Tyler v. Gomez
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Roger T. Benitez (author)
Analysis
The court reviewed a pro se prisoner's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) and his civil rights complaint. The court denied the IFP motion and dismissed the action without prejudice for failure to pay the filing fee.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Denial of Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis“Therefore, the IFP motion is denied and the case is dismissed without prejudice.” | unsure The court relied on the prison certificate indicating the plaintiff could pay the fee and the observation that the complaint was 'fanciful and incomprehensible' and likely time-barred. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), a prisoner is entitled to IFP status if they cannot afford the fee. The court's denial based on the certificate of ability to pay is procedurally standard. However, the court's reliance on the merits of the complaint (statute of limitations/fancifulness) to deny IFP status is legally suspect, as IFP status is generally determined by financial inability, not the merit of the claim, although courts may deny IFP if the action is frivolous or malicious under § 1915(e)(2). The order conflates the two grounds. |
Dismissal of Action Without Prejudice“DISMISSES this action without prejudice for failure to pay the full $402 civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)” | agree with court The dismissal is for failure to pay the filing fee after the IFP motion was denied. This is a standard procedural outcome when a prisoner is found able to pay but does not. The dismissal is without prejudice, allowing refiling upon payment. |
The order itself: sound with gaps — The order is procedurally sound in denying IFP based on the prison certificate indicating ability to pay and dismissing for non-payment. However, the reasoning is slightly muddled by citing the likely dismissal on the merits (statute of limitations/fancifulness) as a factor in the IFP denial, which is not the primary statutory test for IFP eligibility (financial inability), though it may support a finding of frivolousness under § 1915(e)(2). The order does not explicitly state that the action is frivolous or malicious, which is the specific statutory ground for denying IFP based on merit. It relies more on the financial certificate.
Opinion
1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 CLAUDIE TYLER, Case No.: 24-cv-2346-BEN (BLM) 6 CDCR #K19763 7 Plaintiff, 8 v. ORDER DENYING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 9 AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT 10 B. GOMEZ, et al., 11 Defendants. 12 13 14 Claudie Tyler (“Plaintiff” or “Tyler”), currently incarcerated at the Richard J. 15 Donovan State Prison (“RJD”) located in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, 16 filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has not prepaid the 17 civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead, he has filed a Motion to Proceed 18 In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 19 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 20 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 21 $402. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 22 prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 23 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007). However, a 24 prisoner granted leave to proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in 25 “increments” or “installments,” Bruce v. Samuels, 577 U.S. 82, 84 (2016); Williams v. 26 Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether her action is 27 28 1 ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 2 || 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).' 3 A review of his IFP request does not indicate any current expenses, and the prison 4 certificate from his correctional facility indicates that he can pay the filing fee. A review 5 || of the proposed Complaint indicates that it is fanciful and incomprehensible and based on 6 event in 2021 that is likely barred by the statute of limitations. The Complaint will 7 || likely be dismissed upon review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1)(B) if the motion to 8 || proceed IFP is granted. Therefore, the IFP motion is denied and the case is dismissed 9 || without prejudice. 10 Therefore, the Court: 11 1) DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed IFP; and 2) DISMISSES this action without prejudice for failure to pay the full $402 civil 13 filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 || DATED: April 4, 2025 16 on. Roger T. Benitez United States District Judge 17 18 19 || ———____— 20 ' Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 21 ‘certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 23 || trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 4 monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner 25 ||has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the 26 preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards 27 those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 28 1915(b)(2); Bruce, 577 U.S. at 84.
Cites, in this corpus
- Lonnie Williams, Jr. v. Daniel Paramo 13-56004 · 2015-01-07