People v. Quiroz CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D084001 · 2025-04-11 · Unpublished

Proceeding: appeal from a judgment
Trial court: Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCN417516
Trial judge: Brad A. Weinreb
Outcome: affirmed — Affirmed.
Area: criminal
Panel: William S. Dato (author), Buchanan, Julia C. Kelety

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T03:50Z · confidence high

The trial court imposed a stipulated 50-year sentence following a guilty plea and declined to continue the hearing for a late request to withdraw the plea, instead retaining jurisdiction for post-judgment motions. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, finding that the appellate record was insufficient to establish ineffective assistance of counsel because it did not reveal the substance of the potential motion or why counsel failed to act.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Denial of the request to withdraw the guilty plea and imposition of the stipulated sentence “Quiroz did not pursue the matter further in the superior court.”	unclear	not reached	agree with court The appellate court explicitly stated it did not need to reach the question of whether the trial court's invitation to file a post-judgment motion was legally erroneous because the record was too incomplete to evaluate the underlying claim.
Ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding the failure to press for a plea withdrawal or file a motion “As a result, we are unable to infer anything about why his attorney chose not to bring it. (Lopez, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 966 [no deficient performance for failure to act “ ‘ “unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation” ’ ”].)”	de novo	not reached	agree with court The court found the claim failed on both prongs of the Strickland test because the record did not disclose the reasons for counsel's inaction (deficiency) or the merits of the potential motion (prejudice), rendering the presumption of reasonable performance unrebutted.

Authorities

relied: Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 — Establishes the two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel: deficient performance and prejudice.
relied: People v. Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th 960 — Presumption of reasonable performance is unrebutted where the record sheds no light on why counsel failed to act in the manner challenged.
relied: People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181 — Counsel's actions are presumed to fall within the broad range of reasonableness.
relied: People v. Singh (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 76 — Prejudice requires a basis to conclude that the motion would have been meritorious.
relied: People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264 — Ineffective assistance claims based on unexplained counsel inaction are properly raised via habeas corpus.
relied: People v. Knight (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 337 — A guilty plea may not be withdrawn based solely on 'buyer's remorse'.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the Strickland standard and the Lopez presumption, noting that an appellate court cannot speculate on the merits of a motion or the strategy of counsel when the record is silent on both. It appropriately directs the defendant to habeas corpus as the proper vehicle for developing the record.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:29Z · confidence low

The trial court accepted Quiroz's guilty plea to five counts of forcible lewd acts on a child, imposed the stipulated 50-year sentence, and, when defense counsel announced at the close of the hearing that Quiroz wished to withdraw his plea, declined to continue the matter over the prosecutor's objection but told Quiroz he could still file motions; no motion was ever filed. On appeal, Quiroz argued trial counsel was ineffective for failing to press or file a motion to withdraw the plea; the Court of Appeal affirmed in a memorandum opinion because the silent record showed neither deficient performance nor prejudice, leaving habeas corpus as the remedy.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Entry of judgment on the stipulated 50-year sentence without entertaining the late oral request to withdraw the guilty plea, challenged on appeal as the product of ineffective assistance of trial counsel “We likewise have no basis to conclude that his motion would have been meritorious, as would be required to find prejudice.”	de novo	correct	agree with court The opinion does not expressly state a standard but applies the two-prong Strickland test independently, as is customary for ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal. Under Lopez and Mickel, a silent record about why counsel did not act forecloses a finding of deficient performance on direct appeal, and without any showing of what grounds supported withdrawal there is no basis to find a reasonable probability of a different result. Directing the claim to habeas under Mendoza Tello is the standard and correct disposition.
Trial court's statement that it retained jurisdiction and that Quiroz could file a postjudgment motion to withdraw his plea “We need not reach that question given the gaps in the record on appeal that we discuss post.”	unclear	not reached	agree with court The appellate court expressly declined to decide whether the invitation to file a postjudgment motion was legally erroneous, resolving the appeal instead on the inadequacy of the record for the ineffective assistance claim. Because the claim failed regardless of the correctness of the trial court's statement, not reaching the issue was a permissible exercise of judicial restraint.

Authorities

relied: Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 — Ineffective assistance requires both deficient performance and prejudice, meaning a reasonable probability of a different outcome but for counsel's errors.
relied: People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181 — Reviewing courts presume counsel's actions fell within the broad range of reasonable professional assistance.
relied: People v. Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th 960 — On direct appeal, deficient performance for failure to act will not be found where the record sheds no light on counsel's reasons, unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to give one or no satisfactory explanation could exist.
relied: People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264 — Ineffective assistance claims that depend on matters outside the appellate record are more appropriately raised by petition for writ of habeas corpus.
relied: People v. Singh (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 76 — To show prejudice from counsel's failure to bring a motion, the defendant must show the motion would have been meritorious.
relied: People v. Knight (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 337 — A guilty plea may not be withdrawn merely because the defendant has buyer's remorse about the sentence received.
relied: People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847 — Appeals raising no substantial issues of law or fact may be resolved by memorandum opinion.

