gno.law

P. v. Jackson CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D062507 · 2013-07-15 · Unpublished

Proceeding
appeal from a judgment
Trial court
Superior Court of Riverside County · No. INF057530
Trial judge
Joe O. Littlejohn
Outcome
affirmed — Affirmed.
Area
criminal
Panel
O'Rourke (author), McINTYRE, Joan K. Irion

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T06:52Z · confidence high

The trial court resentenced the defendant to a total indeterminate term of 60 years to life, including five-year prior serious felony enhancements on each indeterminate count, following the appellate court's prior mandate. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that the defendant's challenge to the enhancements was barred by the law of the case doctrine established in the prior appeal.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Imposition of five-year prior serious felony enhancements under Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a)(1) on each indeterminate sentence imposed under the One Strike law (section 667.61).
“Our decision in Jackson I that the section 667, subdivision (a) five-year enhancement must be applied once to the determinate term and to each indeterminate term is a "principle or rule of law necessary to the decision" (People v. Barragan, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 246) that must be adhered to in this appeal.”
unclearcorrectagree with court
agree with court

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236 — Defines the law of the case doctrine and its exceptions, stating that a rule of law necessary to a prior decision must be adhered to in subsequent appeals absent substantial injustice or different evidence.
  • relied: Morohoshi v. Pacific Home (2004) 34 Cal.4th 482 — Establishes that an appellate court's decision stating a rule of law necessary to the decision conclusively establishes that rule for the same parties in subsequent proceedings.
  • relied: People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764 — Identifies judicial economy as the principal basis for the law of the case doctrine.
  • relied: People v. Whitt (1990) 51 Cal.3d 620 — States that the law of the case doctrine prevents parties from seeking appellate reconsideration of an already decided issue absent significant change in circumstances.
  • relied: People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133 — Outlines the requirements for applying the law of the case doctrine, including that the point of law must have been necessary to the prior decision and actually determined.
  • relied: People v. Martinez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 673 — Provides an exception to the law of the case doctrine where there is a manifest misapplication of existing principles resulting in substantial injustice.
  • relied: People v. Williams (2004) 34 Cal.4th 397 — Cited by the defendant as authority for the proposition that prior serious felony enhancements apply to aggregate sentences, which the court distinguishes or relies upon via the prior appeal's mandate.
  • relied: People v. Misa (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 837 — Cited by the defendant as authority regarding the application of enhancements, which the court addresses through the law of the case doctrine.
  • relied: People v. Tassell (1984) 36 Cal.3d 77 — Cited by the defendant for the proposition that only one section 667, subdivision (a) enhancement should be added to an aggregate sentence.
  • relied: People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380 — Cited as having overruled People v. Tassell on another point.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is procedurally sound because it correctly applies the well-established law of the case doctrine to bar the defendant's re-litigation of an issue already decided in the prior appeal. The court properly notes that the defendant failed to identify any intervening authority or substantial injustice that would warrant an exception to the doctrine.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:31Z · confidence medium

On remand after a prior appeal that modified the judgment to add five-year Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a)(1) enhancements to the determinate term and to each indeterminate One Strike term, the Riverside County Superior Court followed the appellate directions and resentenced Jackson to 25 years eight months determinate plus 50 years to life indeterminate. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that Jackson's renewed challenge to the per-count section 667(a) enhancements was barred by the law of the case doctrine because the issue had been decided in Jackson I and no exception applied.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Imposition on resentencing of a five-year section 667, subdivision (a)(1) prior serious felony enhancement on each indeterminate One Strike (§ 667.61) term (counts 1, 2 and 3) in addition to one enhancement on the determinate term, as directed by the prior appellate opinion.
“Our decision in Jackson I that the section 667, subdivision (a) five-year enhancement must be applied once to the determinate term and to each indeterminate term is a "principle or rule of law necessary to the decision"”
unclearcorrectagree with court
The opinion does not reach the merits of the section 667(a) question; it holds the claim barred by law of the case. The elements of the doctrine as stated in Barragan and Ramos are satisfied on the opinion's own account: Jackson I expressly decided, as a rule of law necessary to its disposition, that the enhancement attaches to each indeterminate term; Jackson raised the same One Strike/Tassell argument in his petition for review, which the Supreme Court denied; the facts on remand were identical; and Jackson identified no intervening authority or injustice that would trigger an exception. The trial court simply followed the remittitur, which it was bound to do. The court's application of the doctrine is consistent with the cited Supreme Court authority.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236 — A rule of law stated in an appellate opinion and necessary to the decision becomes law of the case binding on trial and appellate courts in later proceedings, right or wrong, unless the evidence on remand is substantially different; the doctrine applies only to questions of law.
  • relied: Morohoshi v. Pacific Home (2004) 34 Cal.4th 482 — Law of the case governs the effect of a first appellate decision on a later retrial or appeal and conclusively establishes the rule of law for the same parties in the same case.
  • relied: People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133 — Law of the case applies where the point of law was necessary to the prior decision, was actually presented and determined, and application would not produce an unjust decision.
  • relied: People v. Martinez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 673 — Law of the case will not be followed where there has been a manifest misapplication of existing principles resulting in substantial injustice.
  • relied: People v. Whitt (1990) 51 Cal.3d 620 — The doctrine prevents parties from seeking appellate reconsideration of an already decided issue in the same case absent a significant change in circumstances.
  • relied: People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764 — The principal basis for the law of the case doctrine is judicial economy.
  • relied: People v. Williams (2004) 34 Cal.4th 397 — Under the Three Strikes law, a section 667, subdivision (a) enhancement is added to each indeterminate third-strike term rather than once to the aggregate sentence; cited as the basis for the Jackson I rule that Jackson sought to relitigate.
  • relied: People v. Misa (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 837 — Section 667, subdivision (a) enhancements may be applied to an indeterminate term and separately once to a determinate term; cited as a basis for the Jackson I rule.
  • relied: Hammell v. Britton (1941) 19 Cal.2d 72 — An appellate court may take judicial notice of its own records in a prior appeal.

