Stewart v. Quest Diagnostics Clinical Laboratories, Inc.
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Andrew G. Schopler (author)
Analysis
Plaintiff Stewart moved for preliminary approval of a class-action settlement, but the court found the proposed class definition ambiguous and inconsistent with the previously certified class. The court denied the motion without prejudice, allowing the parties to resubmit a corrected request by April 1, 2025.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement Agreement denied without prejudice“The motion for preliminary approval of the settlement agreement is thus DENIED without prejudice.” | agree with court The court correctly identified that Rule 23(e)(1)(B)(ii) requires the court to ascertain the class before approving a settlement. Because the plaintiff's filings contained three materially different class definitions (one matching the prior certification, one broader, and one with a different time frame), the court could not determine which class was being settled. Denying without prejudice is the appropriate procedural remedy to allow the parties to clarify the scope of the settlement. |
The order itself: sound — The order is procedurally sound. It correctly applies the requirement under Rule 23(e)(1)(B)(ii) that a class must be ascertained before settlement approval. The court accurately identifies the specific discrepancies in the class definitions provided by the plaintiff (geographic scope and inclusion criteria). By denying without prejudice, the court balances the policy favoring settlements with the necessity of judicial clarity on the scope of the relief.
Opinion
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Pamela STEWART, et al., individually Case No.: 19-cv-2043-AGS-DDL and on behalf of all similarly situated 4 employees of Defendants in the State of ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 5 California, MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT 6 Plaintiffs, AGREEMENT (ECF 272) 7 v. 8 QUEST DIAGNOSTICS CLINICAL LABORATORIES, INC., et al., 9 Defendants. 10 11 Plaintiff Pamela Stewart seeks preliminary approval of a settlement agreement 12 regarding her class-action lawsuit and Private Attorney General Act representative action. 13 (ECF 272, at 7.) Before the Court may approve a class-action settlement, it must “certify 14 the class for purposes of judgment on the proposal.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(B)(ii). To do 15 so, it must ascertain the class in question. Here, the Court is left guessing as to whether the 16 proposed agreement seeks approval for the previously certified class or one of two new 17 class definitions that plaintiff offers. 18 Stewart acknowledges that this Court previously certified the following class: “All 19 of Defendant’s non-exempt California Patient Service Representatives who were not 20 compensated with one hour of pay for all instances where they did not receive a duty-free 21 and uninterrupted 10-minute rest period consistent with California law, any time between 22 September 13, 2015, and the date of judgment.” (ECF 272, at 10.) She refers to this class 23 in her: (1) motion’s “procedural summary”; (2) attorney’s declaration; (3) settlement 24 agreement; (4) proposed settlement notice; and (5) argument that this “class has previously 25 been certified” and thus that “there is no need to re-establish class certification or request 26 provisional certification.” (Id. at 10, 20; ECF 272-2, at 9, 31, 56.) 27 But elsewhere Stewart defines the class as “All current and former non-exempt 28 Patient Service Representatives of Defendant during the Class Settlement Period.” 1 || (ECF 272, at 7.) She references this class in both the motion’s introduction and the 2 settlement agreement. (/d.; ECF 272-2, at 30.) 3 Finally, Stewart defines a third class in her proposed second amended complaint, 4 ||which accompanies her settlement papers: “All current and former non-exempt Patient 5 ||Service Representatives of Defendant who were employed at any time in the State of 6 California from 4 years from the date of filing this Complaint through the present.” 7 || (ECF 272-2, at 94, 131.) 8 The differences between these three definitions are significant. For example, some 9 || of the proposed classes include only California workers. (ECF 272, at 10, 94.) Another 10 |/includes no geographical limitation to California. (/d. at 7.) And the more recent definitions 11 |/include “[a]ll” non-exempt patient service representatives, while the initially certified 12 || version included only those “who were not compensated with one hour of pay for all 13 ||instances where they did not receive a duty-free and uninterrupted 10-minute rest period.” 14 || (See id. at 7, 10.) 15 Although there is a “strong judicial policy that favors settlements, particularly where 16 || complex class action litigation is concerned,” Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle, 955 F.2d 17 || 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992), the Court cannot proceed without a clear class identification, 18 || Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(B)ai). Until then, it cannot determine whether to rely upon its 19 |/previous certification or engage in a “settlement-only class certification” analysis. See 20 ||Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997). 21 The motion for preliminary approval of the settlement agreement is thus DENIED 22 || without prejudice. If the parties so choose, they may correct the deficiencies identified in 23 order and submit an amended request no later than April 1, 2025. 24 Dated: February 18, 2025 26 Hon. Andrew G. Schopler 17 United States District Judge 28