Bennett v. Navy Federal Credit Union

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 FRANK BENNETT, Case No.: 24-cv-00295-W-MMP 12 Plaintiff, ORDER: v. 13

1. GRANTING IN PART AND 14 NAVY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, DENYING IN PART JOINT

15 MOTION TO AMEND Defendant. SCHEDULING ORDER; AND 16 17 2. EXTENDING FACT DISCOVERY CUTOFF ONLY 18 19 [ECF No. 36] 20 21 22 Before the Court is the parties’ joint motion to amend the scheduling order. [ECF 23 No. 36.] First, the parties seek to extend the fact discovery cutoff of October 25, 2024 by 24 forty-five (45) days, or in the alternative, twenty-one (21) days following a ruling on the 25 parties’ discovery disputes. The parties represent they have engaged in substantial 26 discovery, stating Defendant served its responses to written discovery, and Plaintiff’s 27 responses are due by October 21, 2024 based on the parties’ agreement. The parties have 28 also engaged in several depositions, though Plaintiff’s deposition has not yet occurred as 1 the parties agreed to postpone it until after Plaintiff responds to written discovery. [Id. ¶¶ 2 3–4.] The parties also represent they are “conferring regarding two pending discovery 3 disputes and anticipate requesting a Discovery Conference with the Court.” [Id. ¶ 4.] In 4 addition, the parties seek to extend all other scheduling order deadlines by thirty (30) days. 5 [Id. at 2, ¶ 7.] 6 A party seeking to modify the scheduling order must demonstrate good cause. Fed. 7 R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4) (“A schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s 8 consent.”); see also Scheduling Order Regulating Discovery and Other Pre-Trial 9 Proceedings, ECF No. 28 at ¶ 20 (“The dates and times set forth herein will not modified 10 except for good cause shown.”); Chambers Rule VIII (“As provided in Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 16(b)(4), modification of the Scheduling Order requires the approval of the Court and good 12 cause. The Rule 16 ‘good cause’ standard focuses on the reasonable diligence of the 13 moving party.”). Courts have broad discretion in determining whether good cause exists. 14 See, e.g., Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1992). The 15 Ninth Circuit has instructed the good cause standard focuses on the diligence of the party 16 seeking to amend the scheduling order and the reasons for seeking modification. Id. at 609 17 (“[T]he focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking modification. 18 [ ] If that party was not diligent, the inquiry should end.”) (internal citation omitted). 19 The Court finds it difficult to determine whether the parties have been diligent based 20 on the joint motion. For example, the parties agreed to extend the deadline for Plaintiff to 21 serve written discovery responses until October 21, 2024—four days before the current 22 fact discovery deadline—and then agreed to postpone Plaintiff’s deposition until after 23 responses have been served. The parties do not address why Plaintiff’s deadline for 24 discovery responses was extended, so it is unclear whether the parties have been diligent. 25 Nor do the parties indicate why an additional forty-five (45) days is necessary. Though the 26 parties identify “two pending discovery disputes,” they have not yet raised any disputes 27 with the Court, and without knowing the basis for the disputes, it is unclear why the Court 28 would need to extend the deadline to complete all fact discovery. Thus, it is unclear 1 whether good cause exists to extend the discovery cutoff by the requested forty-five (45) 2 || days. Finally, the parties do not provide a reason to extend all remaining deadlines by thirty 3 ||(30) days. Thus, the Court cannot conclude good cause exists to do so. The Court will 4 || authorize some overlap of fact and expert discovery but requires a good cause showing to 5 || extend other dates. 6 Based on the above, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the 7 || parties’ joint motion and further ORDERS as follows: 8 1. All fact discovery shall be completed by all parties by December 9, 2024. 9 2. The Court DENIES the parties’ request to extend all other deadlines. All 10 || substantive provisions and other deadlines set forth in the Court’s Scheduling Order, ECF 11 28, remain in effect. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 Dated: October 21, 2024 WMibwla tM. ser 14 HON. MICHELLE M. PETTIT 15 United States Magistrate Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28