Muneer v. Seaworld Parks & Entertainment, Inc.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 MONHSEN MUNEER, A MINOR, BY Case No.: 24-CV-529 W (MSB) AND THROUGH HIS GUARDIAN AD 14 LITEM MINHAJ MUNEER, an ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 15 individual, LEAVE TO FILE IMPLEADER COMPLAINT [DOC. 16] 16 Plaintiff, 17 v. 18 SEA WORLD PARKS & ENTERTAINMENT, INC., 19 Defendant. 20 21 Pending before the Court is Defendant Sea World Parks & Entertainment, Inc.’s 22 motion for leave to file a third-party complaint against Minhaj Muneer for indemnity and 23 related causes of action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a). Plaintiff Monhsen 24 Muneer, by and through his guardian ad litem Minhaj Muneer, opposes. 25 The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted and without oral argument. 26 See Civ.L.R. 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS the motion 27 [Doc. 16]. 28 1 I. DISCUSSION 2 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a), “[a] defending party may, as third- 3 party plaintiff, serve a summons and complaint on a nonparty who is or may be liable to 4 it for all or part of the claim against it.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 14(a). The decision about whether 5 to grant leave to implead a third-party defendant rests in the sound discretion of the 6 district court. Southwest Admrs., Inc. v. Rozay's Transfer, 791 F.2d 769, 777 (9th Cir. 7 1986). The purpose of Rule 14 is “to promote judicial efficiency by eliminating the 8 necessity for the defendant to bring a separate action against a third individual who may 9 be secondarily or derivatively liable to the defendant for all or part of the plaintiff’s 10 original claim.” Id. “Since the rule is designed to reduce multiplicity of litigation, it is 11 construed liberally in favor of allowing impleader.” Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Loube, 12 134 F.R.D. 270, 272 (N.D. Cal. 1991). “[A] court, called upon to exercise its discretion as 13 to impleader, must balance the desire to afford circuity of actions and to obtain consistent 14 results against any prejudice that the plaintiff might suffer from complications of the 15 case.” Zero Tolerance Entm't, Inc. v. Ferguson, 254 F.R.D. 123, 127 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 16 If there is any possibility the third-party defendant may be liable for some or all the 17 defendant’s liability to the plaintiff, then the impleader action should be allowed. Banks 18 v. Emeryville, 109 F.R.D. 535, 540 (N.D. Cal. 1985). Additionally, “impleader should be 19 allowed if the third party complaint arises out of the same set of operative facts, and ‘if 20 under some construction of facts which might be adduced at trial, recovery might be 21 possible.’” Id. Factors considered in determining whether to permit impleader are: 22 (1) prejudice to the original plaintiff; (2) complication of issues at trial; (3) likelihood of 23 trial delay; and (4) timeliness of the motion to implead. Irwin v. Mascott, 94 F. Supp. 2d 24 1052, 1056 (N.D. Cal 2000). Here, for the reasons that follow, the Court finds three 25 factors weigh in favor of granting Defendant’s motion and the remaining factor is neutral. 26 27 28 1 A. Prejudice to Plaintiff 2 Plaintiff argues impleading Minhaj Muneer, Plaintiff’s guardian ad litem and 3 father, would substantially prejudice Plaintiff by creating a conflict of interest. (Opp’n 4 [Doc. 17] at 3:5–6.). The argument is not persuasive for two reasons. 5 First, while the Court recognizes the impleader action will create a conflict of 6 interest, it would appear to be easily remedied by the appointment of a new guadian ad 7 litem.1 Conversely, Defendant would be prejudiced if denied the ability to implead Mr. 8 Muneer by being forced to file a separate lawsuit. This is the exact circuity Rule 14 was 9 intended to avoid. 