The People v. Parrasillas CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D063299 · 2013-09-30 · Unpublished

Proceeding: appeal from a judgment
Trial court: Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCS257860
Trial judge: Kathleen M. Lewis
Outcome: affirmed — Affirmed.
Area: criminal
Panel: Richard D. Huffman, Sr. (author), Gilbert Nares, Cynthia Aaron

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T06:49Z · confidence high

The trial court convicted the defendant of inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant but failed to instruct the jury to view his extrajudicial statements with caution. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, finding that the failure to give the required instructions was harmless error given the strong independent evidence of the crime and the limited probative value of the statements.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Failure to instruct jury on CALCRIM Nos. 358 and 359 regarding defendant's out-of-court statements “We agree that the trial court had a duty to instruct the jury to view the defendant's out-of-court statements with caution. We are satisfied, however, that the error was harmless.”	de novo	error	agree with court The court correctly identified that the trial court had a duty to provide the instructions, as established by People v. McKinnon and People v. Zichko. The court then applied the harmless error standard to determine if the omission affected the verdict.
Harmlessness of the failure to instruct on CALCRIM Nos. 358 and 359 “It is not reasonably probable that there would have been a more favorable result for Parrasillas if the instruction had been given.”	de novo	harmless error	agree with court The court applied the People v. Beagle standard, weighing the evidence against the potential prejudice. It found the independent evidence of the injury (witnesses seeing the bruise) was strong and the statements themselves were not significantly incriminating or disputed in a way that would change the outcome.

Authorities

relied: People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 616 — Establishes the duty to instruct the jury to consider out-of-court statements with caution and that a conviction cannot be based on such statements alone.
relied: People v. Zichko (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1055 — Supports the requirement for trial courts to instruct jurors to consider a defendant's out-of-court statements with caution.
relied: People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441 — Provides the standard for harmless error analysis: whether it appears reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the defendant would have been reached in the absence of the error.
relied: People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210 — Guides the analysis of potential prejudice by considering whether there were conflicts regarding the content of statements or whether they were made at all.
relied: People v. Wilson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1 — Holds that the omission of cautionary instructions can be found harmless where the defendant's denials are before the jury and the jury is fully instructed on judging witness credibility.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the established legal standard for harmless error (People v. Beagle) and relies on appropriate authorities (People v. Wilson, People v. Pensinger) to evaluate the specific facts. The court provides a detailed analysis of why the specific statements were not significantly incriminating and why the independent evidence of the injury was sufficient to render the error harmless.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:31Z · confidence low

A San Diego jury convicted Braulio Parrasillas of inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)) after the trial court omitted CALCRIM Nos. 358 and 359, the cautionary and corpus delicti instructions on a defendant's out-of-court statements. The Court of Appeal agreed with both parties that the omission was error but held it harmless under the reasonable-probability standard because the disputed statements were not strongly incriminating, the defendant's denials were before the jury, the jury was fully instructed on witness credibility, and independent evidence (the victim's testimony and the bruise observed by her aunt and a police officer) established the crime; the judgment was affirmed.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Trial court's failure to instruct sua sponte with CALCRIM No. 358 that the jury should view the defendant's unrecorded out-of-court statements tending to show guilt with caution “We agree that the trial court had a duty to instruct the jury to view the defendant's out-of-court statements with caution. We are satisfied, however, that the error was harmless. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment.”	de novo	harmless error	agree with court Under then-controlling authority (McKinnon, Zichko) a trial court had a sua sponte duty to give the cautionary instruction when a defendant's unrecorded incriminating statements were in evidence, so the court correctly found error. Prejudice is assessed under the Watson reasonable-probability standard (via Beagle and McKinnon), and the court properly weighed the factors recognized in Pensinger and Wilson: the statements were ambiguous and weakly incriminating, the defendant's denials were before the jury, the jury received full credibility instructions, and the victim's eyewitness account corroborated by two observers of a fresh golf-ball-sized bruise made a more favorable result unlikely. The opinion did not expressly state a standard of review, but instructional error is reviewed independently and the court applied the correct prejudice test.
Trial court's failure to instruct with CALCRIM No. 359 that the defendant could not be convicted on his out-of-court statements alone (corpus delicti rule) “There is no serious challenge to the sufficiency of the corpus delicti here. There was an eye witness to the injury, Gonzalez. Suarez saw the fresh bruise on Gonzalez's face and a police officer saw the bruise shortly thereafter.”	de novo	harmless error	agree with court The corpus delicti instruction protects against convictions resting solely on a defendant's extrajudicial statements. Here the victim testified she was struck, and two independent witnesses observed a fresh, significant facial injury shortly afterward, so the corpus delicti was amply established by evidence independent of any statement; omission of the instruction could not have affected the verdict. The court's treatment in a footnote is brief but adequate given the record.

