In re Mariah T. CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D063920 · 2013-10-01 · Unpublished

Proceeding: appeal from an order
Trial court: Superior Court of San Diego County · No. J516163C
Trial judge: Laura J. Birkmeyer
Outcome: affirmed — Affirmed.
Area: dependency
Panel: Judith D. McConnell (author), Alex C. McDonald, Gilbert Nares

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T06:49Z · confidence high

The trial court denied P.A. reunification services under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (11), and found it was not in the child's best interests to offer services under subdivision (c). The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Denial of reunification services under Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.5, subd. (c) (best interests determination) “P.A. has not shown an abuse of the court's discretion. Although she was open and honest about her drug use and failures to reunify with N.A. and Romeo, expressed an interest in reunifying with Mariah and was making efforts to begin voluntary services, she had a very long history of substance abuse, had not moved out of an environment where drug use was prevalent and delayed in starting therapy that was offered on a voluntary basis.”	abuse of discretion	not reached	agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the abuse of discretion standard, which is the appropriate standard for reviewing a juvenile court's best interests determination under section 361.5, subdivision (c). The court properly noted that the trial court has broad discretion in this area and that the determination should not be disturbed unless an abuse of discretion is clearly established. The appellate court's analysis of the facts supporting the trial court's decision is consistent with the legal standard.

Authorities

relied: In re William B. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1220 — A court has broad discretion in deciding whether to offer reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (c). (In re William B. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1227-1229.)
relied: In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295 — A determination committed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court should not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is clearly established. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.)

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion correctly identifies the applicable legal standard (abuse of discretion) and applies it to the facts presented. The court properly notes that the appellant did not challenge the trial court's findings under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (11), which effectively mandated the denial of services unless the best interests exception applied. The analysis of the facts supporting the trial court's best interests determination is thorough and consistent with the legal standard.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:31Z · confidence medium

The juvenile court declared newborn Mariah T. a dependent, removed her from parental custody, and denied reunification services to mother P.A. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (11), declining to find that services would be in Mariah's best interests under subdivision (c). On appeal, mother challenged only the best-interests determination, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, holding she failed to show an abuse of discretion.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Denial of reunification services to mother under section 361.5, subdivision (c) — refusal to find by clear and convincing evidence that reunification was in the child's best interests despite the applicability of bypass provisions (b)(10) and (b)(11). “She has not shown the court abused its discretion by denying her services or by finding that providing her with services was not in Mariah's best interests.”	abuse of discretion	correct	agree with court Mother conceded the (b)(10) and (b)(11) bypass grounds applied, so under subdivision (c) the court was required to deny services unless it found by clear and convincing evidence that reunification was in the child's best interests. The record showed a very long history of untreated substance abuse, daily methamphetamine use during pregnancy, no prenatal care, two prior failed dependencies with no services completed, continued residence in a drug-prevalent environment, and mother's own admission that she could not be a safe parent. Given that record, the appellate court correctly applied the abuse-of-discretion standard from In re Stephanie M. and In re William B., and the result is well supported.

Authorities

relied: In re William B. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1220 — A juvenile court has broad discretion in deciding whether to offer reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (c), once a bypass provision applies.
relied: In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295 — A determination committed to the juvenile court's sound discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is clearly established; the test is whether the court exceeded the bounds of reason.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion correctly identifies that mother conceded the bypass grounds, correctly frames the subdivision (c) best-interests inquiry as discretionary, and applies the proper abuse-of-discretion standard with on-point authority. It could have discussed the recognized best-interests factors (parent's current efforts and fitness, history, gravity of the problem, strength of the parent-child bond, and likelihood of success) more explicitly, but the result is plainly defensible on the facts recited.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 10/1/13 In re Mariah T. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re MARIAH T., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. D063920 SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, (Super. Ct. No. J516163C) Plaintiff and Respondent, v. P.A., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Laura J.

Birkmeyer, Judge. Affirmed.

Neale B. Gold, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County Counsel and Lisa M. Maldonado, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. P.A. appeals a juvenile court order denying her reunification services in the dependency case of her daughter, Mariah T. She contends the court reversibly erred because it would be in Mariah's best interests to provide reunification services to her. We affirm the order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 6, 2013, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) petitioned on behalf of newborn Mariah under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b),1 alleging she had tested positive for methamphetamine at birth, and P.A.

had tested positive for marijuana and methadone, had no prenatal care and admitted she smoked marijuana throughout her pregnancy and smoked methamphetamine just before going into labor with Mariah. The petition further alleged P.A. had failed to reunify with Mariah's two half siblings and she did not have custody of her other child and, Mariah's father, Cesar T., had a history of substance abuse and knew P.A. was using drugs during her pregnancy, but did not stop her. P.A. had a long history of substance abuse. She said she knew she was not ready to be a parent and was not even ready to start working on herself. The court ordered Mariah detained and, at P.A.'s request, ordered voluntary services for her.

