People v. Lucas CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from an order
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCD242421
- Trial judge
- Albert T. Harutunian III
- Outcome
- reversed — Reversed and remanded with instructions.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Michele M. Castillo (author), O'Rourke, Laurence D. Rubin
Analysis
The trial court denied Lucas's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 at the prima facie stage, finding his guilty plea and firearm enhancement established he was the direct perpetrator with specific intent to kill. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the record did not conclusively establish ineligibility because the plea did not rule out conviction under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 at the prima facie stage“The court may deny the petition at the prima facie stage only if the record of conviction”—which includes facts admitted in a guilty plea—“conclusively establishes that the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law.”” | de novo | error | agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the standard from People v. Lewis and People v. Gaillard, which requires that the record of conviction conclusively establish ineligibility to deny a petition at the prima facie stage. The court properly identified that the generic language of the plea and the presence of a codefendant with the same enhancement failed to conclusively establish that Lucas was the sole direct perpetrator acting with specific intent, thereby leaving open the possibility of conviction under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 — Establishes the three-stage procedure for section 1172.6 petitions and the requirement that a court accept the petitioner's factual allegations as true at the prima facie stage.
- relied: People v. Gaillard (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1206 — Clarifies that a trial court may deny a section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage only if the record of conviction conclusively establishes ineligibility as a matter of law, and that such denials are reviewed de novo.
- relied: People v. Basler (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 46 — Clarifies that section 1172.6 relief extends to defendants convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
- relied: People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539 — Holds that generic plea language silent on mental state does not foreclose the possibility that a defendant was convicted under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
- relied: People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588 — Holds that personal discharge enhancements do not show that a defendant acted with malice aforethought and thus do not establish ineligibility for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law.
- relied: People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847 — Cited as general authority for the practice of resolving matters by memorandum opinion.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is procedurally sound and correctly applies the controlling standard from Lewis and Gaillard to the specific facts of the record. It accurately identifies that the presence of a codefendant and the generic nature of the plea prevent a conclusive finding of direct perpetration with specific intent at the prima facie stage.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe San Diego Superior Court denied Damonte Lucas's Penal Code section 1172.6 resentencing petition at the prima facie stage, reasoning that his 2014 guilty plea to attempted murder with an admitted personal firearm discharge enhancement established as a matter of law that he was the direct perpetrator with intent to kill. The Court of Appeal, accepting the Attorney General's concession of error, reversed and remanded with instructions to issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6(c)-(d).
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of section 1172.6 resentencing petition at the prima facie stage on the ground that the guilty plea and personal-discharge admission conclusively established ineligibility as a matter of law“Lucas’ admission he personally discharged a firearm in the commission of the attempted murder does not necessarily establish he was the sole perpetrator of the attempted murder or acted with the specific intent to kill.” | de novo | error (law misapplied) | agree with court Under Lewis, a court may deny at the prima facie stage only if the record of conviction conclusively shows ineligibility as a matter of law. A generic plea to attempted murder entered in 2014, when the natural and probable consequences doctrine still applied to attempted murder, says nothing about the defendant's mental state (Coley), and a section 12022.53(c) enhancement requires only personal discharge, not intent to kill (Offley). Because a codefendant pled to the identical charges and enhancement, the plea does not establish Lucas was the sole or direct perpetrator. The trial court therefore engaged in impermissible factfinding at the prima facie stage, and the appellate court correctly reversed. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 — At the prima facie stage the court accepts the petitioner's allegations as true and may deny relief only if the record of conviction establishes ineligibility as a matter of law; otherwise it must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing.
- relied: People v. Gaillard (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1206 — Denial of a section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage is reviewed de novo, and denial is permitted only where the record of conviction, including facts admitted in a plea, conclusively establishes ineligibility as a matter of law.
- relied: People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539 — A generic plea or conviction for attempted murder that is silent on mental state does not foreclose liability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
- relied: People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588 — A personal firearm discharge enhancement under section 12022.53 does not show the defendant acted with malice aforethought and does not establish ineligibility for resentencing as a matter of law.
