trial schedule.” 20 || (See ECF 9, at 2.) He may be “in the prime of youth” (id.), but that is not a sufficient ground 21 || to expedite trial—especially given the faulty merits of his claim. Bo’s counsel-appointment 22 expedited trial requests are DENIED. As there are no hearings scheduled in this case, 23 ||his request to appear remotely is DENIED AS MOOT. If the Court schedules any 24 || hearings, he may file his remote-appearance and interpretation requests at that time. 25 Dated: May 9, 2025 27 Hon. Andrew G. Schopler 28 United States District Judge