Woods v. United States
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Cathy Ann Bencivengo (author)
Analysis
The court reviewed a pro se complaint by a plaintiff seeking to overturn a reduction in his individual VA disability benefits. The court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction with leave to amend and denied the motion to proceed in forma pauperis as moot.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (IFP) denied as moot“The IFP motion is denied as moot.” | agree with court The court correctly found that the plaintiff met the financial requirements for IFP status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) based on the affidavit provided. However, because the complaint was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the IFP motion became moot. The court appropriately noted that the plaintiff could renew the motion if a future amended complaint states a claim over which the court has jurisdiction. |
Complaint dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction with leave to amend“The Court dismisses Plaintiff's complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).” | agree with court The court correctly applied the jurisdictional bar established by 38 U.S.C. § 511 and the Veterans' Judicial Review Act (VJRA). Under *Recinto v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs.*, district courts lack jurisdiction to review individual veterans' benefits decisions because such review is exclusively vested in the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and the Federal Circuit. The plaintiff's request to restore his specific disability rating based on factual determinations falls squarely within this exclusive jurisdiction. The court properly identified that the claim required reviewing the specifics of an individual benefits request, thus stripping the district court of jurisdiction. Granting leave to amend is appropriate given the pro se nature of the action and the possibility that a broader constitutional claim not tied to individual facts might be cognizable, though such claims are rare. |
The order itself: sound — The order is legally sound. It correctly identifies the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims over individual benefits disputes under the VJRA and 38 U.S.C. § 511. The court properly applied the *Recinto* test to determine that the plaintiff's claim, which sought to overturn a specific factual determination regarding his disability rating, fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the VA system. The court also correctly handled the IFP motion, finding the plaintiff met the financial criteria but denying it as moot due to the jurisdictional dismissal. The reasoning is clear, cites the correct binding authority, and provides appropriate leave to amend.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BYRON O. WOODS, SR., Case No.: 3:24-cv-02437-CAB-DDL 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT 13 v. [ECF Nos. 1–2] 14 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 On Dec. 23, 2024, Plaintiff Byron O. Woods, Sr., filed a complaint against the 18 United States and Renaye Murphy, Executive Director of the San Diego Regional Office 19 of the Department of Veterans Affairs. [ECF No. 1.] Plaintiff did not prepay the civil 20 filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) at the time of filing; instead, he filed a motion 21 to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). [ECF No. 2.] For 22 the reasons outlined below, Plaintiffs’ complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. The 23 IFP motion is denied as moot. 24 I. Motion to Proceed IFP 25 Generally, all parties instituting a civil action in this court must pay a filing fee. See 26 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); CivLR 4.5(a). However, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), the court may 27 authorize the commencement, prosecution, or defense of any suit without payment of fees 28 if the plaintiff submits an affidavit, including a statement of all his or her assets, showing 1 that he or she is unable to pay filing fees or costs. “An affidavit in support of an IFP 2 application is sufficient where it alleges that the affiant cannot pay the court costs and still 3 afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). 4 “[A] plaintiff seeking IFP status must allege poverty with some particularity, definiteness 5 and certainty.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The granting or denial of leave to 6 proceed IFP in civil cases is within the sound discretion of the district court. Venerable v. 7 Meyers, 500 F.2d 1215, 1216 (9th Cir. 1974) (citations omitted). 8 In support of his application, Plaintiff lists several assets, including his savings 9 account, a home, and two vehicles. [ECF No. 2 at 1–2.] He reports receiving $2,241.91 a 10 month from the VA. [Id.] Plaintiff mentions that the last time he filed a tax return was in 11 2008. [Id.] He lists average monthly expenses totaling $4,401.16. [Id.] He provides 12 significant detail to support this amount. [Id.] Plaintiff’s expenses are greater than his 13 source of income, which appears to be solely his VA benefits (the focus of his dispute). 14 [Id.] Based on the “particularity, definiteness and certainty” in the information provided, 15 the Court is persuaded that Plaintiff lacks the funds to pay the filing fee and “still afford 16 the necessities of life.” Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234. 17 II. Screening of the Complaint Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 18 The Court must additionally analyze a complaint’s sufficiency under 28 U.S.C 19 § 1915. A plaintiff seeking to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is subject to 20 sua sponte dismissal if the complaint is “frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim upon 21 which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune 22 from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th 23 Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”). 24 Congress enacted this safeguard because “a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are 25 assumed by the public . . . lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, 26 malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting 27 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). 28 1 The Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint liberally. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 2 342 (9th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff appears to be making a due process claim related to the 3 reduction of his VA benefits. [See Compl. at 3.] Of course, courts have recognized a 4 constitutionally protected liberty interest in veteran’s disability benefits. See Guillory v. 5 Shinseki, 603 F.3d 981, 987 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 6 But this Court lacks jurisdiction over this case. “A district court does not have 7 jurisdiction over claims that would require it to review a question of fact or law relating to 8 or affecting veterans’ benefits decisions.” Recinto v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 706 F.3d 9 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 2013). In other words: “[i]f reviewing” Plaintiff’s “claim would 10 require review of the circumstances of individual benefits requests, jurisdiction is lacking.” 11 Recinto, 706 F.3d at 1175. 12 Plaintiff’s complaint requires exactly that: Plaintiff asks this Court to review, and 13 overturn, a decision affecting his individual benefits. [See Compl. at 8.] He seeks an order 14 restoring his disability rating based on alleged errant factual determinations related to that 15 rating. [Id.] 16 “To adjudicate veterans’ claims, the VA uses a two-step process, beginning with a 17 regional office that processes claims and makes an initial decision.” Recinto, 706 F.3d at 18 1174 (citing Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428 (2011)). “If a veteran 19 is not satisfied with the decision made by the regional office, he or she may appeal it to the 20 VA’s Board of Veterans’ Appeals, which makes the agency’s final decision.” Id.; see also 21 38 U.S.C. §§ 7101, 7104(a). “From there, benefits determinations may be appealed in the 22 manner established by the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act of 1988 (“the VJRA”)[.]” Id. 23 “The VJRA established an Article I court called the United States Court of Appeals for 24 Veterans Claims, which has exclusive jurisdiction to review decisions of the Board of 25 Veterans’ Appeals.” Id.; see 38 U.S.C. §§ 7251, 7252(a), 7261. “On further appeal, 26 decisions from the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims are reviewed by the Federal 27 Circuit.” Id.; see 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c)-(d). 28 1 The Court is sympathetic to Plaintiffs claimed harms. But Congress, and the Ninth 2 || Circuit, has made clear that this Court is “expressly disqualified from hearing cases related 3 ||to VA benefits” pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 511. See Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 4 F.3d 1013, 1023 (9th Cir. 2012). Should Plaintiff amend his complaint to state a 5 || constitutional claim that does not look at the specifics of any individual veteran’s case, the 6 ||Court may have jurisdiction over it. See Recinto, 706 F.3d at 1175. Until then, the Court 7 || dismisses this complaint for want of subject matter jurisdiction. 8 iI. Conclusion 9 The Court dismisses Plaintiff's complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Plaintiff’s 10 || application to proceed IFP [ECF No. 2] is denied as moot. Plaintiff shall have until 11 |/Jan. 31, 2025 to amend his complaint. Should this Court have jurisdiction over any 12 ||amended complaint, Plaintiff may renew his motion to proceed JFP. Plaintiff is reminded 13 federal courts are required to examine jurisdiction sua sponte (meaning, on their own 14 |/initiative). See Bernhardt v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 868 (9th Cir. 2002). 15 16 Dated: January 14, 2025 (6 17 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 18 United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28