People v. Williams CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D074098 · 2025-02-04 · Unpublished

Proceeding: appeal from a judgment
Trial court: Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCD268493
Trial judge: Kenneth So
Outcome: remanded — Remanded for resentencing.
Area: criminal
Panel: Julia C. Kelety (author), Richard D. Huffman, Sr., Michele M. Castillo

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T03:54Z · confidence high

The trial court originally sentenced the defendant to 100 years to life plus 86 years two months for One Strike offenses and imposed various fees and fines. On appeal, the Court of Appeal vacated the sentence and the criminal justice administration fee, remanding the case for a full resentencing to apply ameliorative legislation and to allow the trial court to reconsider fees and fines based on the defendant's ability to pay.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Entitlement to full resentencing based on ameliorative legislation “We agree with the parties that Williams is entitled to a full resentencing, as his case is not yet final and while his appeal was pending there have been various changes in the determinate sentencing laws that may apply to him.”	de novo	correct	agree with court The court correctly applied the presumption from In re Estrada that ameliorative legislation applies to nonfinal cases. The determination of finality is a question of law reviewed de novo, and the court correctly cited People v. Esquivel for the standard that a case is not final until the entire proceeding is complete. Since the Supreme Court had already remanded the case for this specific consideration, the appellate court's agreement with the parties was legally sound.
Reconsideration of fees, fines, and assessments on remand “In reaching our decision, we conclude the law-of-the-case doctrine is inapplicable because the “primary purpose” served by the doctrine is to promote “judicial economy.””	de novo	correct	agree with court The court correctly identified that the law-of-the-case doctrine is discretionary and yields when judicial economy is better served by reconsideration. Because the trial court had never previously considered the defendant's ability to pay, allowing that issue to be addressed during the mandatory full resentencing promotes efficiency. The court appropriately noted that the underlying legal question regarding ability-to-pay hearings was pending before the Supreme Court in People v. Kopp, making a definitive ruling on the merits unnecessary at this stage.
Vacatur of the criminal justice administration fee “Williams therefore is entitled to the vacatur of that portion of the criminal justice administration fee. (People v. Lopez-Vinck (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 945, 953.)”	de novo	correct	agree with court The court correctly applied Government Code section 6111, subdivision (a), which renders the unpaid balance of the former Government Code section 29550.1 fee unenforceable and uncollectible as of July 1, 2021. The citation to People v. Lopez-Vinck supports the proposition that such fees must be vacated when they become unenforceable by operation of law. This is a straightforward application of statutory law to the facts of the case.

Authorities

relied: People v. Williams (2024) 17 Cal.5th 99 — The Supreme Court rejected the equal protection challenge and remanded the case for consideration of ameliorative legislation enacted during the pendency of the appeal.
relied: In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 — When ameliorative legislation goes into effect, the Legislature intends the benefits to apply to all nonfinal cases.
relied: People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671 — The test for finality is whether the criminal prosecution or proceeding as a whole is complete.
relied: People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 — A sentencing court should consider a criminal defendant's ability to pay when imposing fees and fines.
relied: People v. Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47 — The issue of whether a court must consider a defendant's ability to pay is pending before the Supreme Court.
relied: Searle v. Allstate Life Ins. Co. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 425 — The primary purpose of the law-of-the-case doctrine is to promote judicial economy.
relied: People v. Lopez-Vinck (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 945 — The criminal justice administration fee imposed under former Government Code section 29550.1 is no longer valid and must be vacated.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the established legal standards for finality and ameliorative legislation as directed by the Supreme Court's remand. It also appropriately resolves the procedural dispute over the law-of-the-case doctrine by prioritizing judicial economy and allowing the trial court to address the ability-to-pay issue during the mandatory resentencing.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:29Z · confidence low