- relied: People v. Basler (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 46 — Section 1172.6 relief extends to defendants convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
- relied: People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847 — An appellate court may dispose of an appeal by memorandum opinion where the issues are straightforward, such as a conceded error.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion applies the correct de novo standard and the Lewis prima facie framework, and it relies on directly apposite authority (Coley on generic attempted murder pleas, Offley on firearm enhancements) to show the record of conviction did not conclusively establish ineligibility, particularly given the codefendant's identical plea. Although brief and resting on the People's concession, the reasoning fully answers the only issue presented and the disposition follows from binding Supreme Court authority.
Opinion
Filed 4/23/25 P. v. Lucas CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D083279
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD242421)
DAMONTE AKIDA LUCAS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Albert T. Harutunian, III, Judge. Reversed and remanded with instructions. Gene D. Vorobyov, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson, Michael D. Butera, and Felicity Senoski, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Damonte Akida Lucas appeals from an order denying at the prima facie stage his petition for resentencing under what is now Penal Code section 1172.6. The People concede error. Resolving this matter by memorandum opinion (see generally People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847), we accept the People’s concession and reverse and remand with instructions. I. In 2014, Lucas pled guilty to attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187(a); count 1) and assault with a firearm (§ 245(b); count 4). In his plea, Lucas admitted (1) he personally discharged a firearm in the commission of the attempted murder (§ 12022.53(c)) and (2) both offenses were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22(b)(1)). The court sentenced Lucas to a total prison term of 31 years. A codefendant pled guilty to the same charges as Lucas. Effective January 2019, the Legislature amended the law to eliminate liability for murder based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine or theories of imputed malice predicated solely on one’s participation in a crime. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959.) Section 1172.6 provides a procedure for defendants convicted under the now-invalid theories to seek resentencing. The Legislature later clarified, as relevant here, this relief extends to defendants convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (People v. Basler (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 46, 55.) In 2023, Lucas petitioned the court to resentence him under what is now section 1172.6. The trial court denied the petition for failure to state a prima facie case for relief. II. Lucas contends the trial court erred when it denied his petition for resentencing at the prima facie stage because his plea does not eliminate the 2 possibility of being convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The People concede error, and we agree. A trial court considering a section 1172.6 petition first must determine whether the petitioner made a prima facie showing he or she could not presently be convicted under the amended laws. (Lewis, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) In doing so, the court accepts the petitioner’s factual allegations as true. (Ibid.) “The court may deny the petition at the prima facie stage only if the record of conviction”—which includes facts admitted in a guilty plea— “conclusively establishes that the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law.” (People v. Gaillard (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1206, 1211.) Otherwise, the court must issue an order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing. (Lewis, at p. 971.) We review de novo the trial court’s order denying resentencing at the prima facie stage. (Gaillard, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1211.) Here, the trial court concluded Lucas was ineligible for resentencing, as it found Lucas’ admission he attempted murder and he personally discharged a firearm in the commission of that attempted murder established “as a matter of law” Lucas “was the direct perpetrator . . . with the specific intent to kill the victim.” But as the People concede, Lucas’ guilty plea does not “unequivocally establish he was the sole perpetrator or a direct aider and abettor of attempted murder.” Because he and his codefendant pled guilty to the same charges, Lucas was not necessarily the sole perpetrator. And as the generic language of Lucas’ plea is silent on his mental state, it does not foreclose imputed malice based on the now-invalid natural and probable consequences doctrine. (People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 542.)
3 Lucas’ admission he personally discharged a firearm in the commission of the attempted murder does not necessarily establish he was the sole perpetrator of the attempted murder or acted with the specific intent to kill. Again, Lucas’ codefendant pled to the same enhancement, which makes it unclear who the direct perpetrator was. In addition, such enhancements “do[ ] not show that a defendant acted with malice aforethought,” and thus it “does not establish as a matter of law” Lucas is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief. (People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 598.) We therefore agree with the People that Lucas’ petition should have proceeded past the prima facie stage to an evidentiary hearing. III. We reverse the trial court’s order denying the petition. On remand, the trial court is instructed to issue an order to show cause and to conduct an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6(c)-(d).
CASTILLO, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
RUBIN, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Garcia F034831 · 2002-04-17