Authorities

relied: People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 616 — Trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct that a defendant's out-of-court statements be viewed with caution; omission is reviewed for prejudice under the reasonable-probability standard.
relied: People v. Zichko (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1055 — Cautionary instruction on a defendant's extrajudicial statements must be given sua sponte when such statements are admitted.
relied: People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441 — Omission of the cautionary instruction is tested for harmlessness by asking whether it is reasonably probable a more favorable result would have been reached absent the error.
relied: People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210 — In assessing prejudice from omitting the cautionary instruction, courts consider whether there was conflict about the content of the statements or whether they were made at all.
relied: People v. Wilson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1 — Omission of the cautionary instruction is harmless where the defendant's denials were before the jury and the jury was fully instructed on evaluating witness credibility.

The appellate opinion: sound — The court correctly identified the then-existing sua sponte duty to give CALCRIM Nos. 358 and 359, applied the Watson reasonable-probability test through Beagle and McKinnon, and used the Pensinger and Wilson factors to assess prejudice. Its conclusion that the ambiguous, weakly incriminating statements could not have changed a verdict supported by eyewitness testimony and independently observed injuries is well reasoned and answers the only issue raised.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 9/30/13 P. v. Parrasillas CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D063299

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCS257860)

BRAULIO PARRASILLAS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Kathleen M. Lewis, Judge. Affirmed.

Alex Kreit, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Warren Williams, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

A jury convicted Braulio Parrasillas of inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a).) Parrasillas appeals contending the trial court erred in failing, sua sponte, to instruct the jury to consider evidence of his extrajudicial statements with caution. The respondent agrees the trial court erred in failing to so instruct, but argues the error was harmless.

We agree that the trial court had a duty to instruct the jury to view the defendant's out-of-court statements with caution. We are satisfied, however, that the error was harmless. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On June 26, 2012, the victim, Johanna Gonzalez, got into an argument with Parrasillas, with whom she was living at the time. She went upstairs to pack her things in order to leave. Parrasillas followed her upstairs.

As the argument continued upstairs, Parrasillas told Gonzalez to "shut the fuck up." After further words, Parrasillas struck Gonzalez in the face, knocking her to the floor. He told her, "I don't care if you call the cops." Gonzalez called her aunt, Mirna Suarez, to come and pick her up.

Gonzalez was waiting outside the house when Suarez arrived. After she arrived, Suarez observed a "pinkish, purplish" bruise on Gonzalez's face. Gonzalez explained that she and Parrasillas had been in an argument and that he had struck her.

Suarez talked with Parrasillas outside the house and asked him what had happened. Parrasillas said, "It just happened. It was like an accident."

After Gonzalez was taken to her mother's house, police were called. A police officer arrived and interviewed Gonzalez. He observed she was traumatized and her left eye was swollen and had a lump the size of a golf ball.

2 Parrasillas testified in his own defense. He acknowledged there had been an argument that day and that the argument continued upstairs. He denied ever hitting Gonzalez or using force on her. Parrasillas also denied telling Gonzalez to "shut the fuck up" or "I don't care if you call the cops."

Parrasillas said he talked to Suarez after she arrived and that Suarez asked him what happened. He told Suarez, "I don't know, ask her." He denied telling Suarez, "It just happened. It was an accident."

