People v. Walkey CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from an order
- Trial court
- Superior Court of San Diego County · No. CRN8555
- Trial judge
- David G. Brown
- Outcome
- reversed — Reversed and remanded.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Julia C. Kelety (author), William S. Dato, Michele M. Castillo
Analysis
The trial court denied Walkey's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 at the prima facie stage, relying on facts from his direct appeal opinion to determine he was the 'actual killer.' The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, accepting the People's concession that the record of conviction did not establish ineligibility as a matter of law and that the trial court improperly engaged in factfinding at the preliminary stage.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 at the prima facie stage“The trial court was not provided with any part of the record of conviction that could establish that Walkey was the actual killer. Thus, the court erred in denying Walkey’s petition at the prima facie stage based upon the facts discussed in the appellate decision.” | de novo | error | agree with court The trial court erred by relying on the summary of facts in the direct appeal opinion to make a factual determination of 'actual killer' status at the prima facie stage, which is prohibited by statute and case law. The appellate court correctly identified that the record of conviction itself did not establish ineligibility, making the denial an abuse of the limited scope of the prima facie inquiry. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 — The prima facie inquiry under section 1172.6 is limited and prohibits the trial court from engaging in factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.
- relied: People v. Duchine (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 798 — Trial courts should decide factual issues only after issuing an order to show cause and holding an evidentiary hearing, not at the prima facie stage.
- relied: People v. Beaudreaux (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1227 — The Legislature intended to prohibit consideration of the summary of facts in an appellate decision, both at the prima facie stage and at the evidentiary hearing, for section 1172.6 petitions.
- relied: People v. Walkey (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 268 — The direct appeal opinion that reduced the conviction to second-degree murder due to insufficient evidence of intent to torture, which contained the factual summary the trial court improperly relied upon.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the controlling authority from People v. Lewis and People v. Beaudreaux to determine that the trial court exceeded its authority by relying on extrinsic factual summaries from a prior appeal. The reasoning directly addresses the specific error committed by the trial court and aligns with the statutory framework for section 1172.6 petitions.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe San Diego Superior Court denied Frederick Walkey's Penal Code section 1172.6 resentencing petition at the prima facie stage, finding he was the "actual killer" based on the factual summary in the 1986 Court of Appeal opinion from his direct appeal. The Court of Appeal accepted the Attorney General's concession of error, reversed, and remanded with directions to issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Denial of section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage on the ground that petitioner was the actual killer, based on the facts recited in the prior appellate opinion“Thus, the court erred in denying Walkey’s petition at the prima facie stage based upon the facts discussed in the appellate decision.” | unclear | error (law misapplied) | agree with court The opinion does not articulate a standard of review, though it effectively asks de novo whether the record of conviction establishes ineligibility as a matter of law. Under Lewis, a trial court at the prima facie stage may not engage in factfinding or weigh evidence, and the 'actual killer' determination here was a factual conclusion drawn solely from the appellate opinion's factual summary. Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), as construed in Beaudreaux, bars reliance on an appellate opinion's factual recitation, and no jury instructions, verdict forms, or other record-of-conviction documents were before the trial court. Given that Walkey's first degree torture-murder conviction was reduced to second degree murder on a record that included a child endangerment count, the record does not foreclose a now-invalid imputed-malice or felony-murder theory. The conclusion of error is well supported. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 — A trial court may consult the record of conviction at the prima facie stage under section 1172.6, subdivision (c), but the inquiry is limited and the court may not engage in factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or exercise of discretion.
- relied: People v. Duchine (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 798 — Factual issues bearing on eligibility should be decided only after issuance of an order to show cause and an evidentiary hearing, not at the prima facie stage.
- relied: People v. Beaudreaux (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1227 — The Legislature intended to prohibit consideration of the summary of facts in an appellate decision under section 1172.6, both at the prima facie stage and at the evidentiary hearing.
- relied: People v. Walkey (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 268 — Prior direct appeal reducing Walkey's first degree torture-murder conviction to second degree murder for insufficient evidence of intent to torture; cited for procedural history and as the opinion whose factual summary the trial court improperly relied upon.