The appellate opinion: sound — The court correctly identified and applied the elements and exceptions of the law of the case doctrine from controlling Supreme Court authority, and the record it describes shows the identical legal issue was decided in Jackson I and presented to the Supreme Court on a denied petition for review. It did not need to reach the merits of whether Williams and Misa extend to One Strike terms, and Jackson offered no intervening authority or claim of injustice that would have required it to do so.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 7/15/13 P. v. Jackson CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D062507

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. INF057530)

CLAYTON CORNELL JACKSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County, Joe O.

Littlejohn, Judge. Affirmed.

Nancy L. Tetreault for Defendant and Appellant, under appointment by the Court of Appeal.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorneys General, Peter Quon, Jr., Theodore M. Cropley, Deputy Attorneys General for the Plaintiff and Respondent. Clayton Cornell Jackson appeals from a judgment entered following our remand in his prior appeal (People v. Jackson (Jan. 31, 2012, D058387) [nonpub. opn.] (Jackson I)).

In Jackson I, after concluding the trial court made several sentencing errors, we modified the judgment and remanded the matter for the court to exercise its discretion in resentencing certain counts. On remand, the court, following our directions, sentenced Jackson to a determinate term of 25 years eight months plus a 50-year-to-life indeterminate term. In this appeal, Jackson challenges the new sentence, asserting the court erred by adding five-year prior serious felony enhancements under Penal Code,1 section 667, subdivision (a)(1) to each of his indeterminate sentences, which were imposed under the "One Strike" law (§ 667.61). Because appellate review of Jackson's resentence is barred by the doctrine of law of the case, we affirm the judgment.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

Following his jury convictions, the trial court sentenced Jackson to a total determinate term of 25 years four months on three counts (counts 5, 6 and 7), and to a total indeterminate term of 57 years to life, consisting of unstayed sentences of life with the possibility of parole after seven years on count 1, a consecutive term of 25 years to 1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 The facts supporting Jackson's convictions are set out in greater detail in Jackson I, and we incorporate those facts here. To summarize, in February 2007, Jackson came upon the victim and took her at gunpoint to a garage, then to a bedroom in an attached apartment where he sexually assaulted her and threatened to set fire to the house if she reported his actions. We take judicial notice of the pleadings and record in Jackson I. (Hammell v. Britton (1941) 19 Cal.2d 72, 75 [court may take judicial notice of its own records of prior appeal].) 2 life on count 2, and a consecutive term of 25 years to life on count 3. (Jackson I, D058387, p. 2.) The court stayed a sentence on count 4. (Ibid.) It had found true allegations that Jackson suffered a prior strike conviction qualifying as a serious and violent felony, but dismissed that prior conviction in the interest of justice. (Ibid.)

As relevant to Jackson's sentencing challenge in the present case, we held in Jackson I that the trial court imposed an unauthorized sentence when, after it had dismissed Jackson's prior strike conviction under section 1385, it failed to impose one or more five-year sentence enhancements under section 667, subdivision (a)(1).

Specifically, we held the trial court's only discretion was to impose five-year enhancements under that section because as a matter of law, Jackson's prior conviction for residential burglary qualified as a serious felony under section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(18); the People pleaded the factual basis for the prior conviction; and the enhancement was mandatory even where the prior conviction was stricken in the interest of justice. (Jackson I, D058387, p. 3.) We pointed out that a prior serious felony enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a) is applied to every indeterminate term, but only once to a determinate sentence, and modified the judgment to impose one five- year enhancement on Jackson's determinate sentence (making it 30 years four months)

and one five-year enhancement on each of counts 1, 2 and 3, staying Jackson's sentence on count 1. (Jackson I, D058387, pp. 27-28.) We remanded the matter for the trial court to pronounce sentence on count 4 and exercise its discretion to impose terms on counts 6 and 7. (Jackson I, D058387, p. 29.)

