gno.law

In re Brendon A. CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D062687 · 2013-08-27 · Unpublished

Proceeding
appeal from an order
Trial court
Superior Court of San Diego County · No. JCM229420
Trial judges
Carolyn M. Caietti; Browder A. Willis
Outcome
affirmed — Affirmed.
Area
delinquency
Panel
Joan K. Irion (author), Judith L. Haller, Patricia D. Benke

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T06:51Z · confidence high

The juvenile court found Brendon A. to have aided and abetted misdemeanor battery and aggravated assaults and imposed a probation condition prohibiting the possession of weapons without an express knowledge requirement. The Court of Appeal affirmed the findings of fact but modified the probation condition to include a 'knowingly' requirement.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Sufficiency of evidence for aiding and abetting misdemeanor battery and aggravated assault
“we conclude the record contains substantial evidence from which the juvenile court reasonably concluded Brendon aided and abetted the crimes alleged against him.”
substantial evidenceerroragree with court
agree with court
Validity of probation condition prohibiting possession of weapons
“We accept the People's concession and order the modification requested by Brendon.”
unclearerroragree with court
agree with court

Authorities

  • relied: In re Cesar V. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 989 — The standard of proof in juvenile proceedings involving criminal acts is the same as the standard in adult criminal trials.
  • relied: Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307 — Standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence is whether substantial evidence supports the verdict.
  • relied: People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301 — Substantial evidence is evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value.
  • relied: In re James B. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 862 — Reviewing court presumes existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce.
  • relied: People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978 — Presumption in support of judgment regarding facts deduced from evidence.
  • relied: In re V.V. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1020 — If circumstances reasonably justify findings, contrary possibility does not warrant reversal.
  • relied: People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111 — One who aids and abets another in the commission of a crime is guilty of the crime.
  • relied: People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547 — Aider and abettor liability requires knowledge of perpetrator's intent and intent to facilitate.
  • relied: People v. Long (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 586 — Aiding and abetting is a question of fact that may be proved by circumstantial evidence.
  • relied: People v. Wilson (1928) 93 Cal.App. 632 — Aiding and abetting may be proved by circumstantial evidence.
  • relied: In re Juan G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1 — Presence, companionship, and conduct before/after offense are factors in determining aiding and abetting.
  • relied: People v. Brown (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1 — Firing a BB gun at a victim constitutes assault.
  • relied: Vaughn v. Jonas (1948) 31 Cal.2d 586 — Firing a gun at and hitting a victim constitutes battery.
  • relied: People v. Martinez (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 886 — Any harmful or offensive touching constitutes an unlawful use of force or violence.
  • relied: People v. Lucas (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 721 — Passing a gun used in a shooting to a companion is a tangible act of aiding and abetting.
  • relied: People v. Pelayo (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 115 — An aider and abettor can be convicted even if not in the room when the crime occurs.
  • relied: People v. Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402 — Concerted action in passing a weapon reasonably implies a common purpose.
  • relied: People v. Reed (1952) 38 Cal.2d 423 — Circumstantial evidence is as sufficient to convict as direct evidence.
  • relied: People v. Loza (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 332 — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support liability as an aider and abettor.
  • relied: People v. Santana (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1194 — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support liability as an aider and abettor.
  • relied: People v. Freitas (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 747 — It is appropriate to modify a probation condition to specify that the defendant not knowingly possess prohibited items.
  • relied: In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902 — Modifying a probation condition prohibiting presence near weapons to make the knowledge requirement explicit is appropriate.