In 2018 the San Diego Superior Court sentenced Williams to 100 years to life plus 86 years two months for One Strike offenses on 13 counts and imposed fees, fines, and assessments without an ability-to-pay hearing; the Court of Appeal affirmed in 2020 and the Supreme Court rejected his equal protection claim but remanded for consideration of ameliorative legislation. On remand, the Court of Appeal, with the People's concession, vacated the sentence for a full resentencing, held the law-of-the-case doctrine does not bar Williams from challenging the fees, fines, and assessments on remand, and vacated the unpaid portion of the former Government Code section 29550.1 criminal justice administration fee.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Imposition of the determinate sentence (86 years two months) and overall sentence, now subject to ameliorative sentencing legislation enacted while the appeal was pending “Williams has submitted a supplemental brief arguing his case is not yet final and he is entitled to a full resentencing based on several statutory changes that may affect his determinate sentence.”	de novo	error (statutory interpretation)	agree with court The sentence was not erroneous when imposed, but under Estrada and Esquivel the case is nonfinal because the prosecution as a whole is not complete, so intervening ameliorative statutes presumptively apply and vacatur for full resentencing is the correct remedy. The People conceded the point. The court did not identify the specific statutes or cite the full resentencing rule (Buycks), but the result follows directly from binding Supreme Court authority.
Imposition of fees, fines, and assessments without an ability-to-pay hearing, and whether law of the case bars reconsideration on remand “In addition, we conclude that at resentencing the trial court may reconsider the fees, fines, and assessments it previously imposed.”	de novo	not reached	agree with court The court did not decide whether the fees were improperly imposed; it held only that the trial court may reconsider them at the full resentencing and that law of the case does not preclude this. The result is defensible because a full resentencing reopens all sentencing components and the Dueñas question remains unsettled, but the court's reasoning rests only on Searle's 'judicial economy' purpose rather than the recognized exceptions to the doctrine (intervening change in law, manifest injustice) or the full resentencing rule. The opinion also does not describe how the prior opinion treated the issue, so the law-of-the-case argument cannot be fully evaluated from this text.
Imposition of the $154 criminal justice administration fee under former Government Code section 29550.1 “Finally, the $154 criminal justice administration fee imposed under former Government section 29550.1 is no longer valid.”	de novo	error (statutory interpretation)	agree with court Government Code section 6111, subdivision (a) renders the unpaid balance of this fee unenforceable and uncollectible as of July 1, 2021, and published authority (Lopez-Vinck) holds defendants are entitled to vacatur of the unpaid portion. The court correctly limited vacatur to the portion unpaid as of that date.

Authorities

relied: In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 — Ameliorative legislation is presumed to apply to all cases not yet final when it takes effect.
relied: People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671 — For Estrada purposes, a case is final only when the criminal prosecution or proceeding as a whole is complete.
relied: People v. Williams (2024) 17 Cal.5th 99 — Rejected Williams' equal protection challenge to section 3051, subdivision (h) and directed the Court of Appeal to consider ameliorative legislation enacted during the appeal.
relied: People v. Williams (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 475 — Prior Court of Appeal opinion affirming the judgment and rejecting the equal protection claim; basis for the People's law-of-the-case argument.
relied: People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 — A sentencing court should consider a defendant's ability to pay before imposing fees, fines, and assessments.
relied: People v. Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47 — Cited as the vehicle in which the ability-to-pay question is pending before the Supreme Court.
relied: Searle v. Allstate Life Ins. Co. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 425 — The primary purpose of the law-of-the-case doctrine is judicial economy.
relied: People v. Lopez-Vinck (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 945 — Under Government Code section 6111, a defendant is entitled to vacatur of the unpaid portion of a criminal justice administration fee as of July 1, 2021.
missed: People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857 — When part of a sentence is vacated on appeal, the full resentencing rule allows the trial court to revisit all sentencing choices; this would have directly supported reopening the fees, fines, and assessments.
missed: People v. Shuey (1975) 13 Cal.3d 835 — The law-of-the-case doctrine is not applied where there has been an intervening change in controlling law or where its application would result in an unjust decision; a more direct answer to the People's argument than Searle's judicial-economy rationale.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The disposition follows from Estrada, Esquivel, the Supreme Court's remand directions, Government Code section 6111, and the People's concession, so the result is correct. The opinion is thin on the law-of-the-case question, resting on a single 'judicial economy' citation rather than the recognized exceptions or the full resentencing rule, and it does not identify the ameliorative statutes at issue or describe the prior treatment of the fee issue.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

record incomplete

Opinion

Filed 2/4/25 P. v. Williams CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D074098

