gno.law

Bonilla v. US District Court - San Diego

District Court, S.D. California · 3:24-cv-01982 · 2024-11-14 · Unknown

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
William Q. Hayes (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T21:20Z · confidence high

The court reviewed a pro se civil rights complaint filed by an incarcerated serial litigant challenging the validity of his criminal conviction and sentence, along with motions to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) and for relief. The court denied the IFP motions under the Prison Litigation Reform Act's three-strikes rule, dismissed the complaint as frivolous for failing to state a claim because habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy, and denied the motion for relief as moot.

What the court decidedThe model
Denial of Motions to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
“The Court: (1) DENIES Plaintiff’s Motions to proceed IFP [ECF No. 2 & 5] as barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)”
agree with court
The court correctly applied 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which bars prisoners with three or more prior dismissals for frivolousness, maliciousness, or failure to state a claim from proceeding IFP unless they face imminent danger of serious physical injury. The order recites that the plaintiff is a serial litigant and cites a prior order from the Northern District of California noting the dismissal of 34 actions and a specific finding that he no longer qualifies for IFP. The plaintiff made no allegations of imminent danger. The application of the statute to the facts recited is legally sound.
Dismissal of Complaint as Frivolous
“(2) DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2)”
agree with court
The court applied 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), which requires sua sponte dismissal of prisoner complaints that are frivolous or fail to state a claim. The complaint sought to invalidate a criminal judgment and death sentence. Under Preiser v. Rodriguez, a § 1983 action is not the proper vehicle to challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence; habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy. Therefore, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The dismissal is legally correct.
Denial of Motion for Relief due to Discrimination
“(3) DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for relief [ECF No. 4] as moot”
agree with court
The court denied the motion as moot. While the order does not elaborate extensively on why it is moot, it is standard practice to deny ancillary motions when the underlying complaint is dismissed. The dismissal of the complaint renders any request for relief within that action moot. This is a defensible procedural ruling.
Certification that IFP Appeal Would Not Be Taken in Good Faith
“(4) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal in this case would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)”
agree with court
The court certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Given that the complaint was dismissed for failing to state a claim (a legal error that is clear on the face of the complaint and the law) and the IFP status was denied based on statutory bars, there is no reasonable basis for an appeal. This certification is consistent with the dismissal.
Denial of Motion for Recusal (Footnote 1)
“The Court finds that recusal is not warranted.”
agree with court
The court treated the 'Disqualification of Judges' document as a motion for recusal. It applied the standard from United States v. Studley (whether a reasonable person would question impartiality) and United States v. Bell (conclusory speculations lacking factual support need not be accepted). The court found the plaintiff's allegations were conclusory and lacked factual support. This is a correct application of recusal standards to pro se filings that rely on unsupported accusations.