P.A. said she had used methamphetamine almost every day during her pregnancy with Mariah and did not stop using drugs because she did not want to have another baby, but was afraid to have an abortion since she had already had about 11 to 12 abortions. She currently lived in an unsafe environment, surrounded by drug use and unsanitary conditions. Two older children had been removed from her custody. N.A. was removed because P.A. reported feeling stress with thoughts of hurting N.A. and because of her drug and alcohol use and failure 1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 2 to arrange adequate care while she worked as a prostitute. P.A. declined to participate in services in N.A.'s case, and N.A. was freed for adoption. Her child, Romeo A., was removed when she and Romeo's alleged father were arrested for getting into a car with Romeo while they were under the influence of methamphetamine. P.A. said she had used methamphetamine while she was pregnant with Romeo. She was not offered reunification services because of her continued drug use and because her services in N.A's case had been terminated.

The social worker said when he met with P.A. about Mariah's dependency, she was open and honest about her past problems and was making efforts through voluntary services to show she wanted to reunify with Mariah. He expressed concern, however, that she had used methamphetamine while pregnant, did not receive prenatal care, had not moved out of a home where the people around her were using drugs and she had no understanding of how to become an adequate parent.

After considering the evidence and argument presented at the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, the court found the allegations of the petition to be true and that Mariah would be at a substantial risk of harm in parental care. It declared Mariah a dependent of the juvenile court, removed her from parental custody, denied services to P.A. under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (11), and did not find that it would be in Mariah's best interests to offer P.A. services. The court ordered services for Cesar.

DISCUSSION

P.A. contends the court reversibly erred by denying reunification services to her. She argues the court should have exercised its discretion to order services under section 361.5, subdivision (c) because offering her services was in Mariah's best interests.

3 P.A. does not contend the court erred by finding section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (11) applicable and denying her services on that basis.2 Under section 361.5, subdivision (c), the trial court was therefore required to deny reunification services unless it found by clear and convincing evidence that reunification was in Mariah's best interests.

A court has broad discretion in deciding whether to offer reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (c). (In re William B. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1227-1229.) A determination "committed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court . . . should not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is clearly established." (In re Stephanie M.

(1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.) " 'The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason.' " (Id. at pp. 318-319.)

P.A. has not shown an abuse of the court's discretion. Although she was open and honest about her drug use and failures to reunify with N.A. and Romeo, expressed an interest in reunifying with Mariah and was making efforts to begin voluntary services, she had a very long history of substance abuse, had not moved out of an environment where drug use was 2 Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) provides reunification services need not be provided when the court finds by clear and convincing evidence: "That the court ordered termination of reunification services for any siblings or half siblings of the child because the parent or guardian failed to reunify with the sibling or half sibling after the sibling or half sibling had been removed from that parent or guardian pursuant to Section 361 and that parent or guardian is the same parent or guardian described in subdivision (a) and that, according to the findings of the court, this parent or guardian has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal of the sibling or half sibling of that child from that parent or guardian." Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(11) provides reunification services need not be provided to a parent when the court finds by clear and convincing evidence: "That the parental rights of a parent over any sibling or half sibling of the child had been permanently severed, and this parent is the same parent described in subdivision (a), and that, according to the findings of the court, this parent has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal of the sibling or half sibling . . . ." 4 prevalent and delayed in starting therapy that was offered on a voluntary basis. She had not participated in reunification services for N.A. and Romeo, and, despite losing custody of these children, never had any substance abuse treatment, but used methamphetamine daily while she was pregnant with Mariah. She told the social worker she knew she could not be a safe parent for Mariah and she needed to overcome many problems that stem from her terrible childhood and long history of drug abuse and instability. P.A.'s short period of voluntary services did not show there was any likelihood that ordering services for her would result in her becoming a safe and adequate parent. She has not shown the court abused its discretion by denying her services or by finding that providing her with services was not in Mariah's best interests.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

MCCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

NARES, J.

MCDONALD, J.

Cites, in this corpus

In Re William B. G039351 · 2008-05-14
In Re Stephanie M. S030816 · 1994-02-24