DISCUSSION

When the trial court instructed the jury, it failed to include CALCRIM Nos. 358 and 359 in those instructions.1 The parties agree that case law requires trial courts to instruct jurors to consider a defendant's out-of-court statements with caution and that a conviction cannot be based on such statements alone. (People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 1 CALCRIM No. 358 provides: "You have heard evidence that the defendant made [an] oral or written statement[s] (before the trial/while the court was not in session). You must decide whether the defendant made any (such/of these) statement[s], in whole or in part. If you decide that the defendant made such [a] statement[s], consider the statement[s], along with all the other evidence, in reaching your verdict. It is up to you to decide how much importance to give to the statement[s]. [¶] Consider with caution any statement made by (the/a) defendant tending to show (his/her) guilt unless the statement was written or otherwise recorded." CALCRIM No. 359 provides: "The defendant may not be convicted of any crime based on (his/her) out-of-court statement[s] alone. You may only rely on the defendant's out-of-court statements to convict (him/her) if you conclude that other evidence shows that the charged crime [or a lesser included offense] was committed. [¶] That other evidence may be slight and need only be enough to support a reasonable inference that a crime was committed. [¶] The identity of the person who committed the crime [and the degree of the crime] may be proved by the defendant's statement[s] alone. [¶] You may not convict the defendant unless the People have proved (his/her) guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." 3 Cal.4th 616, 679; People v. Zichko (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1055, 1058.) Given there is no dispute that the court should have used the two instructions, the only question presented in this case is whether the omission was harmless.2 A. Harmless Error We turn then to the question, whether the error was harmless. Case law also establishes that failure to give the two instructions in this case is subject to harmless error analysis. In evaluating the possible prejudice arising from an error we must determine whether, after weighing the evidence, it appears reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the defendant would have been reached in the absence of the error. (People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441, 455; People v. McKinnon, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 679.)

The purpose of these instructions is to help the jury determine whether the statements attributed to the defendant were actually made. In analyzing potential prejudice reviewing courts consider whether there were conflicts regarding the content of any statements or whether they were made at all. (People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1268.)

Where the defendant's denials of the statements are before the jury and the jury is fully instructed on judging the credibility of witnesses, the omission of the cautionary instructions can be found to be harmless. (People v. Wilson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1, 20.)

2 CALCRIM No. 359 relates to the requirement that there be a corpus delicti established for the crime independent of the out-of-court statements. There is no serious challenge to the sufficiency of the corpus delicti here. There was an eye witness to the injury, Gonzalez. Suarez saw the fresh bruise on Gonzalez's face and a police officer saw the bruise shortly thereafter. There is evidence, independent of any statements, to establish the commission of the crime. 4 B. Analysis Whether the defendant made the three challenged statements was disputed at trial.

He denied making the statements to Gonzalez and explained he made a slightly different statement to Suarez than that to which she testified. Analysis of the potential prejudice from failure to give a cautionary instruction requires a weighing of the evidence against any potential prejudice. Here the jury had the testimony of Gonzalez to the fact Parrasillas struck her. Both Suarez, and the police officer observed a significant fresh bruise to Gonzalez's eye, when she was picked up by Suarez and seen shortly thereafter by police. Yet, Parrasillas denied he struck Gonzalez or that she had been harmed at the house.

More importantly, the extrajudicial statements are not terribly significant. The fact Parrasillas told Gonzalez to "shut the fuck up" really contributes little, if anything, to the question of whether he hit her in the face. The jury was aware of the stormy relationship between the two people and certainly knew there had been an argument preceding the blow, an argument which Gonzalez precipitated. The statement added nothing more than there was an angry exchange going on.

Likewise, the statement "I don't care if you call the cops" is not an admission of guilt. It is not even clear the context of any such statement. It could possibly support an inference he knew he had hit Gonzalez, or that there may have been an accident as he said to Suarez. Whatever the meaning of this particular statement, the lack of a cautionary instruction, is not reasonably probable that it affected the verdict.

5 The disputed statement to Suarez that "It just happened. It was an accident," is likewise not an admission of guilt. It arguably acknowledges something happened, even perhaps that he had done something to the victim. Again, the statement is not powerfully incriminating. The jury was fully informed on issues of credibility of witnesses. It is not reasonably probable that there would have been a more favorable result for Parrasillas if the instruction had been given.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

NARES, J.

AARON, J.

Cites, in this corpus

People v. Wilson S070327 · 2008-03-27
People v. Zichko B169184 · 2004-05-20
People v. Pensinger Docket Nos. S004466, S009489. Crim. Nos. 22808, 24569 · 1991-02-28
People v. Beagle Crim. 15794 · 1972-01-05