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD268493) JERIMIAH IRA WILLIAMS, Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Kenneth So, Judge. Remanded for resentencing. Rebecca P. Jones, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel J. Hilton and Steve Oetting, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION1 This is our second appeal involving defendant Jerimiah Ira Williams. In 2018, the trial court sentenced him to an indeterminate term of 100 years to life plus a determinate sentence of 86 years two months for One Strike offenses (Pen. Code, § 667.61),2 after a jury convicted him of 13 counts involving victims Jane Does 1 and 2. In affirming the judgment in the published portion of our opinion (People v. Williams (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 475, 493), we rejected Williams’ argument that his equal protection rights were violated because he is statutorily ineligible for a youth parole hearing pursuant to section 3051, subdivision (h) as a result of being a One-Strike offender. The Supreme Court granted review, limited to the equal protection question. It recently issued its decision rejecting Williams’ equal protection challenge. (People v. Williams (2024) 17 Cal.5th 99.) In remanding, the Williams court directed us “to consider any briefing on defendant’s entitlement to the benefit of any ameliorative legislation enacted during the pendency of his appeal.” (Id. at p. 138.) Williams has submitted a supplemental brief arguing his case is not yet final and he is entitled to a full resentencing based on several statutory changes that may affect his determinate sentence. He further argues that at resentencing he is entitled to object to the previously imposed fees, fines, and assessments because he did not have an ability-to-pay hearing.

1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion pursuant to California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1.

2 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 The People in their supplemental brief concede that Williams is entitled to resentencing. The People, however, disagree that on remand he can challenge the fees, fines, and assessments, arguing the law-of-the-case doctrine precludes that review based on our earlier treatment of that issue. DISCUSSION We agree with the parties that Williams is entitled to a full resentencing, as his case is not yet final and while his appeal was pending there have been various changes in the determinate sentencing laws that may3 apply to him. (In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 745 [when ameliorative legislation goes into effect, we generally presume the Legislature intends the benefits of the new enactment to apply as broadly as constitutionally permissible to all nonfinal cases]; People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 679 [the test for finality is “whether the criminal prosecution or proceeding as a whole is complete” (italics added)].) In addition, we conclude that at resentencing the trial court may reconsider the fees, fines, and assessments it previously imposed. We note the decision in People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, 1164, which held that a sentencing court should consider a criminal defendant’s ability to pay, was decided after Williams’ sentencing; and the issue of whether a court must consider a defendant’s ability to pay is currently pending before the Supreme Court. (People v. Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47, review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S257844.)

3 We say “may” because we express no opinion as to how the trial court should exercise its discretion in resentencing Williams.

3 In reaching our decision, we conclude the law-of-the-case doctrine is inapplicable because the “primary purpose” served by the doctrine is to promote “judicial economy.” (Searle v. Allstate Life Ins. Co. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 425, 435.) Here, that purpose is not subverted given that Williams is entitled to a full resentencing. Because the trial court never considered Williams’ ability to pay, we conclude the better practice — one that actually promotes judicial economy — is to allow him to challenge the fees, fines, and assessments on remand. (Ibid.) Finally, the $154 criminal justice administration fee imposed under former Government section 29550.1 is no longer valid. (Gov. Code, § 6111, subd. (a) [as of July 1, 2021, the unpaid balance of this fee is deemed “unenforceable and uncollectible”].) Williams therefore is entitled to the vacatur of that portion of the criminal justice administration fee. (People v. Lopez-Vinck (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 945, 953.) DISPOSITION We vacate (1) the sentence of Williams and remand to allow for a full resentencing based on any ameliorative legislation enacted during the pendency of his appeal; and (2) the portion of the criminal justice administration fee imposed pursuant to former Government Code section 29550.1 that remains unpaid as of July 1, 2021.

4 Upon completion of resentencing, the court is directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and to forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

KELETY, J. WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

CASTILLO, J.

Cites, in this corpus

People v. Esquivel S262551 · 2021-06-17
Searle v. Allstate Life Insurance L.A. 31703 · 1985-04-04
In Re Estrada Crim. 8524 · 1965-12-23