The appellate opinion: sound — The court correctly applied the substantial evidence standard to the aiding and abetting claims, relying on well-established California precedent regarding circumstantial evidence and the elements of aiding and abetting. The modification of the probation condition was supported by the People's concession and consistent with prior case law requiring explicit knowledge requirements in such conditions.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:31Z · confidence low

The juvenile court found true allegations that Brendon A. committed misdemeanor battery on one victim and two counts of misdemeanor assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury on an aiding-and-abetting theory arising from a group BB-gun shooting, continued him as a ward, and placed him on formal probation with a condition barring possession of weapons. The Court of Appeal held substantial evidence supported the aiding-and-abetting findings, accepted the People's concession that the weapons condition should include an express knowledge requirement, modified the condition accordingly, and affirmed the dispositional order as modified.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
True findings on misdemeanor battery and two counts of misdemeanor aggravated assault based on aiding and abetting the BB-gun shooter
“From these facts, the juvenile court reasonably could infer that Brendon knew whoever shot the BB gun at Tyler and Michael was intending to hit them, and that Brendon intended to and did encourage the shooter to do so.”
substantial evidencecorrectagree with court
The court correctly stated the Beeman elements (knowledge of the perpetrator's criminal purpose and intent to facilitate) and the Juan G. factors (presence, companionship, conduct before and after). The evidence that Brendon joined three companions in passing a single BB gun around, firing roughly 80 shots through window screens toward a public street, with companions laughing when a passerby was hit, permits a reasonable inference of concerted action and a shared purpose; Pelayo answers the argument that presence in the room at the moment of each hit was required. The inference that Brendon knew the shooter was aiming at people rather than screens is thin, and the court did not discuss whether the record showed Brendon was still present when the victims were struck, but under the deferential standard the finding is defensible and the authorities cited support it.
Probation condition forbidding use or possession of firearms, ammunition, or other weapons without an express knowledge requirement
“We accept the People's concession and order the modification requested by Brendon.”
unclearerroragree with court
The court did not state a standard of review and resolved the issue on the People's concession, relying on Freitas and Victor L., which modified similar conditions to add an express scienter requirement. The result is consistent with the then-prevailing practice in the Courts of Appeal following In re Sheena K., which the court did not cite. Modification rather than remand was appropriate and the condition as modified is enforceable; no legal misstep appears in the disposition.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547 — Aider and abettor liability requires knowledge of the perpetrator's unlawful purpose and intent to encourage or facilitate the offense; it is a question of fact provable by circumstantial evidence.
  • relied: In re Juan G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1 — Presence at the scene, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense are factors supporting an aiding and abetting finding.
  • relied: People v. Lucas (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 721 — Passing a gun used in a shooting to a companion is a tangible act of aiding and abetting.
  • relied: People v. Pelayo (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 115 — An aider and abettor may be convicted even if not in the room when the crime occurs.
  • relied: People v. Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402 — Concerted action among participants reasonably implies a common purpose supporting aiding and abetting liability.
  • relied: People v. Brown (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1 — Firing a BB gun at a victim constitutes an assault.
  • relied: People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111 — One who aids and abets a crime is guilty of that crime even if another performs the acts constituting it.
  • relied: In re V.V. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1020 — If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, a reviewing court does not reverse merely because the evidence could be reconciled with a contrary finding.
  • relied: Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307 — Sufficiency review asks whether any rational trier of fact could find the elements beyond a reasonable doubt viewing the evidence favorably to the judgment.
  • relied: People v. Freitas (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 747 — A probation condition barring possession of weapons should be modified to require knowing possession.
  • relied: In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902 — Juvenile probation condition concerning weapons or ammunition modified to make the knowledge requirement explicit.
  • missed: In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875 — A juvenile probation condition is unconstitutionally vague if it lacks an express knowledge requirement, and the appellate court may modify the condition to add one; the foundational authority for the relief granted, though omitting it did not change the result.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion states the correct sufficiency standard and aiding-and-abetting elements, answers both of Brendon's specific arguments with on-point authority (Pelayo, Campbell), and properly modifies the probation condition rather than remanding. It does not, however, address whether the record placed Brendon at the house when the victims were struck or distinguish knowledge that the shooter aimed at people from mere participation in shooting through window screens, and it omits the controlling Supreme Court authority, In re Sheena K., on the knowledge-requirement issue.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 8/27/13 In re Brendon A. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re BRENDON A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. D062687 THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. JCM229420)

v. BRENDON A., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Carolyn M.

Caietti and Browder A. Willis, Judges. Affirmed.