3 Jackson petitioned for review, in part arguing that a section 667, subdivision (a)

sentence enhancement should not be imposed on each indeterminate One Strike sentence based on the reasoning of the "Three Strikes" laws, because the One Strike law was an alternative sentencing scheme rather than a status enhancement aimed at punishing recidivism. In April 2012, the California Supreme Court denied Jackson's petition for review and we issued a remittitur in May 2012.

At Jackson's resentencing hearing, the trial court acknowledged this court's directions and followed them. In particular, it acknowledged we had modified the sentence to add one five-year prior serious felony enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a)(1) to Jackson's determinate term for a total determinate sentence of 15 years eight months, and also to add one five-year enhancement on each of the indeterminate life terms on counts 1, 2 and 3, giving Jackson 30-year-to-life terms on counts 2 and 3, with count 1 stayed, for a total indeterminate sentence of 60 years to life.

The court then exercised its discretion to impose the upper term on count 7, and one-third the midterm on count 6 consecutive to count 7. With the parties' agreement, the court corrected the abstract of judgment as to count 5 to impose the proper eight-month midterm. Jackson filed the present appeal.

DISCUSSION

Repeating his contention in his petition for review to the California Supreme Court, Jackson contends the trial court misapplied section 667, subdivision (a) to his indeterminate sentences. Though he acknowledges the court acted under our directions, Jackson nevertheless argues his indeterminate life sentences were imposed under section 4 667.61, not the Three Strikes laws, and as a result they do not fit within the reasoning of either People v. Williams (2004) 34 Cal.4th 397 or People v. Misa (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 837, both relied upon by this court in Jackson I. He maintains that under People v. Tassell (1984) 36 Cal.3d 77 (overruled on another point in People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 401; see People v. Williams, at p. 400, fn. 1), only one section 667, subdivision (a) enhancement should be added to an aggregate sentence, and thus the separate five-year enhancements imposed by the court should be vacated as unauthorized.

The People respond in part that the law of the case doctrine precludes these claims. We agree with the People.

The law of the case doctrine deals with the effect of the first appellate decision on a later retrial or appeal; an appellate court's decision stating a rule of law necessary to the decision of the case conclusively establishes that rule and makes it determinative of the rights of the same parties in any subsequent retrial or appeal in the same case.

(Morohoshi v. Pacific Home (2004) 34 Cal.4th 482, 491, quoting 9 Witkin, Cal.

Procedure (4th ed.1997) Appeal, § 895, p. 928.) "Under the law of the case doctrine, when an appellate court ' "states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, that principle or rule becomes the law of the case and must be adhered to throughout [the case's] subsequent progress, both in the lower court and upon subsequent appeal . . . ." ' [Citation.] Absent an applicable exception, the doctrine 'requir[es] both trial and appellate courts to follow the rules laid down upon a former appeal whether such rules are right or wrong.' [Citation.] As its name suggests, the doctrine applies only to an appellate court's decision on a question of law; it does not apply to questions of fact."

5 (People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 246.) The principal basis for the doctrine is judicial economy. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 786.) The doctrine "prevents the parties from seeking appellate reconsideration of an already decided issue in the same case absent some significant change in circumstances." (People v. Whitt (1990) 51 Cal.3d 620, 638.)

To apply law of the case, the point of law must have been necessary to the prior decision, the matter must have been actually presented and determined by the court, and application of the doctrine must not result in an unjust decision. (People v. Ramos (1997)

15 Cal.4th 1133, 1161.) Law of the case will not apply, however, where the evidence in the new proceeding pertinent to the legal question is substantially different: "[D]uring subsequent proceedings in the same case, an appellate court's binding legal determination 'controls the outcome only if the evidence on retrial or rehearing of an issue is substantially the same as that upon which the appellate ruling was based. [Citations.]' [Citation.] Where, on remand, 'there is a substantial difference in the evidence to which the [announced] principle of law is applied, . . . the [doctrine] may not be invoked.' "

(People v. Barragan, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 246.) Nor will the doctrine be adhered to " 'where there has been a "manifest misapplication of existing principles resulting in substantial injustice . . . ." ' " (People v. Martinez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 673, 683.)

Our decision in Jackson I that the section 667, subdivision (a) five-year enhancement must be applied once to the determinate term and to each indeterminate term is a "principle or rule of law necessary to the decision" (People v. Barragan, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 246) that must be adhered to in this appeal. As the People point out, 6 Jackson does not identify any intervening appellate decision, statute or other authority that would alter or clarify the rule we set out in Jackson I. Nor does he attempt to argue that application of the rule stated in Jackson I will result in an unjust decision.

Accordingly, under law of the case the outcome is controlled by our prior determination.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

O'ROURKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

McINTYRE, Acting P. J.

IRION, J.

Cites, in this corpus