gno.law

Alexander v. Chime

District Court, S.D. California · 3:24-cv-00979 · 2024-06-21 · Unknown

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
John A. Houston (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T21:29Z · confidence high

Plaintiff Liam Alexander filed a complaint against Chime alleging breach of an unidentified agreement and harassment, along with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The court dismissed the complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim and denied the motion to proceed in forma pauperis.

What the court decidedStandard it appliedThe model
Complaint dismissed without prejudice
“The Complaint as to Defendant DISMISSED without prejudice”
substantial evidenceagree with court
The court correctly applied the Twombly standard, noting that the complaint lacked a cognizable legal theory and essential facts. The allegations of 'breach of an unidentified agreement' and 'harassing and abusing' are conclusory and fail to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Dismissal without prejudice is appropriate for a pro se plaintiff who has not yet had the opportunity to amend.
Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis denied
“Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Proceed IFP, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), is DENIED.”
de novoagree with court
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a court must dismiss an IFP complaint if it fails to state a claim. Because the court found the complaint failed to state a claim, it was required to deny the IFP motion. The denial is a procedural consequence of the dismissal.

The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the applicable legal standards for IFP review and Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. It applies the Twombly standard to the specific facts of the complaint, finding that the allegations are conclusory and lack essential facts. The reasoning is direct and supported by the cited authorities.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LIAM ALEXANDER, Case No.: 24-cv-00979-JAH 12 Plaintiff, ORDER: 13 v. (1) DISMISSING COMPLAINT 14 CHIME, WITHOUT PREJUDICE; AND 15 Defendant. (2) DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE 16 TO PROCEED IN FORMA 17 PAUPERIS. 18 On June 3, 2024, Plaintiff Liam Alexander (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against 19 Defendant Chime (“Defendant”) alleging that Defendant breached an agreement and “is 20 harassing and abusing Plaintiff.” ECF No. 1 (“Complaint” or “Compl.”). Plaintiff has also 21 filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). ECF No. 2 (“Motion”). 22 When a plaintiff seeks leave to proceed IFP, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), the 23 Complaint is subject to sua sponte review and mandatory dismissal if it is “frivolous or 24 malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary 25 relief from a defendant immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Coleman v. 26 Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532, 537-38 (2015) (pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) “the court shall 27 dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . (B) the action or appeal . . . (ii) 28 fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e) “not only permits but requires a district court to 2 dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.”). “The standard for 3 determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 4 under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 5 standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 6 2012). 7 Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 8 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Dismissal is warranted under Rule 12(b)(6) where the complaint 9 lacks a cognizable legal theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 10 534 (9th Cir. 1984); see Neitzeke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989) (“Rule 12(b)(6) 11 authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law.”). 12 Alternatively, a complaint may be dismissed where it presents a cognizable legal theory 13 yet fails to plead essential facts under that theory. Robertson, 749 F.2d at 534. While a 14 plaintiff need not give “detailed factual allegations,” he must plead sufficient facts that, if 15 true, “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 16 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). 17 Here, Plaintiff fails to state a claim because the Complaint lacks a cognizable legal 18 theory and fails to plead essential facts. The entirety of the Complaint rests upon Plaintiff’s 19 assertion that Defendant breached an unidentified agreement and that Defendant “is 20 harassing and abusing Plaintiff.” Compl. at 4. However, Plaintiff fails to include any 21 additional facts or details regarding his allegations that “raise a right to relief above the 22 speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545. Without more, the Court finds that Plaintiff 23 fails to state a claim and his Complaint must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). 24 Accordingly, because Plaintiff fails to state a claim, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion 25 to proceed IFP. 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// I CONCLUSION AND ORDER 2 For all the reasons discussed above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 3 1. The Complaint as to Defendant DISMISSED without prejudice; and 4 2. Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Proceed IFP, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), is 5 DENIED. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 || DATED: June 21, 2024 Mak 10 HN A. HOUSTON JUNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28