The order itself: sound — The order is procedurally and substantively sound. It correctly identifies the plaintiff as a serial litigant subject to the three-strikes rule under § 1915(g) and cites specific prior litigation history to support this finding. It correctly applies the Preiser v. Rodriguez doctrine to dismiss the § 1983 complaint challenging a criminal conviction, noting that habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy. The recusal motion is handled appropriately by applying the correct legal standard and finding the allegations conclusory. The authorities cited are binding and directly on point. There are no significant gaps in reasoning for the core rulings.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 STEVEN WAYNE BONILLA Case No.: 24cv1982-WQH (DDL) CDCR #J-48500, 13 ORDER DENYING MOTION TO Plaintiff, 14 PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, vs. DENYING MOTION FOR RELIEF, 15 AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT U.S. DISTRICT COURT – SAN DIEGO 16 PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) AND JOHN DOES 1-1000, AND AS FRIVOLOUS PURSUANT 17 Defendants. TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2) 18 19 Plaintiff Steve Wayne Bonilla, currently incarcerated at the California Medical 20 Facility in Vacaville, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights complaint 21 (“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, two motions to proceed in forma pauperis 22 (“IFP”), and a Motion for relief due to discrimination. (ECF Nos. 1–2, 4–5.)1 Plaintiff is 23 24 25 1 Plaintiff has also filed documents entitled: (1) “Judicial Notice” (ECF No. 6) and (2) “Disqualification of Judges; Conflict of Interest” (ECF No. 7). The Judicial Notice document appears to discuss a claim 26 of “malicious prosecution” in state court. The Disqualification Document asserts, “Judge William Q. Hayes and Judge David D. Leshner are disqualified to rule due to conflict of interest. They have 27 admitted to participating in criminal acts against me; and have admitted to owing me for the damages…” 1 a serial litigant and in this action, he once again complains this Court erred in failing to 2 invalidate his Alameda County criminal judgment and death sentence.2 (Compl. at 2-3.) 3 I. Motion to Proceed IFP 4 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 5 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 6 $405, consisting of a $350 statutory fee plus an additional administrative fee of $55, 7 although the administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. 8 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee 9 Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 10 prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 11 § 1915(a). Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007). 12 “A negative consequence that may impact a prisoner who files a frivolous complaint 13 is a restriction on his ability to file future cases without prepaying filing fees.” Harris v. 14 Mangum, 863, F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 2017). Under § 1915(g), a prisoner with three or 15 more “strikes,” i.e., prior civil cases or appeals dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for 16 failing to state a claim, “cannot proceed IFP” absent allegations of “imminent danger of 17 serious physical injury.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005); 28 18 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Bonilla is one of those prisoners, and he makes no plausible allegations 19 20 (ECF No. 7 at 1.) The Court liberally construes these filings to be a motion for recusal (ECF No. 7) and 21 Plaintiff’s evidence accompanying the motion (ECF No. 6). “The standard for recusal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455 is whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude the judge’s 22 impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1986). “While a judge’s consideration of a motion for recusal must take all facts provided as true for the 23 purpose of ruling on their legal sufficiency, the court need not accept conclusory speculations that lack 24 any factual support.” United States v. Bell, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1173 (E.D. Cal. 1999). Plaintiff has not presented any evidence of judicial bias other than conclusory statements which lack any factual 25 support. The Court finds that recusal is not warranted.

26 2 Plaintiff recently had a similar civil rights complaint in this Court dismissed as frivolous which also alleged this Court failed to declare his Alameda County conviction and sentence invalid. See Bonilla v. 27 Schopler, et al., So.Dist.Cal. Civil Case No. 24cv0205-JAH (DDL) (Order filed 2/26/24 [ECF No. 2].) 1 of imminent danger here. See In re Steven Bonilla, 2012 WL 216401, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 2 24, 2012) (noting Plaintiff’s litigation history in the Northern District of California, 3 including the dismissal of 34 pro se § 1983 civil rights actions between June 1 and October 4 31, 2011, alone, which were dismissed “because the allegations in the complaints do not 5 state a claim for relief under § 1983.”); id. at *3 n.1 (“The Court recently informed Plaintiff 6 that, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), he no longer qualifies to proceed in forma 7 pauperis in any civil rights action.”) 8 II. Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) 9 Even if Bonilla paid the full filing fee or is eligible to proceed IFP, 28 U.S.C. 10 § 1915A, also enacted as part of the PLRA, requires sua sponte dismissal of prisoner 11 complaints like his, or any portions of them, which are frivolous, malicious or fail to state 12 a claim upon which relief may be granted, and those that seek monetary relief from a 13 defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2); Coleman v. 14 Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532, 538-39 (2015). “The purpose of § 1915A is to ensure that the 15 targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.” Nordstrom 16 v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quote marks omitted). 17 Bonilla’s challenge to the validity of his conviction and sentence fails to state a claim 18 in this action because a habeas corpus action is his sole federal remedy, and a lawsuit under 19 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is inappropriate. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 479 (1973) 20 (“Release from penal custody is not an available remedy under the Civil Rights Act”);

21 Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 933 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“[H]abeas corpus is the 22 exclusive remedy to attack the legality of [a] conviction or sentence, . . . ”) 23 III. Conclusion and Order 24 The Court: (1) DENIES Plaintiff’s Motions to proceed IFP [ECF No. 2 & 5] as 25 barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), (2) DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint as frivolous 26 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2); (3) DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for relief [ECF 27 No. 4] as moot; (4) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal in this case would not be taken in good 1 faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); and (5) DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to close 2 the file. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 _____________________________________ 5 Dated: 11/14/2024 Hon. William Q. Hayes 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27