gno.law

Deetsch v. Lei

District Court, S.D. California · 3:22-cv-01166 · 2024-10-29 · Unknown

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
Robert Steven Huie (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T21:20Z · confidence high

Plaintiff moved to seal three exhibits designated as confidential by Defendants, relying solely on those designations and the protective order. The Court denied the motion, holding that the designations alone do not meet the required legal standard for sealing judicial records.

What the court decidedThe model
Motion to Seal Denied
“As Defendants have provided no other basis regarding the need to seal these exhibits, the request to seal is DENIED.”
agree with court
The court correctly applied the Ninth Circuit precedent that a mere designation of documents as confidential in discovery does not automatically justify sealing them when they become part of the public record in a dispositive motion. The order notes that the designating parties (Defendants) failed to file a response to the sealing motion as required by the Civil Chamber Rules, leaving the Plaintiff's motion to stand on the insufficient basis of the designations alone. Therefore, the denial follows logically from the cited authorities and the procedural posture.

The order itself: sound — The order is legally sound. It correctly identifies the high bar for sealing judicial records in the Ninth Circuit. It accurately notes that the Plaintiff's sole argument was the prior confidential designation, and it correctly cites binding authority (Foltz) and persuasive district court authority (Cadles) to show that such designations do not carry over to the public docket without a specific showing of need. The court also correctly noted the procedural failure of the designating parties to respond to the motion, which further weakened the case for sealing. The reasoning is concise and directly addresses the motion.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TODD DEETSCH, Case No.: 22-cv-1166-RSH-BLM 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 13 v. SEAL 14 PETER LEI, et al., [ECF No. 93] 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Seal (“Motion”). ECF No. 93. Plaintiff 19 requests leave to file three exhibits under seal in conjunction with Plaintiff’s anticipated 20 reply claim construction brief and motion for summary judgment. Id. at 4. The documents 21 were designated “Confidential” or “Confidential – For Counsel Only” by Defendants 22 during discovery pursuant to the protective order entered in this case. Id. at 2. For the 23 reasons below, the Court denies the Motion. 24 I. LEGAL STANDARD 25 “[T]he courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public 26 records and documents, including judicial records and documents.” Nixon v. Warner 27 Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). “Unless a particular court record is one 28 ‘traditionally kept secret,’ a ‘strong presumption in favor of access’ is the starting point.” 1 Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations 2 omitted). “The presumption of access is ‘based on the need for federal courts, although 3 independent—indeed, particularly because they are independent—to have a measure of 4 accountability and for the public to have confidence in the administration of justice.’” 5 Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting 6 United States v. Amodeo (Amodeo II), 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995)). 7 A party seeking to seal a judicial record bears the burden of overcoming the strong 8 presumption of access. Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178 (citing Foltz v. State Farm Mut. 9 Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003)). The showing required to meet this 10 burden depends upon whether the documents to be sealed relate to a motion that “is more 11 than tangentially related to the merits of the case.” Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1101. 12 When the underlying motion is more than tangentially related to the merits, the 13 “compelling reasons” standard applies. Id. at 1097–99. When the underlying motion does 14 not surpass the tangential relevance threshold, the “good cause” standard applies. Id. The 15 decision to seal documents is “one best left to the sound discretion of the trial court” upon 16 consideration of “the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case.” Nixon, 435 17 U.S. at 599. 18 II. ANALYSIS 19 Here, the only basis Plaintiff has provided for filing the referenced documents 20 under seal is Defendants’ designation of these documents as “Confidential” or “For 21 Counsel Only” pursuant to the protective order. See ECF No. 93-1. Pursuant to the 22 Court’s Civil Chamber Rules, Plaintiff’s counsel states he e-mailed Defendants’ counsel 23 on October 16, 2024 to determine Defendants’ position as to whether the documents 24 should be filed under seal. Declaration of Patrick Cummins [ECF No. 93-2 (“Cummins 25 Decl.”)] ¶¶ 3-4.1 Counsel for the Amazon Defendants responded any documents 26 27 1 This Court’s Civil Chamber Rules state in relevant part: “Parties often seek to seal 28 1 designated “Confidential” or “For Counsel Only” should be filed under seal. Id. ¶ 7. 2 Counsel for the Lei Defendants did not respond. Id. ¶ 8. Plaintiff filed the instant Motion 3 to Seal on October 21, 2024. ECF No. 93. Under the Civil Chamber Rules, as the 4 designating parties, Defendants were required “to file a response to the sealing motion 5 within seven (7) days.” See Civil Chamber Rules VIII (emphasis in original). Defendants 6 have not done so. See Docket. 7 The mere designation of materials as “Confidential” or “For Counsel Only” in 8 discovery is not sufficient to meet either the good cause or compelling reason standard to 9 seal. See Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1136 (9th Cir. 2003) 10 (“Once the [sealed discovery] documents are made part of a dispositive motion . . . they 11 lose their status of being raw fruits of discovery, and no longer enjoy protected status 12 without some overriding interests in favor of keeping the discovery documents under 13 seal.”); Cadles of W. Va. v. Alvarez, No. 20-CV-2534 TWR (WVG), 2023 U.S. Dist. 14 LEXIS 54540, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2023) (“The existence of a stipulated protected 15 order is not enough, standing alone, to justify sealing under the [more permissive] good 16 cause standard.”). As Defendants have provided no other basis regarding the need to seal 17 these exhibits, the request to seal is DENIED. 18 /// 19 /// 20 /// 21 /// 22 /// 23 24 protective order, including with a “confidential” or “attorneys’ eyes only” designation. In 25 these circumstances, the moving party must first meet and confer with the designating party to determine whether the designating party maintains that any portion of the 26 document must be filed under seal. If so, the moving party must file a motion to seal. In 27 addition, the designating party must file a response to the sealing motion within seven (7) days that satisfies the sealing standard . . . . If no response is filed, the Court may order 28 1 Plaintiff may publicly re-file the documents lodged in connection with his October 2 2024 Motion to Seal [ECF No. 94] in this case. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 || Dated: October 29, 2024 fehut ¢ fp 5 6 Hon. Robert S. Huie United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28