Steven J. Carroll, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Heather M. Clark, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Brendon A. appeals the juvenile court's dispositional order continuing him as a ward of the court and placing him on formal probation. Brendon contends the evidence was insufficient to support the court's findings that he committed one count of misdemeanor battery and two counts of misdemeanor aggravated assault. Brendon also argues the probation condition forbidding him to possess any weapons is invalid because it does not contain an express knowledge requirement. We modify the probation condition to include a knowledge requirement and affirm the dispositional order as modified.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

After school one day, Brendon and three other boys went to the house of Thomas M. One of the boys brought up the idea of shooting a BB gun, and the boys agreed to do so. The boys passed the gun around and took turns shooting it; Brendon shot the gun two or three times. The gun was fired through three different window screens, leaving 80 holes.

Tyler N. and Michael S. were struck by BB pellets as they passed by Thomas's house at separate times. Tyler was walking alone when he felt a "snap" on his left ankle.

He looked down and saw "a little BB gun wound." Tyler did not see the shooter, but he heard multiple people laughing when he was shot. A few minutes later, Michael was walking with his brother and two girls when he was struck twice in the left thigh. As Michael looked at the red marks on his thigh, he and his brother heard something "whizzing" or "swishing" past their ears. Michael and his brother thought someone was 2 shooting at them and ducked behind a pickup truck. When Michael peered over the bed of the truck, a third pellet hit his bicycle helmet.

A police investigator found several BB pellets on the sidewalk across the street from Thomas's house. The investigator also found the BB gun in Thomas's bedroom.

The manual that came with the gun stated it could cause great bodily injury or death.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The People filed an amended petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging Brendon committed misdemeanor battery on Michael (Pen. Code, § 242), and committed misdemeanor assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury on Tyler and Michael (id., §§ 17, subd. (b)(4), 245, subd. (a)(4)). The juvenile court (Hon. Carolyn M. Caietti) conducted an evidentiary hearing and found the allegations of the petition to be true. At the disposition hearing, the court (Hon. Browder A. Willis) continued Brendon as a ward of the court (he had been on court probation at the time of the current offenses), and placed him on formal probation. One of the conditions of probation stated that Brendon "shall not use, possess, transport, sell or have in or under his/her control any firearm, replica, ammunition or other weapon, including a knife, any explosive, or any item intended for use as a weapon, including hunting rifles or shotguns."

DISCUSSION

A. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court's Findings Brendon contends the evidence was insufficient to sustain the juvenile court's findings that he committed the battery and assaults alleged against him. Specifically, he 3 argues the People's aiding and abetting theory failed because the prosecutor presented no evidence that Brendon knew of the shooter's unlawful purpose or specifically intended to facilitate the shooter's commission of the offenses. For reasons we shall explain, we disagree.

1. Standard of Review " 'The standard of proof in juvenile proceedings involving criminal acts is the same as the standard in adult criminal trials.' " (In re Cesar V. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 989, 994.) When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire record to determine whether it contains substantial evidence, i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319; People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1348; In re James B.

(2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 862, 872.) We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence, whether the conviction rests primarily on direct or circumstantial evidence. (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) " 'Thus, if the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant reversal of the judgment.' " (In re V.V. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1020, 1026.)

2. Analysis The issue here is whether the record contains sufficient evidence to support the People's theory that Brendon aided and abetted the battery and assaults committed against 4 Michael and Tyler. One who aids and abets another in the commission of a crime is guilty of the crime, even if the other commits some or all of the acts constituting the crime. (Pen. Code, § 31; People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117.) Liability as an aider and abettor attaches if the defendant knew the perpetrator intended to commit the crime and the defendant intended to, and did, encourage or facilitate the perpetrator in committing the crime. (People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 561.) Whether a defendant aided and abetted the commission of a crime is a question of fact that may be proved by circumstantial evidence. (Id. at p. 559; People v. Long (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 586, 591; People v. Wilson (1928) 93 Cal.App. 632, 636.) "Among the factors which may be considered in determining aiding and abetting are: presence at the crime scene, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense." (In re Juan G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1, 5.) Considering these factors, we conclude the record contains substantial evidence from which the juvenile court reasonably concluded Brendon aided and abetted the crimes alleged against him.