The appellate opinion: sound — The court correctly applied the settled Strickland/Lopez framework: where the appellate record is silent as to counsel's reasons and as to the substance of the unfiled motion, neither deficient performance nor prejudice can be established on direct appeal, and the proper vehicle is habeas corpus. The opinion is brief and does not discuss threshold questions such as whether a certificate of probable cause was required or whether the trial court retained authority to hear a postjudgment plea-withdrawal motion, but it expressly and permissibly declined the latter issue and neither omission affects the defensible result.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

record incomplete

Opinion

Filed 4/11/25 P. v. Quiroz CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D084001

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN417516)

GABRIEL JOSEPH QUIROZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Brad A. Weinreb, Judge. Affirmed. Richard Schwartzberg, under the appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel J. Hilton and Steve Oetting, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION1 Defendant Gabriel Joseph Quiroz pleaded guilty to five counts of committing forcible lewd acts on a child under 14 in violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (b)(1), admitted to three aggravating factors, and stipulated that each count was a separate act with the same victim under subdivision (d) of Penal Code section 667.6 and Rule 4.426 of the California Rules of Court. Consequently, he was subject to five upper term consecutive sentences of 10 years each. (Penal Code, § 667.6, subd. (d).) In exchange for the dismissal of the 23 other charges pending in the case, Quiroz stipulated to a sentence of 50 years, which the trial court imposed. The sentencing hearing proceeded smoothly until the very end. Quiroz’s attorney began by confirming that there was no legal cause for sentencing not to go forward, and the judge announced his intention to impose a 50-year term. Because the parties stipulated to Quiroz’s sentence, other than the People reading a statement from the victim, neither party requested to be heard. But after the court pronounced sentence, and just before the hearing was about to end, Quiroz’s attorney stated that she had just been told for the first time that her client wanted to withdraw his guilty plea. This appeal concerns what happened—and did not happen—next. The reasons for Quiroz’s late request were neither voluntarily disclosed by his attorney nor inquired into by the court. For the court’s part, it invited the prosecutor to agree to a continuance so that Quiroz could file a written motion to withdraw his plea. After she declined, the judge told Quiroz that 1 This case is appropriate for resolution by memorandum opinion because it raises “no substantial issues of law or fact.” (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1; see People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847.)

2 the court would “still retain[ ] jurisdiction over the case for a period of time” and that he was “certainly . . . entitled to file motions and the Court will consider [them].” Quiroz did not pursue the matter further in the superior court. Now represented by different counsel, Quiroz claims on appeal that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance on the theory that she should have either pressed the judge to entertain Quiroz’s motion during the hearing or filed a motion later. In his view, these failures caused him to lose the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea.2 Quiroz assures us that his desire to withdraw his plea was not based on “buyer’s remorse”—i.e., receiving a higher sentence than he expected when deciding to plead guilty— but on unspecified “other grounds.” (People v. Knight (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 337, 344–345 [guilty plea may not be withdrawn based on buyer’s remorse].) A defendant asserting an ineffective assistance claim must establish both (1) deficient performance by his attorney and (2) prejudice, defined as a “reasonable probability” that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different but for the alleged errors. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 691, 694.) We must presume that his trial “counsel’s actions [fell] within the broad range of reasonableness.” (People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 198.) This presumption is unrebutted where the record “ ‘ “sheds no light on why counsel . . . failed to act in the manner challenged.” ’ ” (People v. Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th 960, 966 (Lopez).) Quiroz bases his ineffective assistance claim on an appellate record that reveals nothing about the substance of Quiroz’s potential motion. As a result, we are unable to infer anything about why his attorney chose not 2 Quiroz contends that the trial court’s invitation to file a postjudgment motion may have been legally erroneous. We need not reach that question given the gaps in the record on appeal that we discuss post. 3 to bring it. (Lopez, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 966 [no deficient performance for failure to act “ ‘ “unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation” ’ ”].) We likewise have no basis to conclude that his motion would have been meritorious, as would be required to find prejudice. (People v. Singh (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 76, 77.) Thus, we have no choice but to affirm the judgment. Quiroz’s remedy, if any, is by way of habeas corpus. (See People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266–267.) DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

DATO, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

BUCHANAN, J.

KELETY, J.

Cites, in this corpus

People v. Lopez S143615 · 2008-01-28
People v. Garcia F034831 · 2002-04-17
People v. Mendoza Tello S055184 · 1997-04-17
People v. Knight Docket Nos. B021763, B024323 · 1987-08-21