People v. Meza CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from an order
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Bernardino County · No. FWV1102812-1
- Trial judge
- Jon D. Ferguson
- Outcome
- affirmed — Affirmed.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- William S. Dato (author), Judith D. McConnell, Joan K. Irion
Analysis
The trial court denied Meza's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, finding that his jury's true finding on the mayhem-based felony murder special circumstance rendered him ineligible for relief as a matter of law. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that because the trial occurred after People v. Banks and People v. Clark, the special circumstance finding conclusively establishes that Meza remains liable for murder under current law.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 at the prima facie stage.“We agree Meza is not eligible for relief, and therefore affirm the order.” | de novo | correct | agree with court The appellate court correctly applied the holding in People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, which establishes that for trials conducted after People v. Banks and People v. Clark, a felony-murder special circumstance finding ordinarily precludes a prima facie case for relief under section 1172.6. Since the jury found the special circumstance true based on alternatives that remain viable theories of murder liability (actual killer, aider/abettor with intent, or major participant with reckless indifference), Meza cannot show he could not presently be convicted of murder. The court also correctly rejected Meza's argument regarding jury instructions as a matter that should have been raised on direct appeal, not in a resentencing petition. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698 — For trials conducted after People v. Banks and People v. Clark, a felony-murder special circumstance finding ordinarily establishes a defendant's ineligibility for resentencing under section 1172.6 and precludes a prima facie case for relief.
- relied: People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 — Established the legal framework for determining major participant status and reckless indifference in felony murder cases, which the court used to define the viable theories of liability remaining after statutory changes.
- relied: People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 — Clarified the factors relevant to a finding of reckless indifference to human life, which the court cited to show that the jury's finding under Alternative (C) remains a viable theory of murder liability.
- relied: People v. Burns (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 862 — A petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 is not a second appeal allowing a defendant to challenge errors that should have been addressed on appeal from the judgment.
- relied: People v. Flores (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1164 — A petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 is not a second appeal allowing a defendant to challenge errors that should have been addressed on appeal from the judgment.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the controlling precedent from People v. Strong to the specific facts of the case, noting that the trial occurred after Banks and Clark were decided. It also properly distinguishes between a resentencing petition and a direct appeal, correctly rejecting Meza's attempt to raise instructional errors in the wrong procedural vehicle.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe San Bernardino County Superior Court denied Hector Meza's Penal Code section 1172.6 resentencing petition at the prima facie stage, ruling that the jury's three special circumstance findings (lying in wait, mayhem felony murder, torture) made him ineligible as a matter of law. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the post-Banks/Clark mayhem felony-murder special circumstance finding alone establishes Meza remains guilty of first degree murder under current law and that his claim of instructional error on the Banks/Clark factors should have been raised on direct appeal.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage on the ground that the jury's mayhem felony-murder special circumstance finding establishes ineligibility as a matter of law“Because this finding indicates his murder conviction is entirely unaffected by the recent statutory changes, he is ineligible for resentencing relief as a matter of law.” | unclear | correct | agree with court The opinion does not articulate a standard of review, though it treats the question as one of law. Under People v. Strong, a felony-murder special circumstance finding made after Banks (2015) and Clark (2016) ordinarily establishes ineligibility, and the jury here was instructed it had to find Meza was the actual killer, an intent-to-kill aider and abettor, or a major participant acting with reckless indifference—each a valid theory of murder under amended sections 188 and 189. The record of conviction therefore refutes the petition's allegations without improper factfinding, which is the correct prima facie analysis. |
Rejection of Meza's claim that the jury was misinstructed on the Banks/Clark factors for the major participant/reckless indifference alternative“a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 is not a second appeal allowing a defendant to challenge errors that should have been addressed on appeal from the judgment.” | unclear | correct | agree with court Strong's rationale for allowing pre-Banks/Clark petitioners to proceed was that their juries were not instructed under the correct legal standard that had not yet been announced; where, as here, the trial post-dated Banks and Clark, any claimed failure to instruct on the Banks/Clark factors was error under then-existing law remediable on direct appeal, not a change in law under section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(3). The court's reliance on Burns and Flores for the proposition that section 1172.6 is not a vehicle to relitigate trial error is consistent with those decisions and with Strong. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698 — A felony-murder special circumstance finding made before Banks and Clark does not preclude a prima facie case under section 1172.6, but findings made after Banks and Clark ordinarily establish ineligibility for resentencing.
- relied: People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 — Clarified the factors governing whether a defendant was a 'major participant' in the underlying felony for the felony-murder special circumstance.
- relied: People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 — Clarified the factors governing whether a defendant acted with 'reckless indifference to human life' for the felony-murder special circumstance.
- relied: People v. Burns (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 862 — A section 1172.6 petition is not a second appeal and cannot be used to challenge errors that should have been raised on direct appeal from the judgment.
- relied: People v. Flores (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1164 — Section 1172.6 permits relief only where the defendant could no longer be convicted of murder because of the statutory changes, not for ordinary trial error.
- missed: People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 — At the prima facie stage the trial court may consider the record of conviction, including jury instructions and verdicts, to determine whether the petitioner is ineligible as a matter of law, but may not engage in factfinding; the standard for prima facie review is a question of law.
