ESA Management, LLC v. Kaler
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Cathy Ann Bencivengo (author)
Analysis
The court considered Plaintiff's motion to remand a case that Defendant had removed for the third time, as well as Defendant's motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The court granted the motion to remand, denied the IFP motion as moot, and directed the Clerk to close the case.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Plaintiff's motion to remand is granted.“The outcome here should be no different: the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction for the reasons identified in Kaler I & II and REMANDS this case back to the San Diego County Superior Court.” | agree with court The court correctly applies 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), which mandates remand if the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The court relies on prior orders in the same litigation (Kaler I and Kaler II) which established that neither federal question nor diversity jurisdiction existed. Given that the underlying state case and parties are identical, and the prior remands were affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, the conclusion that the court lacks jurisdiction is legally sound. |
Defendant's motion to proceed in forma pauperis is denied as moot.“The Court DENIES AS MOOT Defendant’s IFP motion.” | agree with court Because the court is remanding the case and closing the federal docket, there are no further proceedings in federal court for which IFP status would be relevant. Denying the motion as moot is the standard procedural response when the underlying case is dismissed or remanded. |
The Clerk is directed to close the case.“The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close this case.” | agree with court This is a standard administrative order following a remand. |
The order itself: sound with gaps — The order is procedurally correct and relies on binding precedent (28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)) and prior consistent rulings in the same case. However, it is a 'sound with gaps' opinion because it does not independently analyze the specific jurisdictional defects (lack of diversity/federal question) or the timeliness argument in detail, instead relying entirely on the prior orders (Kaler I and II). While legally sufficient given the prior history, it skips the explicit application of the law to the current facts in favor of a reference to previous decisions.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
record incompleteOpinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ESA MANAGEMENT, LLC, Case No.: 24-CV-01755-CAB-SBC 12 Plaintiff, ORDER 13 v. GRANTING REMAND 14 TIMOTHY KALER, 15 Defendant. DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA 16 PAUPERIS AS MOOT 17 [ECF No. 2, 3] 18 19 20 On October 2, 2024, Defendant Timothy Kaler removed this case from San Diego 21 County Superior Court (Case No. 37-2023-00010833-CL-UD-CTL). [ECF No. 1.] This 22 is not the first time Defendant has sought removal. In fact, this is now the third time that 23 Defendant has attempted to remove the underlying case to federal court. See ESA Mgmt., 24 LLC v. Kaler, No. 3:23-CV-01324-RBM-MMP, 2023 WL 4932088, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 25 2, 2023), appeal dismissed, No. 23-55694, 2023 WL 7401409 (9th Cir. Sept. 28, 2023) 26 (hereinafter, “Kaler I”); ESA Mgmt., LLC v. Kaler, No. 3:24-CV-00175-RBM-MMP, 2024 27 WL 3542584, at *1 (S.D. Cal. June 5, 2024), appeal dismissed, No. 24-3590, 2024 WL 28 3548314 (9th Cir. June 20, 2024) (hereinafter “Kaler II”). In both of Defendant’s prior 1 attempts at removal, the reviewing district court ordered remand. Defendant even appealed 2 those remand decisions twice: both efforts were summarily dismissed by the Ninth Circuit. 3 Plaintiff ESA Management, LLC represents that Defendant now faces a default judgment 4 at the state level. At issue is Plaintiff’s (third) motion to remand this case back to state 5 court. [ECF No. 3.] Defendant also filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). 6 [ECF No. 2.] 7 The district court must remand any case removed from a state court “if at any time 8 before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” 28 9 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The Court can adjudicate subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte. See 10 Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1116 (9th Cir. 2004). In favor of remand, 11 Plaintiff argues that Defendant failed to include in his removal notice “a copy of all process, 12 pleadings, and orders served upon such defendant.” [ECF No. 3 at 3.] Additionally, 13 Plaintiff asserts that removal is untimely since Defendant “was served with the summons 14 and complaint on April 17, 2023” and “had until May 17, 2023 to seek removal” to federal 15 court. [Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (b)(l) (30-day removal deadline)]. Of course, the Court 16 recognizes that this exact same state case has already been removed and remanded twice 17 before. 18 In the first order for remand, the reviewing district court concluded that neither a 19 relevant federal question nor diversity provided subject matter jurisdiction. See Kaler I, 20 2023 WL 4932088, at *2–3. In its second remand order, the district court addressed the 21 same removal defects identified by Plaintiff on this third go-around. See Kaler II, 2024 22 WL 3548314, at *1. The outcome here should be no different: the Court lacks subject 23 matter jurisdiction for the reasons identified in Kaler I & II and REMANDS this case back 24 to the San Diego County Superior Court. [ECF No. 3.] The Court DENIES AS MOOT 25 Defendant’s IFP motion. [ECF No. 2.] 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close this case. The Court notes that the 2 || abuse of the judicial process may result in sanctions. Am. Unites for Kids v. Rousseau, 985 3 || F.3d 1075, 1088 (9th Cir. 2021). 4 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 7 ||Dated: October 15, 2024 € Z 8 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo ? United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28