10 Second, the type of prejudice typically cited by courts evaluating a Rule 14 motion 11 is a delay in the proceedings because the potential third-party defendant lacks familiarity 12 with the case. See, e.g., Green Valley Corp. v. Caldo Oil Co., 2011 WL 1465883, *8 13 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (finding prejudice where motion would add parties unfamiliar with the 14 case and the motion was filed “only 4.5 months prior to close of discovery” and thus 15 “could delay resolution of this case.”); see also Zero Tolerance, 254 F.R.D. at 127 16 (holding third-party defendant is prejudiced when permitting impleader would require 17 extending the discovery deadline and delay trial). Here, Mr. Muneer has been involved 18 in this litigation since it was removed to this Court and, therefore, is well-acquainted with 19 the issues. (See Notice of Removal [Doc 1] at 2:18–19.) Allowing Defendant to file a 20 third-party complaint would not result in significant delay. 21 For these reasons, this factor weighs in favor of granting the motion. 22 23 B. Complication of Issues 24 Plaintiff contends the proposed third-party complaint would introduce unnecessary 25 complexity into the case by attempting to “shift blame.” (Opp’n at 3:10–15.) But this 26 27 28 1 type of alleged “complexity” is the exact reason underlying Rule 14(a)—to allow a 2 defendant to shift blame and demonstrate that another party is liable for some or all of 3 plaintiff’s injuries. In fact, as set forth above, “impleader should be allowed if the third 4 party complaint arises out of the same set of operative facts, and ‘if under some 5 construction of facts which might be adduced at trial, recovery might be possible.’” 6 Banks, 109 F.R.D. 535. Therefore, this factor also weighs in favor of granting the motion. 7 8 C. Likelihood of Trial Delay 9 Plaintiff contends the impleader action would cause undue delay. (Opp’n at 3:17.) 10 However, as both Plaintiff and Defendant noted when the motion was filed, discovery is 11 in its early stages and no trial date has been set. (Id. at 3:18; P&A [Doc. 16] at 4:9.) 12 Further, no depositions have gone forward, and Mr. Muneer has not been deposed. (P&A 13 at 4:11–12.) This factor weighs in favor of granting the motion. 14 15 D. Timeliness of the motion 16 Plaintiff argues Defendant delayed filing the motion and, therefore, must 17 demonstrate good cause for the delay. (Opp’n at 4:18.) But Plaintiff fails to cite 18 authority supporting the contention that Defendant must demonstrate good cause, which 19 is the standard applicable to a motion to modify a scheduling order under Federal Rule of 20 Civil Procedure 16(b)(4), not for evaluating a motion under Rule 14. 21 Further, Defendant did not unreasonably delay in filing the motion. Plaintiff and 22 Defendant originally sought to resolve whether Defendant should be allowed to file an 23 impleader action by filing a “joint motion” on July 18, 2024, one day before the deadline. 24 However, the motion was not a “joint motion,” and was rejected on July 23, 2024. 2 25 26 27 2 Under Civ.L.R. 7.2, joint motions are akin to stipulations in which the parties agree to the requested relief. In contrast, the “joint motion” filed in this case set forth the parties’ arguments over Defendant’s 28 1 ||Defendant’s counsel then exercised diligence and filed the pending motion two days 2 later. Plaintiff filed his opposition seven days later. Under these circumstances, this 3 || factor is neutral regarding whether to grant the Motion. 4 5 E. Plaintiff’s Remaining Arguments 6 Plaintiff also contends that Defendant’s impleader allegations against Mr. Muneer 7 |! are speculative and insufficient to establish liability. (Opp’n at 5:3-4.) However, 8 || whether a third-party complaint states a claim or is futile is not a factor for determining 9 || whether to grant a motion for leave to file an impleader action. Accordingly, Plaintiffs 10 || final contention lacks merit. 11 12 CONCLUSION & ORDER 13 For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS the Defendant’s motion for 14 |! leave to file an impleader action [Doc. 16]. Defendant shall file the third-party complaint 15 || on or before February 21, 2025. 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 17 ||Dated: February 12, 2025 \ 19 Hn. 7 omas J. Whelan 20 United States District Judge 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28