The appellate opinion: sound — The court correctly applied Lewis's bar on prima facie factfinding and Beaudreaux's reading of section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) to a trial court ruling that rested entirely on an appellate opinion's factual recitation, and the People's concession was properly accepted. The opinion is brief and does not state a standard of review or examine what theory of second degree murder the 1984 jury was instructed on, but neither omission affects the result because no record-of-conviction materials were before the trial court.
Opinion
Filed 11/18/24 P. v. Walkey CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D082790
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. CRN8555) FREDERICK WALKEY, Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, David G. Brown, Judge. Reversed and remanded. William J. Capriole, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa A. Mandel, James M. Toohey and Joseph C. Anagnos, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Frederick Walkey appeals from an order denying his petition for resentencing filed pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.951 (now section 1172.6).2 He contends his petition established a prima facie claim for relief requiring the trial court to issue an order to show cause. The People concede the trial court erred in denying Walkey’s petition because the record of conviction does not establish Walkey is ineligible for resentencing relief as a matter of law. We accept the People’s concession and remand the case with directions for the trial court to issue an order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing. I. Factual and Procedural Background In 1983, Frederick Walkey was involved in an incident that resulted in the death of a two-year-old child. In 1984, a jury found Walkey guilty of first degree murder by means of torture (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (a)—count 1); and child endangerment (§ 273a, subd. (1)— count 2). The trial court sentenced Walkey to 25 years to life. Walkey appealed, and this Court reduced the defendant’s conviction to second degree murder because the evidence was insufficient to show that he intended to torture his victim. (People v. Walkey (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 268, 271 (Walkey).) Walkey was resentenced to prison for 15 years to life. In 2022, appellant filed a petition for vacatur of his murder conviction and for resentencing under current section 1172.6. The trial court denied this petition at the prima facie stage, stating that Walkey was not entitled to relief because he was the actual killer.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 We refer to the statute by its current number throughout the remainder of this opinion. 2 II. Discussion A. Section 1172.6 When presented with a petition seeking relief under section 1172.6, the trial court must first determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) Where a petitioner makes the requisite prima facie showing he or she falls within the provisions of section 1172.6 and is entitled to relief, the court must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction and resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c) & (d)(1).) The court may rely on the record of conviction in determining whether a prima facie showing has been made. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971.) However, “[w]hile the trial court may look at the record of conviction . . . to determine whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case for section [1172.6] relief, the prima facie inquiry under subdivision (c) is limited.” (Lewis, at p. 971.) “In reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this preliminary juncture, a trial court should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ ” (Id. at p. 972.) “Rather, it should decide such issues only after issuing an order to show cause and holding an evidentiary hearing.” (People v. Duchine (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 798, 811.) B. The Superior Court Erred in Denying Walkey’s Petition Without Issuing an Order to Show Cause The People concede the record of conviction in this case does not establish Walkey is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. We agree and accept the concession. In denying Walkey’s petition, the trial court asserted that Walkey is precluded from relief for a claim under section 1172.6 because he was the 3 “actual killer.” This conclusion of fact was premised upon the facts described in the opinion of the Court of Appeal from Walkey’s direct appeal, which had been attached to the People’s response to Walkey’s petition. However, as noted above, the trial court is prohibited from engaging in factfinding at the prima facie stage; and moreover, the opinion’s discussion of the facts could not be considered by the trial court on a petition under section 1172.6. (See People v. Beaudreaux (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1227, 1238 [concluding that the Legislature intended to prohibit consideration of the summary of facts in an appellate decision, both at the prima facie stage and at the evidentiary hearing].) The trial court was not provided with any part of the record of conviction that could establish that Walkey was the actual killer. Thus, the court erred in denying Walkey’s petition at the prima facie stage based upon the facts discussed in the appellate decision.
4 III. Disposition The order denying Walkey’s petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to issue an order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing as required by statute. We express no opinion on the appropriate outcome of such hearing.
KELETY, J.
WE CONCUR:
DATO, Acting P. J.
CASTILLO, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Lewis S260598 · 2021-07-26
- People v. Walkey D001560 · 1986-01-23