- missed: People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433 — A jury finding precludes section 1172.6 relief at the prima facie stage only if, applying issue preclusion principles, the finding establishes every element of murder under current law; the opinion's conclusion is consistent with this but did not address it.
The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The court correctly applied Strong to a post-Banks/Clark felony-murder special circumstance and properly treated the claimed instructional error as a direct-appeal issue outside the scope of section 1172.6. It did not state the standard of review or cite Lewis or Curiel, the controlling Supreme Court authority on the prima facie inquiry and the preclusive effect of jury findings, though the result is consistent with both.
Opinion
Filed 11/27/24 P. v. Meza CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D082022
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. FWV1102812-1)
HECTOR J. MEZA, Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, Jon D. Ferguson, Judge. Affirmed. Eric Multhaup, under the appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Christopher P. Beesley and Michael D. Butera, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION In 2011, Maria B. died after a group of men beat her, doused her with gasoline, and set her body on fire. Defendant Hector J. Meza, Maria’s former boyfriend, was among several individuals found guilty of first degree murder in her death, as well as other charges. (Pen. Code, §§ 187 and 189.)1 In connection with convicting Meza of first degree murder, the jury found true three special circumstances: (1) that the murder was committed by means of lying in wait (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)); (2) that the murder was committed while Meza was engaged in the commission of mayhem (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(J)); and (3) that the murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18)). He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Following changes to California’s murder statutes in 2018 and 2021, Meza filed a petition for resentencing alleging that he could no longer be convicted of murder due to these statutory changes and requesting relief pursuant to section 1172.6.2 (See Stats. 2018, ch. 1015 (Sen. Bill No. 1437); Stats. 2021, ch. 551 (Sen. Bill No. 775).) The trial court denied the petition at the prima facie stage, finding that each of the three special circumstance findings made relief unavailable as a matter of law. We agree Meza is not eligible for relief, and therefore affirm the order.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 Meza’s petition requested relief under section 1170.95, the predecessor statute in effect at that time. Section 1170.95 was renumbered as section 1172.6 effective June 30, 2022. For simplicity’s sake, we consistently refer to the statute by its current designation. 2 DISCUSSION For our purposes, it is sufficient to address the trial court’s conclusion that the jury’s true finding on the felony murder special circumstance based on mayhem establishes that Meza remains liable for murder under current law. Because this finding indicates his murder conviction is entirely unaffected by the recent statutory changes, he is ineligible for resentencing relief as a matter of law. In People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698 (Strong), the Supreme Court addressed whether defendants found to have committed a special circumstance felony murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)) before the decisions in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark) could still state a prima facie case for relief under section 1172.6. It concluded that for trials conducted before the decisions in Banks and Clark, a felony-murder special circumstance finding does not conclusively preclude a prima facie case under section 1172.6. (Strong, at p. 710.) But the trial in this case took place after both Banks and Clark were decided. And as the court in Strong made clear, “findings made after Banks and Clark ordinarily establish a defendant’s ineligibility for resentencing under [section 1172.6] and thus preclude the defendant from making a prima facie case for relief.” (Strong, at p. 710.) Here, the jury was instructed that to find true the mayhem-murder special circumstance, it had to reach one of three conclusions: (A) Meza was the actual killer, or (B) he aided and abetted the murder with intent to kill, or (C) he was a major participant in committing mayhem and, in doing so, acted with reckless indifference to human life. Each of these remains a viable theory of murder liability after the statutory changes effected by Senate Bill No. 1437 and Senate Bill No. 775. In other words, if any one of 3 these alternatives is true—and the jury had to find at least one was true— there is no way Meza can show that he “could not presently be convicted of murder . . . because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) Once the jury finds (A) or (B) or (C) and that the murder was committed while defendant was engaged in the commission of mayhem, it was and continues to be murder of the first degree under California law. Meza does not dispute the logic of this analysis or that a felony-murder special circumstance finding after Banks and Clark “ordinarily” precludes relief under section 1172.6. Instead, he argues that the jurors in his case were not properly instructed regarding Alternative (C) because the trial court failed to explain they should consider the Banks/Clark factors both with respect to deciding whether Meza was a “major participant” and whether he acted with “reckless indifference.” But even if we were to assume Meza was correct, he would establish at most a garden-variety instructional error based on law that was applicable at the time of his trial. (See Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 617–623 [discussing factors relevant to a finding of reckless indifference].) His argument should have been raised on direct appeal. As we have explained on several occasions in different contexts, a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 is not a second appeal allowing a defendant to challenge errors that should have been addressed on appeal from the judgment. (See People v. Burns (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 862, 865, 867–869; People v. Flores (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1172–1173.) It permits relief only to the extent the defendant can show he could no longer be convicted of murder or attempted murder in light of recent statutory changes. Here, the changes to sections 188 and 189 effected by Senate Bill No. 1437 cast no doubt on the validity of Meza’s first degree murder conviction because 4 the jury’s felony-murder special circumstance finding establishes that he would be guilty of the same crime under current law.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Meza’s petition is affirmed.
DATO, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
IRION, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Clark S066940 · 2016-06-27
- People v. Banks S213819 · 2015-07-09