As an initial matter, there is no dispute that a battery was committed against Michael, or that assaults by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury were committed against Michael and Tyler. The assaults were committed when the BB gun, which its manual stated was capable of causing great bodily injury or death, was fired at Michael and Tyler. (See Pen. Code, § 240 ["An assault is an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another."]; People v. Brown (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1, 7-8 [firing BB gun at victim constitutes assault].) The battery occurred when Michael was hit three times by pellets fired from the BB gun.

5 (See Pen. Code, § 242 ["battery is any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another"]; Vaughn v. Jonas (1948) 31 Cal.2d 586, 603 [firing gun at and hitting victim with bullets constitutes battery]; People v. Martinez (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 886, 889 ["Any harmful or offensive touching constitutes an unlawful use of force or violence."].)

There was also substantial evidence Brendon aided and abetted the commission of these crimes. Brendon went with three other boys to Thomas's house after school. The boys passed the BB gun around and took turns firing it. Brendon fired the gun a few times, and the boys fired 80 shots altogether, three of which struck Michael and one of which struck Tyler. Tyler heard multiple people laughing when he was hit; and when Michael was hit and ducked for cover, he and his brother heard objects "whizzing" past them. From these facts, the juvenile court reasonably could infer that Brendon knew whoever shot the BB gun at Tyler and Michael was intending to hit them, and that Brendon intended to and did encourage the shooter to do so. (See, e.g., In re Juan G., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 5 [defendant's "presence at the crime scene, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense" may prove aiding and abetting]; People v. Lucas (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 721, 737 [passing gun used in shooting to companion was "tangible act of aiding and abetting"].)

Brendon contends these inferences cannot be drawn because the People "presented no evidence that [he] was in the same room as the shooter when [Michael and Tyler]

were hit," or that "Brendon was one of the persons laughing when [Tyler] was struck."

We disagree. The People did not have to prove Brendon was in the room when Michael 6 and Tyler were hit by pellets fired from the BB gun, because an aider and abettor "can be convicted of an offense even if he is not in the room when the crime occurs." (People v. Pelayo (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 115, 121.) Nor did the People have to prove Brendon was one of the persons Tyler heard laughing when he was hit. Whether Brendon laughed or not, his "concerted action" with the other boys in passing the BB gun around and taking turns firing it "reasonably implies a common purpose." (People v. Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402, 409.) Thus, although the evidence required the juvenile court to draw inferences from the facts in order to find Brendon liable as an aider and abettor, "[c]ircumstantial evidence is as sufficient to convict as direct evidence." (People v. Reed (1952) 38 Cal.2d 423, 431; see People v. Loza (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 332, 361 [circumstantial evidence sufficient to support liability as aider and abettor]; People v. Santana (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1200 [same].)

B. The Probation Condition Regarding Possession of Weapons Must Be Modified to Contain a Knowledge Requirement Brendon contends the condition of probation concerning weapons is invalid because it does not contain a knowledge requirement, and asks us to modify the condition to include such a requirement. The People respond that no modification is necessary because a knowledge requirement may be read into all probation conditions, but concede we "may choose to modify the probation condition to include a knowledge requirement."

We accept the People's concession and order the modification requested by Brendon.

(See, e.g., People v. Freitas (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 747, 752 ["We agree with defendant that it is appropriate to modify the probation condition to specify that defendant not 7 knowingly possess the prohibited items."]; In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 912-913 [modifying condition of probation prohibiting minor's presence near weapons or ammunition to make knowledge requirement explicit].)

DISPOSITION

The probation condition of the dispositional order concerning weapons is modified to read: "The minor shall not knowingly use, possess, transport, sell or have in or under his control any firearm, replica, ammunition or other weapon, including a knife, any explosive, or any item intended for use as a weapon, including hunting rifles or shotguns." As so modified, the order is affirmed. The juvenile court is directed to forward a certified copy of the modified dispositional order to the probation authorities.

IRION, J.

WE CONCUR:

BENKE, Acting P. J.

HALLER, J.

Cites, in this corpus