Price v. San Diego Police Department

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 V incent d/b/a Vincent Patrick PRICE, Case No.: 24-cv-1758-AGS-BLM 4 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 5 v. RECONSIDER (ECF 4) AND CLOSING CASE 6 SAN DIEGO POLICE DEPARTMENT, A-Z Towing, 7 Defendants. 8 9 This Court dismissed plaintiff Vincent Price’s complaint about his car-towing for 10 being frivolous and for failing to state a claim. (See ECF 3.) In short, the Court concluded 11 that his claim for millions of dollars generally failed, whether based on (1) his apparently 12 homemade license plate’s self-declared “EXEMPT” status from towing or (2) “due 13 process.” (Id. at 2–3.) But he was given until “December 20, 2024,” to file an amended 14 complaint addressing the “defects” in his complaint. (Id. at 3.) Instead of filing a new 15 complaint with additional factual allegations, Price elected to file a one-page “Answer” 16 that argues this Court’s screening order was incorrect because his car’s registration was 17 purportedly “not the issue.” (See ECF 4.) 18 The Court interprets this filing as a motion to reconsider its screening order. A 19 motion to reconsider is uncommon medicine, appropriate only when a court “(1) is 20 presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision 21 was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law.” School 22 Dist. No. IJ v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). Since he doesn’t offer new 23 evidence nor point to any changed law, the Court presumes Price relies on clear error. In 24 his motion to reconsider, Price—for the first time—claims that his original complaint is 25 based on the constitutional “Right to Travel.” (Compare ECF 4, at 1, with ECF 1.) That is, 26 he argues that his right to travel on public roads with an unregistered automobile is a 27 “Fundamental Right” that cannot be “rightfully deprived.” (ECF 4, at 1.) 28 Even such a reimagined complaint, however, would not undermine this Court’s I |}screening order. “Although there is a constitutional right to travel, that right is not 2 || unfettered, and it does not include the right to drive a motor vehicle on public roads free 3 || from state-government requirements for licensing and registration.” Andreaccio v. Weaver, 4 ||674 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1021 (D. Nev. 2023). After all, “burdens on a single mode of 5 || transportation do not implicate the right to interstate travel.” Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 6 || 1205 (9th Cir. 1999). “The plaintiff's argument that the right to operate a motor vehicle 1s 7 || fundamental because of its relation to the fundamental right of interstate travel is utterly 8 || frivolous.” /d. at 1206 (cleaned up). “What is at issue here is not his right to travel interstate, 9 || but his right to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways, and we have no hesitation 10 |/in holding that this is not a fundamental right.” /d. (cleaned up). 11 As “every court to confront it has held,” Price’s “right-to-travel theory lacks a true 12 || basis in the law and 1s patently frivolous.” See Andreaccio, 674 F. Supp. 3d at 1021 & n.58 13 || (collecting cases). And nothing suggests this Court made a clear error in its screening order. 14 ||The motion to reconsider is therefore DENIED. Because Price elected not to file an 15 |}amended complaint, the Clerk is directed to issue a judgment and close this case. See Lira 16 || v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take advantage of 17 ||the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the dismissal of the 18 || complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”). 19 Dated: December 23, 2024 20 | fi 1 Andrew G. Schopler United States District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 a ee