Williams v. Berryhill

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MADELINE W., Case No.: 18-cv-02678-AJB-BLM 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 13 v. ATTORNEY’S FEES 14 FRANK BISIGNANO,1 Acting (Doc. No. 28) Commissioner of Social Security, 15 Defendant. 16 18 Before the Court is a motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) filed 19 by Denise Bourgeois Haley, counsel for Plaintiff Madeline W. (“Plaintiff”). (Doc. No. 28.) 20 Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1, the Court finds the matter suitable for determination 21 on the papers. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the motion 22 for attorney’s fees. 23 I. BACKGROUND 24 On November 6, 2018, Plaintiff signed a contingency fee agreement retaining Haley 25 and the Law Offices of Lawrence D. Rohlfing to represent Plaintiff in connection with her 26 27 1 Frank Bisignano became Acting Commissioner of Social Security on May 6, 2025, and is automatically substituted as Defendant in this case pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the federal Rules of Civil 28 1 Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) claim before the Social Security Administration 2 (“SSA”) and any judicial review. (Doc. No. 28-1.) 3 On November 26, 2018, Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking judicial review of the 4 Commissioner’s denial of her application for supplemental security income (Doc. No. 1), 5 which the Court dismissed with leave to amend in screening (Doc. No. 5.) Plaintiff then 6 filed an amended complaint. (Doc. No. 6.) On October 28, 2019, the Commissioner filed 7 the administrative record. (Doc. No. 15.) After Plaintiff filed a motion seeking reversal 8 and/or remand of the SSA’s denial of benefits (Doc. No. 20), the parties filed a joint motion 9 to remand the matter to the SSA for further administrative proceedings pursuant to sentence 10 four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (Doc. No. 24), which the Court granted (Doc. No. 25). 11 On May 8, 2020, the parties filed a joint motion for Plaintiff to be awarded attorney’s 12 fees and expenses pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. 13 § 2412(d). (Doc. No. 26.) The Court granted the joint motion, awarding the requested 14 $2,300.00 in fees. (Doc. No. 27.) Subsequently, on remand, the SSA awarded Plaintiff 15 approximately $56,434.38 in retroactive SSI. (Doc. No. 28-3 at 4.) 16 On April 10, 2025, Haley filed the instant motion in which she seeks $14,000.00 17 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §406(b) for 13.6 hours “Haley expended or supervised,”2 with an 18 order to reimburse Plaintiff $2,300.00 for the previously awarded EAJA fees. (See 19 generally Doc. No. 28.) The Commissioner filed a response declining to take a stance on 20 the motion but providing brief analysis of the requested fee. (Doc. No. 30.) 21 II. LEGAL STANDARD 22 “Under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), a court entering judgment in favor of [a social security] 23 claimant who was represented by an attorney ‘may determine and allow as part of its 24 judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total 25 of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such 26 27 2 The instant motion mistakenly states 13.5 hours were expended. However, as identified by the Commissioner (see Doc. No. 30 at 2 n.4), Haley’s timesheet records reflect a total of 13.6 hours, comprised 28 1 judgment.’” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) 2 (quoting § 406(b)(1)(A)). “Within the 25 percent boundary, . . . the attorney for the 3 successful claimant must show that the fee sought is reasonable for the services 4 rendered.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). 5 “[A] district court charged with determining a reasonable fee award 6 under § 406(b)(1)(A) must respect ‘the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee 7 agreements,’ . . . ‘looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, then testing it 8 for reasonableness.’” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1148 (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 793, 9 808). When determining reasonableness, the court must consider “whether the amount 10 need be reduced, not whether the loadstar amount should be enhanced.” Id. at 1149. While 11 there is not a definitive list of factors, courts should consider “the character of the 12 representation and the results the representative achieved.” Gisbrecht, 533 U.S. at 808. 13 “The court may properly reduce the fee for substandard performance, delay, or benefits 14 that are not in proportion to the time spent on the case.” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151. 15 However, since Gisbrecht, “district courts generally have been deferential to the terms of 16 contingency fee contracts in § 406(b) cases, accepting that the resulting de facto hourly 17 rates may exceed those for non[-]contingency-fee arrangements.” Hearn v. Barnhart, 262 18 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2003). Finally, any fee award under § 406 must be offset 19 by any award of attorney’s fees granted under the EAJA. 28 U.S.C. § 2412; Gisbrecht, 535 20 U.S. at 796. 21 III. DISCUSSION 22 Having reviewed the record and respecting the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee 23 agreements, the Court finds that the amount of attorney’s fees sought is reasonable. See 24 Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1148. First, the requested amount is does not exceed the agreed upon 25 25% cap for services rendered prosecuting judicial review. (See Doc. No. 28-1.) In fact, 26 the agreement permits recovery of 25% for representation before the SSA and another 25% 27 for representation before this Court (id.); however, Haley is only seeking a single award of 28 25% for all representation combined. (Doc. No. 28 at 8.) l Moreover, there is no indication that Plaintiff's agreement to pay counsel 25% of 2 past-due benefits was reached by improper means. There is nothing in the record to 3 || suggest substandard performance, dilatory conduct, or a disproportionate amount of time 4 || spent on this case relevant to the benefits at stake. Rather, counsel’s representation resulted 5 ||in a favorable outcome before this Court, a favorable decision on remand before the SSA, 6 ||and the Commissioner’s award of past-due SSI benefits. (See Doc. Nos. 25; 28-3.) 7 Lastly, the Court notes that the effective hourly rate of approximately $1,029.41 is 8 || within the range of rates awarded by other courts.’ See, e.g., Behrens v. Comm’r of Soc. 9 ||Sec., No. 23-CV-02254-BLM, 2025 WL 896460, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2025) 10 || (approving an hourly rate of $1092.54 for work completed in 2023 through 2024); Reddick 11 Berryhill, No. 16-CV-00029-BTM-BLM, 2019 WL 2330895, at *1—2 (S.D. Cal. May 12 2019) (granting $43,000 in fees for 21.6 hours of work, which effectively is an hourly 13 |/rate of $1,990.74, on reconsideration); Truett v. Berryhill, No. 13-CV-02742-W-BLM, 14 ||2017 WL 3783892, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2017) (accepting a “high hourly rate of 15 $1,788.62”). 16 Accordingly, based on the character of counsel’s representation and the favorable 17 ||results achieved, the Court finds the requested fees in the amount of $14,000.00 reasonable. 18 |TV. CONCLUSION 19 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's counsel’s motion 20 || for attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) and APPROVES an award in the 21 ||amount of $14,000.00. The Court further ORDERS Plaintiffs counsel to refund Plaintiff 22 $2,300.00 for the EAJA fees previously paid. 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 || Dated: May 7, 2025 © g 25 Hon. Anthony J. attaglia 26 United States District Judge 27 28 3 The de facto hourly rate does not distinguish between paralegal and attorney work.